Brexit Diplomacy, Trump, and the uk’s “Special Relationship” with the United States

Diplomatica ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 113-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Klaus Larres

The much-praised “special relationship” between the US and the UK has had little, if any, relevance for President Donald Trump. After the Brexit referendum of June 2016 Prime Minister Theresa May and many of the “Brexiteers” in the Conservative Party hoped that a rejuvenation of relations with the U.S., perhaps by means of free trade treaty, would counter-balance any loss of political and economic influence due to the UK’s departure from the European Union. Some of Trump’s rhetoric seemed to indicate this. He repeatedly praised the country for its desire to get back “its sovereignty” and “control over its borders.” In reality Trump was so focused on the realization of his “America First” policy that it was unlikely that he would be inclined to grant any special favors or generous trade terms to the UK, “special relationship” or not.

Author(s):  
Nicholas Allen

This chapter charts the story of the Conservatives in government between 2015 and 2017. It examines why David Cameron called a referendum on Britain’s membership of the European Union, why Theresa May succeeded him as prime minister, and why May decided to call a snap election in the spring of 2017. It locates these decisions against deep and bitter divisions within the Conservative party over the issue of EU membership, and further examines the broader record of the Conservatives in government. Above all, it seeks to explain how both prime ministers both came to gamble their fortunes on the electorate – and lose.


2019 ◽  
Vol 47 (02) ◽  
pp. 105-117
Author(s):  
Jason Jacobs

AbstractWeaponization of state-backed, foreign investments by China is an emerging national security threat in the United States and the European Union. The U.S. and E.U. have espoused similar policy goals—to address the threat without closing their markets to foreign direct investment—while fostering increased cooperation between allied partners in screening transactions.On the surface, the recent, China-specific measures taken by the U.S. and the investment screening framework adopted by the E.U. appear reflective of an alignment of those policy goals. Indeed, many commentators have suggested that is exactly what is happening. However, closer examination reveals a stark divergence. The U.S. has a robust screening mechanism that has evolved into a weapon of economic warfare. The E.U. meanwhile, remains a patchwork of conflicting—or nonexistent—national regulations overlaid by a comparatively toothless investment screening framework.There is a tendency to attribute this divergence to structural differences between the United States and European Union. This in-depth comparison of U.S. and E.U. investment screening mechanisms exposes a split that goes beyond application and into actual policy. This revelation should temper expectations that the E.U. is equipping itself to block transactions that are of concern to the U.S.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Jeffery Atik ◽  
Xavier Groussot

The U.S.-EU conflict over the application of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) to U.S.-based digital platform companies is marked by a startling legal development: the insertion of a constitutional court squarely into the heart of the dispute. The engagement of the EU’s top court - the Court of Justice (CJEU) - in the Schrems I and Schrems II cases - has significantly inflamed the dispute. The CJEU has now twice struck down GDPR accommodations reached between the United States and the European Union. In doing so, the Court has rebuked both U.S. and EU officials. By transfiguring provisions of the GDPR with constitutional (that is, treaty-based) and human rights values, the Court has placed out of reach any accommodation that does not involve significant reform of U.S. privacy and national security provisions. Heated trans-Atlantic disputes involving assertions of extraterritorial extensions of regulatory power is an inappropriate place for a constitutional court like the CJEU to throw its declarative weight around. 


2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-15
Author(s):  
Rita De Sousa Costa ◽  
Tiago Sérgio Cabral

2016 was marked by the rise of populism and isolationism around the world. The European Union is losing a Member State for the first time, after the British voted to leave in their “Brexit” referendum. Across the Atlantic, Donald Trump was elected President of the United States, causing concern amongst European leaders. In the remaining Member States, populist and Eurosceptic political forces are becoming more relevant, further endangering the integrity of the European Union. In this paper, we analyse the motives behind the European Union’s “existential crisis”, which is arguably, one of the most significant challenges the EU will face in its near future. We conclude that the European Union must reform in order to regain their citizens’ trust and reinforce democracy.


Author(s):  
Ned Kock ◽  
Pedro Antunes

Much of the funding for research and development initiatives in the area of e-collaboration comes from government agencies in various countries. Government funding of e-collaboration research in the European Union (EU) and the United States (U.S.), in particular, seems to be experiencing steady growth in recent years. In the EU, a key initiative to promote governmental investment in e-collaboration research is the Collaboration@Work initiative. This initiative is one of the EU’s Information Society Technologies Directorate General’s main priorities. In the U.S., government investment in e-collaboration research is channeled through several government branches and organizations, notably the National Science Foundation. There are key differences in the approaches used for government funding of e-collaboration research in the EU and U.S. Among other differences, the EU model appears to foster research that is aligned with the action research tradition, whereas the U.S. model places emphasis on research that is better aligned with the experimental research tradition.


2013 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 443-464
Author(s):  
Christa Altenstetter

The literature on the regulation of drugs at the FDA and the European Union is substantial, yet little research has provided comparative analyses and robust empirical data on the regulation of medical devices in the United States and the European Union. As medical and health markets become increasingly globalized, and the U.S. and the EU compete for leadership and recognition, salient domestic regulatory issues are becoming increasingly international and transnational policy issues. Building on Carpenter's (2010) work on drug regulation at the FDA, but taking a slightly narrower yet at the same time a broader approach by drawing on interdisciplinary studies instead of limiting ourselves to only the Political Science literature, this comparison focuses on key aspects of risk regulation and governance of medical devices in the U.S. and the EU, and shows how and why individual and organizational learning is imperative in each case.


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-107
Author(s):  
Jonathan Wyatt

Written in early 2017, in the aftermath of the United Kingdom's vote in June 2016 to leave the European Union and the election, in November of that year, of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency, this brief article argues for an activist scholarly ethic. The author calls himself and the qualitative inquiry community to (re)commit to urgent political and moral intent.


2006 ◽  
Vol 36 (144) ◽  
pp. 381-395
Author(s):  
Guglielmo Carchedi

This essay examines whether the European Union, already the most powerful economic and financial rival of the United States, can develop its military arm to a level compatible with its economic and financial weight. It concludes by suggesting a parallel between European currency and the European military. The ECU started as virtual money that evolved into the Euro to become a real danger for the U.S. dollar. At this point, the nascent EU army is only a potential threat to a still unchallenged U.S. military power, but a parallel and ominous evolution is under way.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sudha N. Setty

Published: Sudha Setty, The President's Private Dictionary: How Secret Definitions Undermine Domestic and Transnational Efforts at Executive Branch Accountability, 24 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 513 (2017)..The 2016 EU-U.S. Privacy Shield is an agreement allowing companies to move customer data between the European Union and the United States without running afoul of heightened privacy protections in the European Union. It was developed in response to EU concerns that the privacy rights of its citizens have been systematically abrogated by the U.S. government in the name of national security, and contains a variety of assurances that the United States will respect and protect the privacy rights of EU citizens.How trustworthy are the U.S. assurances under the Privacy Shield? Both the Bush and Obama administrations secretly interpreted the terms of treaties, statutes and regulations in a manner that allowed them to take controversial actions, keep those actions secret, and later invoke national security to defend the legality of those actions if they became public. In cases involving torture, bulk data collection, and targeted killing, these administrations did so despite the common and objective understanding of applicable legal constraints not providing authorization for the very actions that they claimed were legal.It remains an open question as to whether the Trump administration will interpret the Privacy Shield in a similarly misleading manner: one in which public assurances suggest compliance with the Privacy Shield’s constraints, but the administration’s private interpretation of the Privacy Shield secretly breaches EU privacy protections. This paper considers possible ways to constrain the executive branch from relying on secret interpretations that would undermine the Privacy Shield’s transnational attempts at accountability


Author(s):  
Alexander Shumilin ◽  

The very phrase «Euro-Atlantic solidarity» primarily presupposes an appeal to the foreign policy activities of the states of North America (USA and Canada) and the European Union. A priori, it is aimed at coordinating national and global strategies designed to determine the relations of the countries of this community with the outside world. Most analysts agree that it was this solidarity that was the first and perhaps the biggest and most sensitive victim of the Donald Trump administration's policies. The author of the article believes that after the 45th president leaves the White House, transatlantic solidarity will receive a tangible impetus for its renewal. While maintaining its basic foundations in the form of liberal-democratic values, however, relations between the two shores of the Atlantic are likely to be restructured in a somewhat different paradigm than before. During the Trump presidency, both the United States and Western Europe have practically formed two visions of the correctness of the foundations of transatlantic solidarity. In some aspects, they coincide, while in others they may diverge.


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