Does the WTO exacerbate international conflict?

2020 ◽  
pp. 002234332096020
Author(s):  
J Tyson Chatagnier ◽  
Haeyong Lim
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Unintended Consequences ◽  
Institution Building ◽  
Economic Policies ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Trade Disputes ◽  
Member States ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Compliant Behavior ◽  
Economic Tools

As one component of its mission to reduce trade barriers and encourage the liberalization of international commerce, the World Trade Organization provides states with a forum in which they can raise and resolve complaints about partners’ unfair trading practices. This mechanism streamlines the process of identifying non-compliant behavior, and provides real incentives for the removal of such policies. By furnishing a form of dispute resolution, the institution should be both trade-inducing and peace-enhancing for member states. However, this very mechanism also has the potential to aggravate existing dispute for two reasons. First, it removes the opportunity for states to use economic policies as instruments of structural linkage in resolving disputes. Second, it deprives its members of powerful economic tools that could be used in lieu of militarized responses. Using the implementation of the WTO Dispute Settlement mechanism, as well as the subsequent expiration of Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture (the so-called ‘peace clause’), we examine whether the opportunity to resolve trade disputes through the organization affects the likelihood that member states engage in militarized conflict with one another. We find that membership in a trade institution facilitates peaceful interaction, but that judicialization erases these benefits. We conclude that institution building requires caution and attention to the possibility of unintended consequences.

Revisiting African States Participation in the WTO Dispute Settlement through Intra-Africa RTA Dispute Settlement

2013 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Malebakeng Forere
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
East African ◽  
African Countries ◽  
Trade Disputes ◽  
East African Community ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Southern Africa Development Community

AbstractWhereas developed countries were the main players in the GATT dispute settlement mechanism, the era of the WTO saw a sharp increase in the developing countries’ participation in trade disputes. Thus, developing countries are active complainants and defendants in the WTO dispute settlement processes. Nevertheless, African states are still marginalised, and this situation has attracted attention of many scholars. As a result, scholars in the field have come up with many reasons to explain why African states do not appear as either complainants or respondents. The reasons for Africa’s non-participation have been argued to include cost of WTO litigation relative to the gains, low trade volumes, legal knowledge and non-integration of African countries in the WTO system. This article seeks to contribute to the existing literature on Africa’s non-participation in the WTO dispute settlement. The goal in this article is to confirm or dispel assumptions that African states have interests that they need to safeguard through dispute settlement but are inhibited from doing so because of the reasons mentioned above. Unlike other studies, the determination on Africa’s non-participation in the WTO dispute settlement will be approached from African states’ participation in intra-Africa RTA dispute settlement mechanisms. While there are six intra-Africa RTAs notified to the WTO, this work focuses on only two – East African Community and Southern Africa Development Community.

scholarly journals Dispute Settlement under the African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement: A Preliminary Assessment

2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (Supplement) ◽  
pp. 138-158
Author(s):  
Olabisi D. Akinkugbe
Keyword(s):  
Free Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Free Trade Area ◽  
Power Dynamics ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Settlement System ◽  
Trade Disputes ◽  
Member States ◽  
Trade Area ◽  
Dispute Settlement System

The African Continental Free Trade Area Agreement (AfCFTA) will add a new dispute settlement system to the plethora of judicial mechanisms designed to resolve trade disputes in Africa. Given the discontent of member states and the limited impact that the existing highly legalised trade dispute settlement mechanisms have had on regional economic integration in Africa, this article undertakes a preliminary critical assessment of the AfCFTA Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM). The article situates the AfCFTA-DSM in the overall discontent and unsupportive practices of African states with highly legalised dispute settlement systems and similar WTO-styled DSMs among other shortcomings. Notwithstanding the transplantation of the WTO-styled DSM and the ineffectiveness of previous similar attempts in Africa, the article argues that the Consultation Phase offers the AfCFTA member states a realistic chance of engaging with the DSM. In conclusion, the article highlights other factors such as private sector involvement, the strategic operationalisation of the DSM, and geopolitical and power dynamics as critical to the success of the dispute settlement system.

Why Adjudicate?

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christina L. Davis
Keyword(s):  
Policy Process ◽  
Steel Industry ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
The United States ◽  
Trade Disputes ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Chinese Intellectual ◽  
Trade War

The World Trade Organization (WTO) oversees the negotiation and enforcement of formal rules governing international trade. Why do countries choose to adjudicate their trade disputes in the WTO rather than settling their differences on their own? This book investigates the domestic politics behind the filing of WTO complaints and reveals why formal dispute settlement creates better outcomes for governments and their citizens. It demonstrates that industry lobbying, legislative demands, and international politics influence which countries and cases appear before the WTO. Democratic checks and balances bias the trade policy process toward public lawsuits and away from informal settlements. Trade officials use legal complaints to manage domestic politics and defend trade interests. WTO dispute settlement enables states and domestic groups to signal resolve more effectively, thereby enhancing the information available to policymakers and reducing the risk of a trade war. The book establishes this argument with data on trade disputes and landmark cases, including the Boeing-Airbus controversy over aircraft subsidies, disagreement over Chinese intellectual property rights, and Japan's repeated challenges of U.S. steel industry protection. The book explains why the United States gains better outcomes for cases taken to formal dispute settlement than for those negotiated. Case studies of Peru and Vietnam show that legal action can also benefit developing countries.

Conclusion

2019 ◽  
pp. 312-332
Author(s):  
Sivan Shlomo Agon
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Unintended Consequences ◽  
Institutional Changes ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The World ◽  
International Adjudication ◽  
Dispute Settlement System

The present chapter concludes the work. It sums up the key findings of the study while discussing the results emerging from a comparative analysis of the three categories of disputes examined throughout the book. The chapter then revisits the central arguments put forth in the book and articulates the lessons to be learned for the study of the goals, operation, and effectiveness of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement System (DSS), and of international courts more broadly. It also discusses some of the insights to be offered with respect to possible institutional changes or reforms of the WTO DSS, with a view to ensuring the system’s future effectiveness. The chapter closes with several observations that go beyond effectiveness, pertaining to the costs and unintended consequences attendant on more effective and empowered international adjudication.

Exploring Aggressive Legalism: Is Now A Good Time to Promote This Approach in Greater Asia?

2015 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yi Lu
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
International Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Good Time ◽  
Asian Countries ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The Status ◽  
Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Asian Developing Countries

AbstractAggressive legalism, a trade policy-making strategy targeted at actively utilizing WTO rules to defend trade interests, has greatly benefited major Eastern Asian countries in past years. This paper examines whether this strategy should be promoted around greater Asia in this era. First, this paper updates the status of adoption of aggressive legalism in East Asian countries including Japan, Korea and China. Second, it looks into the current and possible future utilization of the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism by selected countries which are frequent “targets” of trade remedy measures, namely India, Thailand and Indonesia. Finally, it discusses the participation of Asian developing countries in the WTO. Relying upon case studies and statistical analysis, the author finds that Asian countries’ rising image in international trade signals a trend of adopting aggressive legalism in Great Asia. This trend will undoubtedly promote the energetic development of international trade globally. However, room for more progressive participation in the WTO still exists, especially in developing countries.

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