Party Strength and International Trade

What explains the variation of trade protection across countries and years? The author argues that other things equal, democracies with strong parties will choose freer trade policies. He focuses on two aspects of party strength—organizational centralization and stable party linkages to large groups of the electorate. He contends that legislative logrolls leading to high protection are significantly less likely when parties are centralized. Furthermore, because parties with stable connections to the electorate have longer time horizons, the author argues that they will generally support more open trade policies that provide long-run economic benefits. Finally, he contends that parties linked to large electoral groups—as measured by district size—will prefer public goods such as freer trade over trade patronage. After coding a measure of party centralization developed by Cary and Shugart (1995), the author conducts a quantitative analysis of democracies from 1975-2000. His results support the theory and highlight an understudied institution in trade policy.

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When Britain Turned Inward: The Impact of Interwar British Protection

The American Economic Review ◽

10.1257/aer.20172020 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 109 (2) ◽

pp. 325-352 ◽

Cited By ~ 12

Author(s):

Alan de Bromhead ◽

Alan Fernihough ◽

Markus Lampe ◽

Kevin Hjortshøj O’Rourke

Keyword(s):

International Trade ◽

Trade Policy ◽

Trade Flows ◽

Conventional Wisdom ◽

Trade Policies ◽

The Impact

International trade collapsed, and also became much less multilateral, during the 1930s. Previous studies, looking at aggregate trade flows, have argued that trade policies had relatively little to do with either phenomenon. Using a new dataset incorporating highly disaggregated information on the United Kingdom’s imports and trade policies, we find that while conventional wisdom is correct regarding the impact of trade policy on the total value of British imports, discriminatory trade policies can explain the majority of Britain’s shift toward Imperial imports in the 1930s. (JEL F13, F14, F54, N74)

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Pengaruh globalisasi terhadap ketahanan pangan nasional

Agro Ekonomi ◽

10.22146/agroekonomi.16789 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 10 (1) ◽

pp. 1

Author(s):

Sri Widodo

Keyword(s):

International Trade ◽

Food Security ◽

Social Welfare ◽

Trade Policy ◽

Consumer Surplus ◽

Price Policy ◽

Domestic Price ◽

International Trade Policy ◽

Long Run ◽

The Impact

The problem on food security in Indonesia began to be interested since the economic crisis as one component of the social security net. Sustainable food security covers: availability of food, accessibility, utilization, stability, self reliance (autonomy) and sustainability. . Hirarchically food security can be at global order, regional, national, local, household and individual. The higher order offbod security is a necessary condition but not sufficient condition for the lower order.Economic theory indicate that there are gains to be made from free trade. increase the efficiency ufresource allocation, and increase welfare of all countries. However, all government, without exception, intervene to varying degrees in the working of natural market prces, with the reason the need to protect infant industry, to ensure food security, to redistribute income, and to enhance income of small producers.The liberalization initiatives culminated in UR agreement and WTO, among others, dismantling of quantitative restriction and subsidies as well as other nontariff barriers, but there were several new thing of antidumping tariff, sanitary and phytosanitary, technical barrier to trade,environment, and genetically modified organism.The impact of trade liberalization on exporter countries, in general, would benefit the producers, decrease the consumer surplus, and increase social welfare except large populated as India and China. The impact of importer countries depend on the policy of each country. Malaysia and Indonesia by decreasing import tariff policy would increase consumer surplus and social welfare but sacrificing the producers/farmers.National food policies consist of international trade policy domestic price policy, and policy on production efficiency. The international trade policy means to protect producers, consumers, and social welfare from the uncertainty of international market especially in the long run. The stabilization of domestic price policy needs inter department coordination and STE to implement. Protection could result inefficiency but it is needed for commodities those are not ready to compete and to protect from unfair trade, to protect farmers and long run food security.

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On the effects of EU trade policy: agricultural tariffs still matter

European Review of Agricultural Economics ◽

10.1093/erae/jbz053 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 47 (4) ◽

pp. 1367-1401 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Maria Cipollina ◽

Luca Salvatici

Keyword(s):

European Union ◽

International Trade ◽

Trade Policy ◽

Trade Policies ◽

The European Union ◽

Agricultural Imports

Abstract We capitalise on the latest development in the empirical structural gravity literature to examine the question of whether and how much the European Union (EU) agricultural tariffs affect agricultural imports. We capture both the protectionist and preferential nature of EU trade policies by measuring the effects of multilateral, bilateral and unilateral agreements on international trade relative to intra-EU trade. The computation of bilateral protection and preference margins is used to determine which countries/sectors are most negatively/positively affected. On average, EU agricultural tariffs have decreased international trade by 14 per cent. We also find that EU preferences have been effective in promoting trade by about 10 per cent.

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The Trade Policies of Brexit Britain: the Influence of and Impacts on the Devolved Nations

ERIS – European Review of International Studies ◽

10.1163/21967415-bja10034 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 8 (1) ◽

pp. 22-48

Author(s):

David Eiser ◽

Nicola McEwen ◽

Graeme Roy

Keyword(s):

International Trade ◽

Trade Policy ◽

Intergovernmental Relations ◽

Trade Agreements ◽

Legal Responsibility ◽

Trade Policies ◽

Policy Cycle ◽

Uk Government ◽

The Uk ◽

Trade Deals

Abstract This paper examines the extent to which the UK’s three devolved governments have sought and achieved influence on the UK Government’s evolving post-Brexit international trade policy, distinguishing their influence at key stages of the trade policy cycle (mandate, negotiations and implementation). Despite carrying the legal responsibility to implement those aspects of trade deals that fall within areas of devolved competence, the devolved governments’ attempts to secure meaningful influence on the UK’s trade agreements have largely been frustrated. This reflects a lack of trust between the devolved and UK governments, weaknesses in the framework for and operation of intergovernmental relations, and a strong desire of the UK government to retain control centrally wherever possible. The resulting tensions have exacerbated devolved governments’ concerns over the authority of the devolved institutions post-Brexit.

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Regional trade agreements and the new theory of trade

Journal of International Trade Law and Policy ◽

10.1108/14770021111116133 ◽

2011 ◽

Vol 10 (1) ◽

pp. 49-63 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Neelesh Gounder ◽

Biman Chand Prasad

Keyword(s):

International Trade ◽

Trade Policy ◽

Imperfect Competition ◽

Trade Agreements ◽

Regional Trade Agreements ◽

Trade Policies ◽

Regional Trade ◽

Policy Makers ◽

Content Type ◽

Gains And Losses

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to explore the two issues of regional trade agreements (RTAs) and the new theory of international trade and draw conclusions for Pacific Island countries (PICs). The authors provide a deeper conceptual treatment of the consequences of RTAs and analyse the new theory of international trade to explore its implications for trade policy in PICs.Design/methodology/approachWith regard to RTAs, the argument is developed in the context of the conjecture that questions the benefits from adopting more open trade policies with neighbours while maintaining restrictive policies towards the rest of the world. The authors draw on international and regional analytical literature and on recent modelling work to review critically the possible gains and losses of RTAs for PICs. In the latter issue, the focus is on the roles of imperfect competition and scale economies and their relevance to PICs.FindingsFreeing up trade gradually and unilaterally and realizing the benefits of comparative advantage remains the best way to maximise welfare. PICs could be worse off under a complex system of overlapping RTAs and existence of RTAs by Australia and New Zealand outside the region has the possibility of marginalizing weak PICs economies.Practical implicationsPICs are currently at a critical juncture in terms of trade policy making with various trade agreements being thrown in the region and this paper has the capacity to provide some answers to policy makers on the approach to take.Originality/valueThe paper offers insights into regional trade agreements and the new theory of trade.

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Electoral Rules and Trade Policy

International Studies Review ◽

10.1163/2667078x-01101003 ◽

2010 ◽

Vol 11 (1) ◽

pp. 41-54

Author(s):

Ilseok yang

Keyword(s):

Trade Policy ◽

Open Economy ◽

Small Open Economy ◽

Specific Factor ◽

Trade Policies ◽

Electoral Rules ◽

Long Run ◽

Proportional Elections

This paper analyses the trade policies in the voting equilibria under different rules in a small open economy with a fixed factor of production. Specifically, we consider an economy in which economic rents exist in the long run due to a fixed supply of the factor of production. In this economy, each voter has its own share of the factor of production. We find that the equilibrium trade policy under proportional elections depends on the sum of the product of each group’s density and the group’s share of the product of factor, and is also affected by parameters under some conditions. However, under majoritarian elections, trade policy in equilibrium depends only on the middle group’s fraction of the specific factor if the middle-share group is dominant in one of the districts.

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