scholarly journals Chinese Football in the Era of Xi Jinping: What do Supporters Think?

2018 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ilker Gündoğan ◽  
Albrecht Sonntag

Football has become a field of high priority for development by the central government of the People's Republic of China. After Xi Jinping took office as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in 2012, a football development strategy was launched, including four “comprehensive” reforms. The purpose of this study is to examine the perceptions of these reforms by Chinese football supporters – a fundamental stakeholder group – through an online survey. Particular emphasis was laid on how nationalistic attitudes underpin supporters' expectations, especially with regard to the concept of the “Chinese Dream.” In addition, issues of football governance were also addressed.

2014 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 29
Author(s):  
Abdullah Dahana ◽  
Kelly Rosalin

Since the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 and Deng Xiaoping in 1997, factionalism and power struggle as the characteristic of leadership change in China has ended. Although factionalism still exists, it has been converted to collaboration among all factions within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The election of Xi Jinping to the presidency of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and to the position as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is therefore, as the result of cooperation among factions. This paper discusses various challenges, including nationalism as the most serious issue faced by Xi Jinping as a leader elected through compromise.


2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 429-448
Author(s):  
Erik Durneika

The People’s Republic of China remains a multinational unitary state, where the prc Constitution expressly guarantees freedom of religion and fair treatment of ethnic minorities. The Chinese Communist Party (ccp) retains ultimate authority regarding internal and external affairs, including the selective enforcement of constitutional rights. Various ethnic groups, such as the Turkic Uighurs, have long been perceived as rebellious, while the Muslim Hui have often been treated favorably, with laxer enforcement of laws and more religious autonomy. Many attribute this “model minority” perception of the Hui to cultural similarities shared with the Han. Although the ccp continues to allow religious freedoms to the Hui, the trajectory of persecution has slightly increased due to threats of global Islamist insurgencies. Leadership under President Xi Jinping seeks to maintain its power by combating “foreign infiltration” of Islam. Party officials allow Hui to interact with Muslim countries internationally under one circumstance—beneficial business transactions.


Author(s):  
Vladilen G. Burov

On July 1, 2021, celebrations were held in Beijing on the occasion of the centenary of the formation of the Communist Party of China. Its history is full of various tragic and heroic events. After a five-year period of cooperation with the Kuomintang (the National Party of China), due to the betrayal of the latter, a fifteen-year armed struggle between the two parties for power begins, interrupted for the time of Japan's aggression against China. In 1949, the People's Republic of China was created under the leadership of the Communist Party. The period of socialist construction is replaced by the time of the “great leap forward” and the people's communes, and then by the years of “the cultural revolution”. After 1976, the country gradually begins to implement a policy of reform and openness, which continues until the present time. The Communist Party comes to its anniversary with huge achievements, China has become the second most economically powerful power in the world. The General Secretary of the Communist Party Xi Jinping made a speech at the celebrations. First of all, he recalled the time when, as a result of the opium wars, China turned into a semi-colonial, semi-feudal country and paid tribute to the memory of the revolutionaries of the older generation who ended this condition. Then he listed the majestic tasks that the Chinese state faces in the field of domestic and foreign policy. The experience of the Chinese Communists in implementing the modernization of their country attracts attention all over the world and certainly deserves to be studied.


Author(s):  
Julia Famularo

China’s counterterrorism policy in Xinjiang represents an evolving, complex, and controversial approach to managing ethno-religious tensions. Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping is using a spectrum of tactics to combat the ‘three evil forces’ of ethnic separatism, religious extremism, and violent terrorism, ranging from heavy police actions against violent elements to inducements for minorities to enjoy the purported fruits of CCP rule and assimilate into Chinese society. This chapter examines three core aspects of the Xi administration’s counterterrorism policy in Xinjiang: the influence of ideological imperatives in shaping counter-terrorism policy; the “management” of religious affairs; and the use of militarized policing and surveillance.


2020 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 164-201
Author(s):  
Avery Goldstein

China's grand strategy under Xi Jinping is clearly distinctive. It does not, however, fundamentally break with the grand strategy that China has embraced since the early 1990s—one that aims to realize what is now labeled “the dream of national rejuvenation.” Leaders in Beijing have implemented three different approaches to this strategy. In 1992, the approach to rejuvenation followed Deng Xiaoping's admonition for China to hide its capabilities and bide its time. In 1996, Beijing shifted to a more proactive approach, peaceful rise, seeking to reassure others that a stronger and wealthier China would not pose a threat. In 2012, Xi again recast the grand strategy of rejuvenation to realize the Chinese dream. His approach is distinguished by its combination of three efforts: (1) continuing earlier attempts to reassure others about the benign intentions of rising China, (2) moving China from rhetoric to action in promoting reform of an international order that has facilitated China's rise, and (3) resisting challenges to what the Chinese Communist Party defines as the country's core interests. Xi's bolder approach has further clarified China's long-standing international aspirations and triggered reactions abroad that raise doubts about the prospects for his approach to realizing the goal of national rejuvenation.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 245-274 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan R. Landsberger

On 1 October 2014, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) will observe the 65th anniversary of its founding which ended a decades’ long period of oppression by imperialism, internal strife and (civil) war. Under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), modernisation became the most important task. Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought guided the nation along this path that would lead to modernisation and the recognition of the new, strong China. As the first three decades passed, it became clear that ideological purity and revolutionary motivation did not lead to the realisation of the dream of rejuvenation. In late 1978, the Maoist revolutionary goals were replaced by the pragmatic policies that turned China into today’s economic powerhouse. How has this radical turn from revolution to economic development been realised? How has it affected China’s political, social and artistic cultures? Is China’s present Dream structurally different from the one cherished in 1949?


Since taking power in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party has consistently tried to enforce a monopoly on the writing and interpretation of history. However, since 1998 individual initiatives have increased in the field of memory. Confronting official amnesia, victims of Maoist movements have decided to write their versions of history before it is too late. This chapter presents a typology of these endeavours. Annals of the Yellow Emperor (Yanhuang chunqiu), an official publication, enjoyed some freedom to publish dissenting historical accounts but was suppressed in 2016. With the rise of the internet, unofficial journals appeared that were often dedicated to a specific period: Tie Liu’s Small traces of the Past (Wangshi weihen) published accounts of victims of the Anti-Rightist movement for almost a decade before the editor was arrested; Wu Di’s Remembrance (Jiyi) founded by former Red Guards and rusticated youth circulates on line. The third type is the samizdat: targets of repression during Mao’s reign recount their experience in books that are published at their own expense and circulated privately. Most of these “entrepreneurs of memory” are convinced that restoring historical truth is a pre-requisite to China’s democratization. Since Xi Jinping came to power, they have suffered repression.


2012 ◽  
Vol 04 (02) ◽  
pp. 45-52
Author(s):  
Gang CHEN

Since Hu Jintao became the General Secretary of the Party in 2002, the Party's Politburo has been convening monthly group study sessions conducted by professors and researchers. This indicates a change in China's policy-making process from strongman domination to consensus-seeking, through sharing information and discussions. Speakers lecture on domestic affairs and share developed countries' experience. Priority is given to economic issues, followed by political/ideological and social issues, and lastly, military issues and international relations.


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