Innovation in a Hybrid System: The Example of Nepal

Author(s):  
Lukas Heckendorn Urscheler

The Nepali legal tradition is a legal hybrid in many regards. Nepal was not colonised by a Western state, and the Hindu legal tradition therefore dominated all areas of law until the middle of the 20th century. Since the 1950s there has been a strong influence of Indian common law. It is probably for this reason that comparative classifications that include Nepal see the legal system as a mixture of common law and customary law. However, other mixtures mark the Nepali legal tradition. French law inspired the ruler in the 19th century, and that influence can still be found in the formal law. In addition, the plurality of Nepalese society made it necessary to provide space for different customary regimes to coexist with the formal Hindu law. When it comes to innovations within the legal system, including international law, the different ingredients interact.In family-related matters, the case-law of the Nepali Supreme Court illustrates the confrontation between international legal standards and the traditional rules. The Supreme Court has referred to the culturally conditioned discrimination against women and called for a thorough (political) analysis in order to eliminate discrimination without a radical change of culture. In the area of discrimination against homo- and transsexuals the Supreme Court took a more innovative approach. It remains to be seen, however, if such a change is effective beyond the courtroom.In the area of private financial compensation for wrongs, the formal (written) Nepali law does not have a general concept of tort. Compensation is generally integrated within the ambit of criminal law. Field research indicates that it would be possible to resort to existing customary principles of compensation rather than to the relatively complex common law of torts favoured by some Nepali scholars. However, this approach might not be without difficulty, as it might imply admitting the “superiority” of the customary practices of ethnic groups of lower standing in society.The example of Nepal shows that innovation in a hybrid system is often marked by the difficulty of – at least apparently – contradictory elements and layers of the legal system. There might be a tendency towards choosing the dominant or the most easily accessible solution. This paper suggests that the hybrid nature of the legal system offers opportunities that could be taken in order to achieve effective change and appropriate solutions.

Author(s):  
Lukas Heckendorn Urscheler

The Nepali legal tradition is a legal hybrid in many regards. Nepal was not colonised by a Western state, and the Hindu legal tradition therefore dominated all areas of law until the middle of the 20th century. Since the 1950s there has been a strong influence of Indian common law. It is probably for this reason that comparative classifications that include Nepal see the legal system as a mixture of common law and customary law. However, other mixtures mark the Nepali legal tradition. French law inspired the ruler in the 19th century, and that influence can still be found in the formal law. In addition, the plurality of Nepalese society made it necessary to provide space for different customary regimes to coexist with the formal Hindu law. When it comes to innovations within the legal system, including international law, the different ingredients interact. In family-related matters, the case-law of the Nepali Supreme Court illustrates the confrontation between international legal standards and the traditional rules. The Supreme Court has referred to the culturally conditioned discrimination against women and called for a thorough (political) analysis in order to eliminate discrimination without a radical change of culture. In the area of discrimination against homo- and transsexuals the Supreme Court took a more innovative approach. It remains to be seen, however, if such a change is effective beyond the courtroom. In the area of private financial compensation for wrongs, the formal (written) Nepali law does not have a general concept of tort. Compensation is generally integrated within the ambit of criminal law. Field research indicates that it would be possible to resort to existing customary principles of compensation rather than to the relatively complex common law of torts favoured by some Nepali scholars. However, this approach might not be without difficulty, as it might imply admitting the “superiority” of the customary practices of ethnic groups of lower standing in society. The example of Nepal shows that innovation in a hybrid system is often marked by the difficulty of – at least apparently – contradictory elements and layers of the legal system. There might be a tendency towards choosing the dominant or the most easily accessible solution. This paper suggests that the hybrid nature of the legal system offers opportunities that could be taken in order to achieve effective change and appropriate solutions.


1987 ◽  
Vol 31 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 70-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel K. B. Asante

On 1976, Ghana celebrated the centenary of the establishment of its Supreme Court. But this was more than a centenary of a supreme court. It was in fact the celebration of a hundred years of a national legal system. During the past century, Ghana has operated a pluralistic legal system encompassing English and other Western juristic ideas and procedures on the one hand, and Ghana's own indigenous laws on the other. The burden of this paper is to undertake an appraisal of the efficacy of this legal heritage and to consider the challenge which this legacy poses. The emphasis is not so much on the historical or analytical description of the nation's legal heritage as on a functional review of the totality of Ghana's legal experience in the light of the prevailing social and economic conditions. More precisely, to what extent have the Ghanaian courts and legislative bodies succeeded in moulding both the received law and the indigenous customary law to respond to the pressing social and economic needs of the country? Is there in fact a peculiarly Ghanaian legal tradition?The first Supreme Court was established in 1853, but its jurisdiction was confined to the coastal settlements and it could not pretend to be a national institution. The modern Ghanaian legal system was inaugurated by the Supreme Court Ordinance, 1876, which not only established a national judicial system but also prescribed the law and procedure to be applied in this court system.


Author(s):  
Fatahuddin Aziz Siregar

The South Tapanuli community adopts a patrilineal kinship system so that women do not get inheritance, even if there is acquisition of property, women receive it not in their capacity as heirs but in the form of holong ni ate as confirmed in the Supreme Court Jurisprudence number 506K / Sip / 1968 dated January 22, 1969 However, on the other hand the Tapsel community underwent a process of Islamization that was quite deep, so that the customary law of South Tapanuli was also influenced by positive law including Jurisprudence which gave heir to girls later issued by the Supreme Court number 528K / Sip / 1972 dated 17 January 1973. This rule makes the practice of distributing the assets of Tapsel's community inheritance also shifts no longer according to the full provisions of adat law.This paper focuses on answering the factors that cause the shift in Batak customary inheritance in Tapsel, how the form of Batak adat inheritance shifts in Tapsel, and how the role of Islamic law in the shifting Batak customary inheritance in Tapsel. To answer this, use descriptive-analytical field research using data collection techniques in the form of observations and interviews with traditional leaders, religious leaders, judges and the community who carry out the distribution of inheritance.From this search, the authors found that the practice of inheritance in Tapsel society has shifted from adat inheritance caused by two factors, namely, First, the factor of Islamic law because Tapsel people have understood Islam well and run it in various fields of life including in the distribution of inheritance. Given that there are dozens of Islamic education institutions in Tapsel according to the author has given a pretty good understanding of Islamic law. So in general it can be said, that this change is a consequence of the Islamization process experienced by the Tapsel people. Second, is the factor of higher power or positive law because until now the community still believes that only the Religious Courts as a place to solve the problem of inheritance to obtain legal certainty.The shift to adat inheritance occurs in several patterns. The first pattern is a total change from customary form to division according to faraid, this pattern occurs in areas that are fairly Islamic, namely the Mandailing Natal region, although of course there are some people who divide in a way that is not consistent in carrying out Islamic law. The second pattern is to carry out adat law, namely in communities that are relatively strict with adat, namely in the Padang Lawas and Sipirok regions, in this area many cases seem to have carried out faraid formally but the substance still reflects the spirit of adat law. The third pattern, namely the way of division which is a combination of Islamic law and customary law, which is a fairly moderate community in the Angkola region.Islamic law has contributed by shifting the implementation of customary law to Islamic law. People who according to customary law do not receive inheritance become heirs who receive a certain portion. At first the mother did not count as an heir, then given a part 1/3 or 1/6. Istdri initially did not get any portion of the inheritance then received 1/4 or 1/8. Girls initially only have the status of olong ate, then receive a relatively large portion, which is 1/2 or 2/3.


1969 ◽  
pp. 299 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julianne Parfett

The common law has historically defined self- incrimination narrowly. Using Packer's models of the criminal justice system as a framework, the article examines the Supreme Court of Canada's interpretations of s. 24(2) of the Charter. The Court has expanded the definitions of both self incrimination and remoteness. The author argues that s. 24(2) has ceased to be a remedy requiring the balancing of interests and has become a quasi- automatic rule of exclusion, which promotes individual rights at the cost of victim's rights. Further, in the Court's zeal to protect the integrity of the system, there is no allowance made for the seriousness of the breach, the consequences of the exclusion, or the causal connection between the breach and any evidence obtained. The author argues that this has resulted in a justice system more concerned with police behaviour than with the pursuit of truth. Instead, either the exclusionary rule must be used to foster a balance of individual and communitarian rights, or other more imaginative remedies should be crafted from s. 24(2) to protect the integrity of the legal system.


2006 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 76-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nurit Tsafrir

AbstractIn this article I describe various aspects of the complex link between the Israeli legal system and the Arab customary institution of sulha (an agreement for peaceful settlement of a dispute). On the basis of contemporary decisions of the Supreme Court and the District Courts in Israel, I argue that a sulha agreement between an accused and his victim (or the victim's family) often influences the judges' decisions during criminal proceedings against the former. This influence tends to work in favor of the accused—mainly in decisions about detention and sentencing—but when a sulha agreement affects the verdict, it tends to work against the accused. The weight attached to the sulha by the court has some problematic aspects: it may cause the accused to force a sulha agreement upon his victim and lead to perversion of the course of justice.


2011 ◽  
Vol 15 (1, 2 & 3) ◽  
pp. 2006
Author(s):  
Ailbhe O'Neill

The question of the temporal effect of a finding that a statute is unconstitutional has arisen in a number of common law jurisdictions. In any legal system that allows its superior courts to strike down legislation, certain practical problems will inevitably emerge. This article explains this aspect of Irish constitutional interpretation and compares the manner in which these difficulties have been addressed under the Canadian and Irish constitutions. It notes that the Supreme Court of Canada was required to address these practical problems directly at an early stage and thus developed a more doctrinally coherent approach to findings of constitutional invalidity than the Irish Supreme Court. The article goes on to analyze a recent decision of the Irish Supreme Court that has highlighted the difficulties with the approach adopted in that legal system and concludes with some reflections on the relative merits of the Canadian approach to findings of invalidity.


Author(s):  
Vladimir Jilkine

The article deals with the basis and procedure for review of court decisions that have entered into force, after the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights on violations of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in review of the cases by the Supreme Court of Finland, in connection with the decision by which the applicant appealed to The European Court of Human Rights. The author’s analysis and comparison of judicial practice and the European legal system shows that when making decisions, the Supreme Court applies current national constitutional and legislative provisions.


2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sipho Stephen Nkosi

The note is about the appeal lodged by the late Mrs Winnie Madikizela-Mandela to the SCA against the decision of the Eastern Cape High Court, Mthatha, dismissing her application for review in 2014. In that application, she sought to have reviewed the decision of the Minister of Land Affairs, to transfer the now extended and renovated Qunu property to Mr Mandela and to register it in his name. Because her application was out of time, she also applied for condonation of her delay in making the application. The court a quo dismissed both applications with costs, holding that there had been an undue delay on her part. Mrs Mandela then approached the Supreme Court of Appeal, for special leave to appeal the decision of the court a quo. Two questions fell for decision by the SCA: whether there was an unreasonable and undue delay on Mrs Mandela’s part in instituting review proceedings; and whether the order for costs was appropriate in the circumstances of the case. The SCA held that there was indeed an unreasonable delay (of seventeen years). Shongwe AP (with Swain, Mathopo JJA, Mokgothloa and Rodgers AJJA concurring) held that the fact that there had been an undue delay does not necessarily mean that an order for costs should, of necessity, particularly where, as in this case, the other litigant is the state. It is the writer’s view that two other ancillary points needed to be raised by counsel and pronounced on by the Court: (a) the lawfulness and regularity of the transfer of the Qunu property to Mr Mandela; and (b) Mrs Mandela’s status as a customary-law widow—in relation to Mr Mandela.


Author(s):  
Anicée Van Engeland

This chapter considers the extent to which Islamic governance can integrate international humanitarian law (IHL) into its own legal system by examining the case of Iran. It addresses the consequences of the emergence of an Islamic-universal hybrid legal system. The stakes are high because IHL’s efficiency and necessity have been questioned: The existence of the Iranian hybrid system of law can be perceived as a threat by scholars arguing that international law is at risk of fragmentation due to the variety of domestic and regional approaches to fundamental legal standards. The importance of those stakes is illustrated by the Iran-Iraq War: The process of mixing a universal secular legal system with a religious domestic law occurred at a crucial time when Iran was at war with Iraq, with clear effects on the protection of civilians and the conduct of hostilities.


2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-50
Author(s):  
Poku Adusei

This article provides comprehensive insights into the study of the Ghana legal system as an academic discipline in the law faculties in Ghana. It urges the view that the study of the Ghana legal system, as an academic discipline, should be transsystemic. Transsystemic pedagogy consists in the introduction of ideas, structures and principles which may be drawn from different legal traditions such as civil law, common law, religion-based law, African law and socialist law traditions to influence the study of law. Transsystemia involves teaching law ‘across,’ ‘through,’ and ‘beyond’ disciplinary fixations associated with a particular legal system. It is a mode of scholarship that defies biased allegiance to one legal tradition in order to foster cross-cultural dialogue among legal traditions. It involves a study of law that re-directs focus from one concerned with ‘pure’ legal system to a discourse that is grounded on multiple legal traditions.


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