scholarly journals Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency

2018 ◽  
pp. 97-130
Author(s):  
Denzenlkham Ulambayar

Since the 1990s, when previously classified and top secret Russian archival documents on the Korean War became open and accessible, it has become clear for post-communist countries that Kim Il Sung, Stalin and Mao Zedong were the primary organizers of the war. It is now equally certain that tensions arising from Soviet and American struggle generated the origins of the Korean War, namely the Soviet Union’s occupation of the northern half of the Korean peninsula and the United States’ occupation of the southern half to the 38th parallel after 1945 as well as the emerging bipolar world order of international relations and Cold War. Newly available Russian archival documents produced much in the way of new energies and opportunities for international study and research into the Korean War.2 However, within this research few documents connected to Mongolia have so far been found, and little specific research has yet been done regarding why and how Mongolia participated in the Korean War. At the same time, it is becoming today more evident that both Soviet guidance and U.S. information reports (evaluated and unevaluated) regarding Mongolia were far different from the situation and developments of that period. New examples of this tendency are documents declassified in the early 2000s and released publicly from the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in December 2016 which contain inaccurate information. The original, uncorrupted sources about why, how and to what degree the Mongolian People’s Republic (MPR) became a participant in the Korean War are in fact in documents held within the Mongolian Central Archives of Foreign Affairs. These archives contain multiple documents in relation to North Korea. Prior to the 1990s Mongolian scholars Dr. B. Lkhamsuren,3 Dr. B. Ligden,4 Dr. Sh. Sandag,5 junior scholar J. Sukhee,6 and A. A. Osipov7 mention briefly in their writings the history of relations between the MPR and the DPRK during the Korean War. Since the 1990s the Korean War has also briefly been touched upon in the writings of B. Lkhamsuren,8 D. Ulambayar (the author of this paper),9 Ts. Batbayar,10 J. Battur,11 K. Demberel,12 Balảzs Szalontai,13 Sergey Radchenko14 and Li Narangoa.15 There have also been significant collections of documents about the two countries and a collection of memoirs published in 200716 and 2008.17 The author intends within this paper to discuss particularly about why, how and to what degree Mongolia participated in the Korean War, the rumors and realities of the war and its consequences for the MPR’s membership in the United Nations. The MPR was the second socialist country following the Soviet Union (the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics) to recognize the DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) and establish diplomatic ties. That was part of the initial stage of socialist system formation comprising the Soviet Union, nations in Eastern Europe, the MPR, the PRC (People’s Republic of China) and the DPRK. Accordingly between the MPR and the DPRK fraternal friendship and a framework of cooperation based on the principles of proletarian and socialist internationalism had been developed.18 In light of and as part of this framework, The Korean War has left its deep traces in the history of the MPR’s external diplomatic environment and state sovereignty


Author(s):  
Shawn M. Powers ◽  
Michael Jablonski

This chapter examines the emergence of an Information-Industrial Complex in the United States, tracking the rise of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and the modern knowledge economy. It first outlines the origins and history of Information-Industrial Complex's antecedent, the Military-Industrial Complex, before turning to the beginnings of the Information-Industrial Complex itself. It then considers how the U.S. government has cultivated a close and codependent relationship with companies involved in information production, storage, processing, and distribution, referred to as the “information industries.” It also looks at In-Q-Tel, a corporation that would “ensure that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) remains at the cutting edge of information technology advances and capabilities,” along with the rise of information assurance after 9/11. The chapter concludes by highlighting the commodification of digital information in the post-9/11 environment through its securitization.


Author(s):  
Simon Willmetts

At the end of the Second World War, the OSS were swiftly disbanded. In response, OSS chief William “Wild Bill” Donovan launched a massive public relations campaign to celebrate the wartime activities of his agency and to advocate for the establishment of a permanent central intelligence agency. Hollywood, perhaps unsurprisingly given the extensive links between American filmmakers and the OSS, played an important part in mythologizing the OSS in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War and in so doing helped make the case for the creation of the CIA.


Author(s):  
James N. Green

The Opening the Archives Digital Collection on the history of US–Brazilian relations contains 50,000 documents about the two countries during the Brazilian military dictatorship (1964–1985) at the height of the Cold War. Student researchers, under the leadership of James N. Green, Professor of Brazilian History and Culture at Brown University, have scanned and indexed thousands of records from the presidential libraries of John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, Richard M. Nixon, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan, as well as from the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Defense Department, among other institutions and organizations. This digital archive affords researchers access to U.S. sources that register the decisions of Washington policymakers as they responded to the rise of radicalism in the early 1960s and the establishment of an authoritarian regime in 1964, which lasted twenty-one years. Materials include documentation on U.S. economic and military aid programs, analyses of the political situation in Brazil, and evaluations of the opposition to the generals in power. Other archives record U.S. labor organizations’ programs directed toward Brazilian trade unions. A collection of dossiers registering information on high-ranking Brazilian military officers, which was compiled by the U.S. Defense Department, provides insights into the relations between the Pentagon and the Brazilian Armed Forces. With the ultimate goal of publishing 100,000 records, the project reflects Brown University’s deep commitment to fostering collaborative relationships in international research projects while strengthening the university’s goal of becoming a leading center for the study of Brazil in the United States. Designed to give universal open access to these archives for researchers, the project is sponsored by Brown University Libraries in partnership with the State University of Maringá, Paraná, and Bem-te-vi Diversidade in São Paulo.


Author(s):  
Betsy Konefal

Guatemala is stunningly beautiful and rich in geographic and cultural diversity. The country also has had a long history of oppression, ethnic discrimination, and violence, resistance, and rebellion. Historical legacies loom large and continue to shape lives and possibilities, but Guatemalans share in a culture of resilience and a remarkable ability to find joy in the present. The early republic took shape amid Latin America’s familiar struggles between liberal and conservative ideologies. After two years as part of Mexico (1821–1823) and then as the capital of an unstable, Liberal-led Central American federation, an independent Guatemala emerged under Conservative-backed Rafael Carrera, who dominated the nation for a quarter-century beginning in 1840. Liberals prospered with the growth of coffee after 1860, gaining national power in 1871. So-called Liberal dictatorships during the next seven decades (except for an important reformist interruption in the 1920s) solidified Guatemala’s agro-export model and opened the door to the Boston-based United Fruit Company, which created a powerful banana enclave. Between coffee and fruit, peasants and workers suffered land loss and labor coercion in the highlands where most of the country’s Maya majority lived and in lowland plantations where workers (Mayas and “Ladinos,” as non-Mayas are known) produced fruit, sugar, and cotton under onerous conditions. In 1944, reformists overthrew dictator Jorge Ubico, opening the way to Guatemala’s first democratic governments. The Arévalo and Árbenz presidencies brought changes in labor laws, voting rights, education, and, in 1952, land tenure. The agrarian reform law encouraged the distribution of fallow portions of the nation’s largest landholdings. The mobilization that the law spurred and fierce backlash it provoked prompted Árbenz’s ouster in 1954 in a coup orchestrated by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), intervening in the name of anti-Communism. US-backed military dictatorships followed almost uninterrupted for the next thirty years, and a guerrilla oppositional insurgency began in 1960. The thirty-six-year war resulted in about 200,000 people killed, an estimated 83 percent of them Maya civilians. A truth commission found state forces to be responsible for 93 percent of killings, including genocidal army massacres of entire communities. The government and guerrilla forces signed an agreement in 1996 bringing an end to the war. The postwar era has been fraught and unsettled, with underlying causes of conflict unresolved; however, much has changed. A new “multiculturalism” is the norm, with at least lip service paid to the rights of Guatemalan Mayas, and a vocal civil society works openly and vigorously to insist on a government accountable to its citizens.


1989 ◽  
Vol 83 (4) ◽  
pp. 795-805
Author(s):  
Lori Fisler Damrosch

As the Constitution begins its third century, the system of congressional oversight of covert action is only in its second decade. In the ancient history of covert action—before the intelligence oversight reforms of the 1970s—Congress did not involve itself in covert operations. After giving the Central Intelligence Agency standing authority to “perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct,” Congress paid little attention to what the Executive did under this authority. The era of congressional noninvolvement came to an end with the Watergate disclosures of intelligence activities that many Americans found reprehensible, the ensuing investigations into assassination attempts and other controversial covert actions, and the adoption of a new statutory framework for congressional oversight of the intelligence agencies.


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