Attack Decision-Making

Author(s):  
Geoffrey S. Corn

Proportionality is one of the most important civilian protection rules in the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). In an era when combat almost always occurs in areas with substantial civilian populations, the proportionality rule is critical to protecting civilians and civilian property from the incidental and collateral consequences of attacks directed at otherwise lawful targets. The proportionality rule, however, prohibits attacks against otherwise lawful military objectives only when the attacker anticipates that civilian casualties or destruction to civilian property will be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated from the attack. Application of the proportionality rule has triggered ongoing debates over the meaning of its constituent terms: What is a military advantage? How is military advantage to be valued? What qualifies as a concrete and direct advantage? When does the knowing infliction of civilian harm qualify as excessive? Considering criminal accountability adds another layer of complexity: What is the proper standard of assessing criminal responsibility based on a violation of this obligation? This chapter explores the relationship between the duty of obedience and the implementation of the proportionality obligation at the tactical level. Given that deliberate attack planning and dynamic targeting arise in different operational contexts, each requires a different implementation focus.

Author(s):  
Tsvetelina van Benthem

Abstract This article examines the redirection of incoming missiles when employed by defending forces to whom obligations to take precautions against the effects of attacks apply. The analysis proceeds in four steps. In the first step, the possibility of redirection is examined from an empirical standpoint. Step two defines the contours of the obligation to take precautions against the effects of attacks. Step three considers one variant of redirection, where a missile is redirected back towards the adversary. It is argued that such acts of redirection would fulfil the definition of attack under the law of armed conflict, and that prima facie conflicts of obligations could be avoided through interpretation of the feasibility standard embedded in the obligation to take precautions against the effects of attacks. Finally, step four analyzes acts of redirection against persons under the control of the redirecting State. Analyzing this scenario calls for an inquiry into the relationship between the relevant obligations under international humanitarian law and human rights law.


1999 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 613-624 ◽  
Author(s):  
Terry Gill

The 1996 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion of the International Court has been both hailed and criticized on various grounds. However, one area, namely the Court's treatment of the distinction between the law regulating the use of force and the humanitarian law of armed conflict, has received relatively little attention. This author is convinced and concerned that the Court's treatment of this issue misconstrued the relationship between these two branches of the law, and in doing so potentially weakened any restraining influence the law of armed conflict might have on the potential use of nuclear weapons.


Author(s):  
Fleck Dieter ◽  
Klappe Ben F

This chapter summarizes key issues for Visiting Forces as relevant for judge advocates, government civilian attorneys, and military legal advisors. The presence of one State’s military forces in another State’s territory raises significant issues about the relationship between those states. Sending States will desire to assert their control over their armed forces during the deployment, while Receiving States will desire to assert their sovereign control over their territory. It is the combined effort of states to balance such interests for mutual security benefits that forms the object and purpose of the law of Visiting Forces. The law of Visiting Forces focuses on aspects of the peacetime presence of a Sending State’s armed forces within the territory of a Receiving State. Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2011, states have increasingly conducted military activities in complex circumstances that may also implicate the law of armed conflict.


2010 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 52-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geoffrey Corn

AbstractOne of the most complex contemporary debates related to the regulation of armed conflict is the relationship between international humanitarian law (or the law of armed conflict) and international human rights law. Since human rights experts first began advocating for the complementary application of these two bodies of law, there has been a steady march of human rights application into an area formerly subject to the exclusive regulation of the law of armed conflict (LOAC). While the legal aspects of this debate are both complex and fascinating, like all areas of conflict regulation the outcome must ultimately produce guidelines that can be translated into an effective operational framework for war-fighters. In an era of an already complex and often confused battle space, there can be little tolerance for adding complexity and confusion to the rules that war-fighters must apply in the execution of their missions. Instead, clarity is essential to aid them in navigating this complexity. This article will explore this debate from a military operational perspective. It asserts the invalidity of extreme views in this complementarity debate, and that the inevitable invocation of human rights obligations in the context of armed conflict necessitates a careful assessment of where symmetry between these two sources of law is operationally logical and where that logic dissipates.


Author(s):  
Judith Gardam

This chapter describes the history of the law of armed conflict and its relevance to women. The law of armed conflict has not been heavily scrutinized by feminists but its provisions offer feminists many challenges. This chapter explores how, despite theoretically seeming to benefit women, these provisions from assumptions around combatancy status to civilian protection depict a gendered vision of women, reinforce destructive gender stereotypes, and fail to address systemic gender discrimination. The chapter concludes by exploring feminist encounters with the law of armed conflict and the extent to which protections for women in situations of armed conflict have improved over time. It also describes challenges that lie ahead and provides suggestions for feminist scholarship to probe further.


2007 ◽  
Vol 89 (866) ◽  
pp. 373-393 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marko Milanovic

AbstractThe article examines and compares two recent judgments which provide some of the most valuable examples of the difficulties surrounding the application of international humanitarian law to the phenomenon of terrorism: the Hamdan judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States, and the Targeted Killings judgment of the Supreme Court of Israel. Both judgments deal with the thresholds of applicability of the law of armed conflict, as well as with the concept of unlawful combatancy and the relationship between human rights law and humanitarian law. Both judgments are at times inconsistent and lacking in analysis, with the Hamdan judgment in particular misinterpreting the relevant international authorities, including the Commentaries on the Geneva Conventions. Despite these flaws, or because of them, both of these judgments remain instructive. The purpose of this article is to present the lessons for the future that these two decisions might bring to ongoing debates on the impact of global terrorism on the law of armed conflict.


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