scholarly journals When Do Powerful Stakeholders Give Managers the Latitude to Balance All Stakeholders’ Interests?

2018 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 232-262 ◽  
Author(s):  
Flore M. Bridoux ◽  
Pushpika Vishwanathan
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Stakeholder Theory ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Value Appropriation ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
As If

Research in instrumental stakeholder theory often discusses the benefits of a stakeholder strategy that balances all stakeholders’ interests as if the firm’s managers were not constrained much in choosing a strategy. Yet, through their value appropriation behavior, stakeholders with high bargaining power can significantly constrain managers’ choices. Our objective is, therefore, to understand when powerful stakeholders give managers the latitude to balance all stakeholders’ interests, rather than forcing them to satisfy primarily their own interests. Building on enlightened self-interest and the justice literature, we identify five motivational drivers that help explain powerful stakeholders’ value appropriation behavior. We next explore the endogenous relationship between the stakeholder strategy adopted by the firm and its effect on powerful stakeholders’ value appropriation behavior. This article complements instrumental stakeholder theory by looking at powerful stakeholders’ motivation to exercise their bargaining power, and in so doing brings powerful stakeholders’ moral responsibility in the treatment of weak stakeholders to the forefront.

The Ethical Decision

2020 ◽  
pp. 128-140
Author(s):  
K. E. Løgstrup
Keyword(s):  
Ethical Decision ◽  
Ethical Action ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The Right ◽  
Do The Right Thing ◽  
As If

This chapter considers a variety of ways in which, as fundamentally self-interested individuals, we try to camouflage that self-interest by making it look as if we are behaving rightly: for example, by evading an ethical action by insisting that it requires further reflection, or by inspecting our motives so that the time for action has passed. We reason in this way because we do not like being griped by the decision, and required to act. Nonetheless, our conscience can make us aware of these evasions, while also, in certain extreme or ‘heightened’ situations, we can still come to do the right thing, even while in more ordinary circumstances, when the risks are a lot less, we remain oblivious to the needs of others.

Value appropriation in Brazilian cattle industry

2017 ◽  
Vol 119 (9) ◽  
pp. 2089-2101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gustavo Magalhães de Oliveira ◽  
Silvia Morales de Queiroz Caleman ◽  
Christiano França da Cunha ◽  
Morenise Puperi
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Live Weight ◽  
Payment System ◽  
Collective Actions ◽  
Value Appropriation ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Efficient System ◽  
Mato Grosso ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Cattle Breeders

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the influencing factors on cattle breeders’ payment system choices using cross-sectional data collected in the Brazilian states of Mato Grosso do Sul and Rio Grande do Sul. The investigation aims to analyze the problem of value appropriation comparing the payment based on carcass index with live weight mode under the perspective of “bovine for slaughtering” as a multidimensional product with various attributes. Design/methodology/approach This study employs a generalized order logistic regression model in a survey with 69 cattle breeders’ interview to conduct the empirical analysis. Findings The empirical results show that measurement difficulties and collective actions influence farmers’ choice to a less efficient payment system in quality terms and value appropriation problems, while the trust level in the slaughterhouse pushes to a more efficient system. Furthermore, trust was presented as more important than technological aspects and long-time relationship as well as collective action corroborates to increase bargaining power and to solve conflicts. In sum, trust, measurement and bargaining power brought traditional and alternative solutions to solve conflicts such as well-designed payment indicators, collective actions and transaction costs. Originality/value This study used first-hand survey and proxy variables on cattle farmers’ payment system choices. Another contribution is the focus on two regions with two different payment systems in the same institutional environment in a way to suggest mechanisms of private strategies and public policy to reduce opportunistic value appropriation as well as decreasing conflict.

Profit Versus Prejudice

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael N. Stagnaro ◽  
Yarrow Dunham ◽  
David G. Rand
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
Dictator Game ◽  
Monetary Incentive ◽  
Significant Group ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Substantial Bias

We examine the possibility that self-interest, typically thought to undermine social welfare, might reduce in-group bias. We compared the dictator game (DG), where participants unilaterally divide money between themselves and a recipient, and the ultimatum game (UG), where the recipient can reject these offers. Unlike the DG, there is a self-interested motive for UG giving: If participants expect the rejection of unfair offers, they have a monetary incentive to be fair even to out-group members. Thus, we predicted substantial bias in the DG but little bias in the UG. We tested this hypothesis in two studies ( N = 3,546) employing a 2 (in-group/out-group, based on abortion position) × 2 (DG/UG) design. We observed the predicted significant group by game interaction, such that the substantial in-group favoritism observed in the DG was almost entirely eliminated in the UG: Giving the recipient bargaining power reduced the premium offered to in-group members by 77.5%.

Security Europeanization since 1989

2019 ◽  
pp. 88-112
Author(s):  
Katherine Graney
Keyword(s):  
Security Policies ◽  
European Security ◽  
Military Alliance ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
European Values ◽  
As If

This chapter examines the process of NATO expansion since 1989, highlighting the strange fact that NATO claims to be a community of “European” values and identity as much as, if not more than, a strategic and military alliance. This has led NATO gatekeepers to pursue enlargement for rationales other than strict realist self-interest and has led NATO into direct conflict with Russia over the security policies of the ex-Soviet republics, especially Georgia and Ukraine. The chapter examines the unsuccessful efforts of NATO to find ways to cooperate with Russia, and of Russia to reshape the European security sphere to its own ends and according to its own values.

Debunking Corporate Moral Responsibility

2003 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 531-562 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manuel Velasquez
Keyword(s):  
Business Ethics ◽  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Moral Agent ◽  
Corporate Moral Responsibility ◽  
Corporate Organization ◽  
As If

Abstract:I address three topics. First, I argue that the issue of corporate moral responsibility is an important one for business ethics. Second, I examine a core argument for the claim that the corporate organization is a separate moral agent and show it is based on an unnoticed but elementary mistake deriving from the fallacy of division. Third, I examine the assumptions collectivists make about what it means to say that organizations act and that they act intentionally and show that these assumptions are mistaken in their failure to understand the nature of intentional causality and of “as-if” intentionality. In exposing these mistakes I set out my own view in the form of two theses, the first of which states that individual members of an organization are always causally responsible for any corporate act, and the second of which states that attributions of intentions to corporations are always either descriptive or prescriptive attributions of “as if” intentionality.

The Influence of Bondholder Concentration and Temporal Orientation on Investments in R&D

2020 ◽  
pp. 014920632090253
Author(s):  
Pengfei Ye ◽  
Jonathan O’Brien ◽  
Christina Matz Carnes ◽  
Iftekhar Hasan
Keyword(s):  
Competitive Advantage ◽  
Agency Theory ◽  
Value Creation ◽  
Conflict Of Interest ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Temporal Orientation ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Value Appropriation

Although innovation can be a critical source of competitive advantage, research has found that debt can erode management’s willingness to invest in R&D. In this article, we employ a stakeholder bargaining power perspective to argue that this effect is most pronounced when the firm’s bonds are concentrated in the hands of bond blockholders. Furthermore, we contend that the temporal orientation of bondholders influences this relationship. Specifically, while it is commonly assumed that bondholders have a limited temporal orientation that induces them to focus on short-term value appropriation, we argue that some bond blockholders adopt a long-term temporal orientation. This orientation, in turn, makes them more inclined to support long-term value creation for the firm in the form of enhanced investments in R&D. Moreover, while agency theory suggests that there is an inherent conflict of interest between shareholders and bondholders, our results suggest that the temporal orientation of investors (i.e., both shareholders and bondholders) matters much more than whether they invested in the firm’s equity or its debt.

The epistolary mode and the first of Ovid's Heroides

1984 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 413-422 ◽  
Author(s):  
Duncan F. Kennedy
Keyword(s):  
Henry Fielding ◽  
Large Element ◽  
Epistolary Novel ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Epistolary Form ◽  
Present Tense ◽  
As If

In April 1741 there appeared a slim volume entitled An Apology for the Life of Mrs Shamela Andrews by a certain Mr Conny Keyber, whose name is generally supposed to conceal that of the novelist Henry Fielding. Shamela, to give the book its more familiar title, was a parody of Samuel Richardson's epistolary novel Pamela: or Virtue Rewarded, which had been published to great acclaim the previous year. In a series of letters purportedly sent to each other by the main characters, the story unfolds of the honest servant-girl Pamela, her efforts to avoid seduction by her master Mr B., and her eventual marriage to him. Fielding's chief target was the morality of the book (Pamela's virtue contains a disturbingly large element of self-interest), but in passing he drew cruel attention to some of the pitfalls of the epistolary form as a vehicle for narrative. One passage in particular deserves quotation, from Letter VI, which Shamela writes to her mother at (so we are duly informed at the top of the letter) twelve o'clock on Thursday night:Mrs Jervis and I are just in Bed, and the Door unlocked; if my Master should come – Odsbods! I hear him just coming in at the Door. You see I write in the present Tense, as Parson Williams says. Well, he is in Bed between us, we both shamming a Sleep, he steals his Hand into my Bosom, which I, as if in my Sleep, press close to me with mine….

A Research on Eco-Tourism Development Models Based on the Stakeholder Theory

2013 ◽  
Vol 291-294 ◽  
pp. 1447-1450 ◽  
Author(s):  
Min Wei ◽  
Rui Rui Yang
Keyword(s):  
Sustainable Development ◽  
Stakeholder Theory ◽  
Tourism Development ◽  
Ecological Environment ◽  
Institutional Constraints ◽  
The Sustainable Development ◽  
Development Models ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Local Residents ◽  
Tourism Enterprises

The development of eco-tourism requires attention to ecological environment and sustainable development, the development, however, often could not reach the standard of “ecological” in practice because of the different interest demands of the main stakeholders involved in tourism development and people’s self-interest psychology. For the sustainable development of eco-tourism, we need to adjust the roles and relationships of the major stakeholders so that the four main stakeholders------- local government, local residents, tourism enterprises and tourists could regulate their own behavior in the institutional constraints.

Homeowners' Activism in Beijing: Leaders with Mixed Motivations

2013 ◽  
Vol 215 ◽  
pp. 513-532 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yongshun Cai ◽  
Zhiming Sheng
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Crucial Role ◽  
Group Solidarity ◽  
Residential Communities ◽  
Number Of Factors ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Community Pressure

AbstractIt is commonly accepted that leaders play a crucial role in collective action. Existing literature has suggested a number of factors that contribute to the emergence of leaders including, among others, personality, sense of moral responsibility, community pressure, self-interest and institutional exclusion. However, current research tends to suggest that activists are driven by a particular reason to become leaders and that their motivation is static. Based on intensive fieldwork in residential communities in Beijing, this article illustrates that leaders' motivations can be mixed or multiple and that leaders may re-prioritize or adjust their objectives over the course of collective action. The re-prioritizing tends to alter the leaders' behaviour and affect group solidarity and interactions with other group members.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document