Cultural-Civilizational Europeanization since 1989

This chapter examines how understandings and practices of Europeanization are shaped in the cultural-civilizational realm since 1989, focusing specifically on the evolution of a European cultural space through the European Broadcasting Union’s yearly Eurovision song contest and the Union of European Football Association’s yearly EURO football championships. It demonstrates the importance that Russia and the non–Central Asian ex-Soviet republics place on being seen as “European enough” to participate successfully in both Eurovision and the EURO football championships, and the ways that participating in these cultural events forces these states to “act European” in political and economic ways, as well as cultural ones. The discussion of Eurovision highlights that event’s influence on spreading the idea of LGBTQ rights as a marker of “Europeanness,” while the EURO football championships are an arena where expectations about civility and racial tolerance as European norms are negotiated.

The Baltic States

This chapter examines the successful “return to Europe” by the three Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. It details how they presented European gatekeepers in the EU and NATO with expertly shaped historical and cultural-civilizational narratives that cast the Baltic states as “essentially European” states that had been “captured” by the alien Soviet Union in 1939, hence worthy of “rejoining” a European community they had been unjustly severed from. Skilled leadership and high levels of human development and national unity also helped ease the Baltic return to Europe. The chapter discusses the Baltics’ key role in pushing for an expanded understanding of Europe that would encompass other ex-Soviet states like Ukraine and Georgia, while denying Europeanness to Russia, which is seen as a threat to Europe. Case studies of each of the three Baltic states detail their specific Europeanization processes since 1989.

From Europhilia to Europhobia?

This chapter introduces the author’s argument about Europeanization in the period since 1989, including the idea of a “Eurocentric-Orientalist Cultural Gradient” that guides understandings about Europe on both sides of the former Iron Curtain. It identifies three main phases of Europeanization since 1989: Europhoria, Europhilia, and Europhobia; three sets of actors working together to produce new institutional and ideational understandings of Europe since 1989: European gatekeepers in European institutions, the other great power in the region (Russia), and the ex-Soviet republics themselves; and three forces that animate the processes of Europeanization: the Eurocentric-Orientalist Cultural Gradient, values-based commitments of European institutions like the EU and NATO, and the instrumental concerns of Russia and the post-Soviet states. The chapter also briefly explores the three realms within which these processes of Europeanization play themselves out—the cultural-civilizational, the political, and the security realm.

The Caucasus States

This chapter examines the Caucasus states of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. It first discusses the Caucasus as a unique region within the Russian and Soviet empires, seen as those entities’ “own Orient,” and the place where the border into the “non-Christian” world is breached. Georgia’s strong desire for Europeanization is contrasted with Armenia’s more moderate pursuit, despite the two sharing similar levels of “intrinsic” Europeanization. Georgia’s peculiarly Euro-oriented elite, and Armenia’s historical and contemporary reliance on Russia as a protector of its survival and sovereignty, are invoked to explain this difference. Azerbaijan, a resource-rich state with the unique claim to be “the first democracy in the Muslim World,” has combined a nonaligned political and security policy with a strong effort to be identified as part of the European cultural-civilizational sphere.

Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova

This chapter presents case studies of three of the Eastern Partnership states that all share similar positions on the European-Orientalist Cultural Gradient but have pursued Europeanization projects of different strengths. Belarus is a weak-moderate Europeanizer that claims to be intrinsically European according to its own idiosyncratic criteria, and despite frequent criticism from European institutions for its autocratic ways. Ukraine has become famous as the home of people who have twice put their lives on the line in the name of European values (in the Orange Revolution and the EuroMaidan), but whose leaders have trouble realizing the promise of Europeanization. Moldova’s unique historical and contemporary relationship with Romania has spurred it to a strong pursuit of Europeanization, though like Ukraine, cultural and economic factors threaten those ambitions. Detailed case studies explicate the different paths toward Europeanization for each of the three states.

Security Europeanization since 1989

This chapter examines the process of NATO expansion since 1989, highlighting the strange fact that NATO claims to be a community of “European” values and identity as much as, if not more than, a strategic and military alliance. This has led NATO gatekeepers to pursue enlargement for rationales other than strict realist self-interest and has led NATO into direct conflict with Russia over the security policies of the ex-Soviet republics, especially Georgia and Ukraine. The chapter examines the unsuccessful efforts of NATO to find ways to cooperate with Russia, and of Russia to reshape the European security sphere to its own ends and according to its own values.

Political Europeanization since 1989

This chapter examines the process of EU expansion into the former Soviet Union since 1989, identifying the different criteria that have been used to judge candidates for EU membership. The Central European and Baltic states successfully made arguments about their “intrinsic Europeanness” and “belonging” to Europe and the EU, while the Balkan states have had a harder time proving their suitability for Europe. Unlike the Baltic states, the other ex-Soviet republics, like Ukraine and Georgia, have had a harder time convincing the EU of their fitness for membership, that is, their “intrinsic Europeanness,” and have had to settle for being made “Eastern Partners” of the EU and signers of Association Agreements with the EU. Russia has sought a form of partnership with the EU, while rejecting any idea of conditionality. Finally, the EU shows little concern for the ex-Soviet states of Central Asia, not seeing them as fundamentally European in any way.

Europe as a Cultural-Civilizational Construct

This chapter examines the different meanings that “Europe” has historically had. It explores the geographic, cultural, religious, and historical understandings of Europe, stressing the uncertainty regarding Europe’s eastern boundary, and how this uncertainty has given rise to the idea that there are actually many “different” Europes, including Central Europe, Eastern Europe, Mitteleuropa, and the Balkans. It stresses the role of Christianity in understanding Europeanness, and the role that Orthodoxy plays as a “quasi-European” form of Christianity, and Islam as Europe and Christianity’s certain “other.” It also discusses how Russia, in both its Tsarist and Soviet guises, has been judged by others (and itself) to only imperfectly fit the criteria associated with Europeanness, even as it judged non-Russian others within its realm according to those same criteria.

Conclusion

This concluding chapter argues that it is premature to declare the “end of Europe” and that European institutions, as well as ideas and understandings about Europe and Europeanness, can demonstrate “concrete achievements” in and continue to inspire post-Soviet states. The chapter identifies the extent to which the fifteen post-Soviet states conform to the expectations of the European-Orientalist Cultural Gradient and identifies the factors that help determine the differing strengths of Europeanization projects among the six Eastern Partner states. It also identifies the factors that are likely to influence the future of Europeanization projects in those states and encourages both scholars and policymakers to respect the importance of the postwar liberal European experiment to the present and future of the post-Soviet world.

The Central Asian States

This chapter argues that with the partial exception of Kazakhstan, by mutual agreement, both European gatekeepers and actors in the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union have decided that these states are not in any meaningful way part of Europe, and that no aspect of Europeanization (political, security, or cultural-civilizational) is appropriate for them. Kazakhstan has made some effort to position itself as a “truly Eurasian” state that is a bridge between Europe and Asia but is firmly tied to Russia’s Euro-alternative institutions. None of the other Central Asian states has shown any interest in identifying as European in any way. The chapter explores the various forms of political authoritarianism, security strategy, and national identity that the five Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan) have pursued instead of a policy of Europeanization. In the absence of a real European presence, Russia’s and China’s roles and ambitions in the region are also discussed.