7. The Right To Life And The Relationship Between Human Rights And Humanitarian Law

2010 ◽  
pp. 121-150 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carla Ferstman

This chapter considers the consequences of breaches of human rights and international humanitarian law for the responsible international organizations. It concentrates on the obligations owed to injured individuals. The obligation to make reparation arises automatically from a finding of responsibility and is an obligation of result. I analyse who has this obligation, to whom it is owed, and what it entails. I also consider the right of individuals to procedures by which they may vindicate their right to a remedy and the right of access to a court that may be implied from certain human rights treaties. In tandem, I consider the relationship between those obligations and individuals’ rights under international law. An overarching issue is how the law of responsibility intersects with the specialized regimes of human rights and international humanitarian law and particularly, their application to individuals.


Author(s):  
William A. Schabas

This chapter examines the rules and principles of the international humanitarian law (IHL) governing the right to life. It discusses the origins and scope of the right to life and clarifies that the protection provided by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) does not cease in times of war. It also considers some widely-recognized exceptions to or limitations upon the right to life, including killing in self-defence and the lethal use of force by the authorities in order to prevent crime. This chapter argues that while resorting to armed force may be necessary to prevent human rights violations, its benefits should not be exaggerated.


2018 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-259 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kosuke Onishi

This article advocates limiting the permissive impact of military necessity on the right to life. It has been argued that military necessity justifies deviations from international human rights law (IHRL) because this body of law is inadequate to deal with the necessities arising out of armed conflict. The article argues that while this rationale is convincing, it should not mean that conduct that is lawful under humanitarian law is necessarily also lawful under human rights law. The degree of force that may be used under international humanitarian law (IHL) is often superfluous. In some instances such violence is tempered by thejus ad bellum, but this body of law does not apply in internal non-international armed conflict (NIAC). The article concludes by exploring the potential for IHRL to play a role in tempering superfluous violence in NIAC that is similar to that whichjus ad bellumplays in international conflict.


2012 ◽  
Vol 94 (885) ◽  
pp. 267-315 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth Watkin

AbstractThis article explores the law governing the maintenance of public order and safety during belligerent occupation. Given the potential for widespread violence associated with international armed conflict, such as occurred in 2003–2004 in Iraq, it is inevitable that military and police forces will be engaged in activities that interface and overlap. Human-rights-based norms governing law enforcement, such as the right to life, are found in humanitarian law, permitting an application of both law enforcement and conduct of hostilities norms under that body of law. This results in the simultaneous application of these norms through both humanitarian and human rights law, which ultimately enhances the protection of inhabitants of the occupied territory.


2006 ◽  
Vol 88 (864) ◽  
pp. 881-904 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louise Doswald-Beck

AbstractThis article describes the relevant interpretation of the right to life by human rights treaty bodies and analyses how this might influence the law relating to the use of force in armed conflicts and occupations where international humanitarian law is unclear. The concurrent applicability of international humanitarian law and human rights law to hostilities in armed conflict does not mean that the right to life must, in all situations, be interpreted in accordance with the provisions of international humanitarian law. The author submits that the human rights law relating to the right to life is suitable to supplement the rules of international humanitarian law relating to the use of force for non-international conflicts and occupation, as well as the law relating to civilians taking a “direct part in hostilities”. Finally, by making reference to the traditional prohibition of assassination, the author concludes that the application of human rights law in these situations would not undermine the spirit of international humanitarian law.


rahatulquloob ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (2(2)) ◽  
pp. 52-74
Author(s):  
Muhammad Sohail ◽  
Saqib Jawad

The right to life is often said to be mother right and most important fundamen-tal right of all rights. The application and criteria of protection of the right to life differs under international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law (HRL). As a general conception, IHL is applicable only during armed conflict and HRL is applicable in all other situations excepting armed conflict. This conception though has been proved to be wrong, however, the primary concern regarding the protection of the right to life during armed conflict is that of IHL. However, it does not mean that HRL has nothing to do with an armed conflict or IHL is having no concern about the protection of the right to life beyond armed conflict, rather it means that standard and criteria of protection of the right to life during armed conflict differs in both these branches of internatio-nal. When the question arises with regard to the protection of the right to life during armed conflict, different answers are found in both these disciplines. The substantive law as well as case law of both the branches differ in this regard to such an extent that a person may lose the protection of his right to life under IHL on the one hand, while still holding such protection under HRL on the other. While Islamic Law does not differentiate between humanitarian law and human rights law, rather in Islam, protection of the right to lie has been ensured on equal footings in and outside an armed conflict. The paper focuses the main causes of differences between IHL and HRL. Consequently, sorting out the best possible manner in which such differences can be removed and resultantly by recommending the standard and criteria as to how the right to life can be best protected.


Author(s):  
Bielefeldt Heiner, Prof ◽  
Ghanea Nazila, Dr ◽  
Wiener Michael, Dr

The dominant concerns of this chapter relate to two aspects of the relationship between ‘religion’ and the ‘right to life’. One is the need to ensure that nobody is denied the right to life on grounds of their religion or belief (this being directly related to freedom of religion or belief), and the other is that nobody should be denied the right to life in the name of religion or belief. At the same time, the chapter also considers the broader horizon of multifaceted issues that are often considered relevant to life and religion. Issues such as religious values relating to the importance of life, and religious positions on abortion and on the death penalty are discussed in order to illustrate that, although not per se falling within freedom of religion or belief, they can be rendered relevant for the practice of freedom of religion or belief, depending on religious or moral convictions which people lay claim to.


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