Why Adjudicate?

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christina L. Davis
Keyword(s):  
Policy Process ◽  
Steel Industry ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
The United States ◽  
Trade Disputes ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Chinese Intellectual ◽  
Trade War

The World Trade Organization (WTO) oversees the negotiation and enforcement of formal rules governing international trade. Why do countries choose to adjudicate their trade disputes in the WTO rather than settling their differences on their own? This book investigates the domestic politics behind the filing of WTO complaints and reveals why formal dispute settlement creates better outcomes for governments and their citizens. It demonstrates that industry lobbying, legislative demands, and international politics influence which countries and cases appear before the WTO. Democratic checks and balances bias the trade policy process toward public lawsuits and away from informal settlements. Trade officials use legal complaints to manage domestic politics and defend trade interests. WTO dispute settlement enables states and domestic groups to signal resolve more effectively, thereby enhancing the information available to policymakers and reducing the risk of a trade war. The book establishes this argument with data on trade disputes and landmark cases, including the Boeing-Airbus controversy over aircraft subsidies, disagreement over Chinese intellectual property rights, and Japan's repeated challenges of U.S. steel industry protection. The book explains why the United States gains better outcomes for cases taken to formal dispute settlement than for those negotiated. Case studies of Peru and Vietnam show that legal action can also benefit developing countries.

scholarly journals What's behind GM food trade disputes?

2005 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 203-228 ◽  
Author(s):  
LEE ANN JACKSON ◽  
KYM ANDERSON
Keyword(s):  
Global Economy ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
The United States ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Trade Disputes ◽  
Gm Food ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Eu

Over the past decade, the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) have implemented widely divergent regulatory systems to govern the production and consumption of genetically modified (GM) agricultural crops. In the US, many GM varieties have been commercially produced and marketed, while in the EU few varieties have been approved: a de facto moratorium limited EU production, import and domestic sale of most GM crops from late 1998 to April 2004, and since then strict labelling regulations and a slow approval process are having a similar effect. The EU policies have substantially altered trade flows and led in September 2003 to the WTO establishing a WTO Dispute Settlement panel to test the legality of European policy towards imports of GM foods. This paper seeks to better understand the economic forces behind the different regulatory approaches of the US and the EU. It uses a model of the global economy (GTAP) to examine empirically how GM biotechnology adoption would affect the economic welfare of both adopting and non-adopting countries in the absence of alternative policy responses to this technology, and in their presence. These results go beyond earlier empirical studies to indicate effects on real incomes of farm households, and suggest the EU moratorium on GM imports helps EU farmers even though it requires them to forego the productivity boost they could receive from the new GM biotechnology.

European Communities —Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products. WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, & WT/DS293/R

2007 ◽  
Vol 101 (2) ◽  
pp. 453-459
Author(s):  
Daniel Bodansky ◽  
Simon Lester
Keyword(s):  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Genetically Modified Organisms ◽  
The United States ◽  
Regulatory Regime ◽  
Panel Report ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Production And Consumption ◽  
Phytosanitary Measures ◽  
Biotech Products

European Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products. WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, & WT/DS293/R. At <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm>.World Trade Organization Panel, September 29, 2006 (adopted November 21, 2006).In what was by far the longest panel report in the World Trade Organization’s history, a WTO panel ruled last September that various parts of the European Communities’ regulatory regime for the approval and marketing of “biotech products” (that is, products that contain, or are made from or with, genetically modified organisms (GMOs)) violated the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement). The panel report was not appealed and was adopted by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body on November 21, 2006.In recent years, a heated international debate has developed regarding the production and consumption of food made from or with GMOs. Among the key players in this debate, the United States, supported by many companies who have developed GMO-based products, has pushed for their acceptance; by contrast, the European Communities (EC) and its member states, backed by consumer groups and other activists, have tried to restrict their use through various regulations.

Extraterritorial Shrimps, NGOs and the WTO Appellate Body

1999 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 199-206 ◽  
Author(s):  
Asif H. Qureshi
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Market Access ◽  
The United States ◽  
Consultation Process ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The Us ◽  
Wto Appellate Body ◽  
Dispute Settlement System

At the centre of the international trading order, under the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO), lies a dispute-settlement system. This system offers a graduated conflict-resolution mechanism that begins with a consultation process; progresses to adjudication, through a panel system, and ends in an appellate process.1 Under this machinery, in October 1996 India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand (the complainants) requested joint consultations with the United States, regarding the US prohibition on the importation of certain shrimps and shrimp products caught with fishing technology considered by the United States adversely to affect the population of sea turtles—an endangered species under CITES.2 The US prohibition arose from section 609 of Public Law 101–1623 and associated regulations and judicial rulings (hereafter referred to as section 609). In a nutshell the complainants claimed denial of market access to their exports, and the United States justified this on grounds of conservation. However, as a consequence of the failure of the consultations, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body established a panel, around April 1997, to consider a joint complaint against the United States in relation to section 609. Australia, Ecuador, the European Communities, HongKong, China, Mexico and Nigeria joined the complainants as third parties. In May 1998 the panel's report was published, containing a decision in favour of the complainants. In July 1998 the United States appealed to the WTO Appellate Body, and in October 1998 the Appellate Body issued its report.4

Legalization in context: The design of the WTO’s dispute settlement system

2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 304-319 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manfred Elsig
Keyword(s):  
Rational Design ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The United States ◽  
Settlement System ◽  
Trading System ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Multilateral Trading System ◽  
The Creation ◽  
Dispute Settlement System

This article asks why the dispute settlement provisions of the multilateral trading system underwent significant reforms during the negotiations that led to the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. Why did the leading trading powers accept a highly legalized system that departed from established political–diplomatic forms of settling disputes? The contribution of this article is threefold. First, it complements existing accounts that exclusively focus on the United States with a novel explanation that takes account of contextual factors. Second, it offers an in-depth empirical case study based on interviews with negotiators who were involved and novel archival evidence on the creation of the new WTO dispute settlement system. Third, by unpacking the long-standing puzzle of why states designed a highly legalized system, it addresses selected blind spots of the legalization and the rational design literatures with the aim of providing a better understanding about potential paths leading toward significant changes in legalization.

Domestic Politics and International Negotiations: the Politics of Global Warming in the United States

1993 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael T. Hatch
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Global Warming ◽  
Policy Process ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
Political Process ◽  
The United States ◽  
International Negotiations ◽  
International Treaty ◽  
International Commitments ◽  
External Pressures

The United States chose an approach to global warming that came to be viewed by much of the international community as a barrier to effective action. In explaining why, this article analyzes the interaction of the domestic political process and international negotiations. It argues that—while external pressures brought to bear through the negotiations leading up to UNCED pushed the domestic agenda on global warming—the nature of the political process, in combination with the nature of the global warming issue itself, set the general limits for U.S. participation in cooperative international arrangements to manage global warming. That is, given the broad set of interests activated by global warming concerns and the ready access those interests had to decision-making bodies through a pluralist policy process, consensus on an approach to global warming proved impossible. The U.S., unwilling to accept international commitments that obligated it to domestic actions, thwarted efforts to get an international treaty containing firm targets and timetables.

Revisiting African States Participation in the WTO Dispute Settlement through Intra-Africa RTA Dispute Settlement

2013 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Malebakeng Forere
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
East African ◽  
African Countries ◽  
Trade Disputes ◽  
East African Community ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Southern Africa Development Community

AbstractWhereas developed countries were the main players in the GATT dispute settlement mechanism, the era of the WTO saw a sharp increase in the developing countries’ participation in trade disputes. Thus, developing countries are active complainants and defendants in the WTO dispute settlement processes. Nevertheless, African states are still marginalised, and this situation has attracted attention of many scholars. As a result, scholars in the field have come up with many reasons to explain why African states do not appear as either complainants or respondents. The reasons for Africa’s non-participation have been argued to include cost of WTO litigation relative to the gains, low trade volumes, legal knowledge and non-integration of African countries in the WTO system. This article seeks to contribute to the existing literature on Africa’s non-participation in the WTO dispute settlement. The goal in this article is to confirm or dispel assumptions that African states have interests that they need to safeguard through dispute settlement but are inhibited from doing so because of the reasons mentioned above. Unlike other studies, the determination on Africa’s non-participation in the WTO dispute settlement will be approached from African states’ participation in intra-Africa RTA dispute settlement mechanisms. While there are six intra-Africa RTAs notified to the WTO, this work focuses on only two – East African Community and Southern Africa Development Community.

On the Legality of the United States Action of Terminating India’s GSP Status

2020 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-129
Author(s):  
R. Rajesh Babu
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
The United States ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Generalized System Of Preferences ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The Us ◽  
Developmental Opportunities ◽  
Enabling Clause

Since the US Presidential Proclamation terminating India status as a Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) beneficiary with effect from 5 June 2019, questions are raised on the WTO legitimacy of such an action. The US measure, which appears to have a punitive element—a move precipitated by lack of reciprocity from India by not providing ‘equitable and reasonable access’ for US products in Indian markets—challenges the fundamentally premise of the GSP schemes. Since the GSP schemes are established to provide economic and developmental opportunities for developing countries, and once established must be administered as per the 1979 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Enabling Clause, meaning it must be on a ‘generalised’, ‘non-reciprocal’ and ‘non-discriminatory’ basis, can India raise a legitimate challenge against the US action at the WTO Dispute Settlement Body? Or can the GSP schemes, being voluntary and unilaterally administered, be structured by developed countries as trade policy tools with stringent trade and non-trade conditionalities? The decision of the Appellate Body in European Communities—Tariff Preferences, the contested nature of the Enabling Clause and the heterogeneous nature of developing countries at the WTO makes the interpretation knotty. In this context, this article provides a brief comment on the legal basis of the Enabling Clause in the WTO framework and the legitimacy of the US action of termination of India from the beneficiary status. Keeping aside the legal question, the author is also of the view that time is ripe for India to consider ‘graduating’ itself from such preferential arrangements and engage in binding obligations that are reciprocal and sustainable. JEL Codes: K33, O24

Does the WTO exacerbate international conflict?

2020 ◽  
pp. 002234332096020
Author(s):  
J Tyson Chatagnier ◽  
Haeyong Lim
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Unintended Consequences ◽  
Institution Building ◽  
Economic Policies ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Trade Disputes ◽  
Member States ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Compliant Behavior ◽  
Economic Tools

As one component of its mission to reduce trade barriers and encourage the liberalization of international commerce, the World Trade Organization provides states with a forum in which they can raise and resolve complaints about partners’ unfair trading practices. This mechanism streamlines the process of identifying non-compliant behavior, and provides real incentives for the removal of such policies. By furnishing a form of dispute resolution, the institution should be both trade-inducing and peace-enhancing for member states. However, this very mechanism also has the potential to aggravate existing dispute for two reasons. First, it removes the opportunity for states to use economic policies as instruments of structural linkage in resolving disputes. Second, it deprives its members of powerful economic tools that could be used in lieu of militarized responses. Using the implementation of the WTO Dispute Settlement mechanism, as well as the subsequent expiration of Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture (the so-called ‘peace clause’), we examine whether the opportunity to resolve trade disputes through the organization affects the likelihood that member states engage in militarized conflict with one another. We find that membership in a trade institution facilitates peaceful interaction, but that judicialization erases these benefits. We conclude that institution building requires caution and attention to the possibility of unintended consequences.

Mutually agreed solutions under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: An Analytical Framework after the Softwood Lumber Arbitration

2011 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 343-373 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALBERTO ALVAREZ-JIMÉNEZ
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Analytical Framework ◽  
Settlement System ◽  
Trade Disputes ◽  
Applicable Law ◽  
Softwood Lumber ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Intimate Relation ◽  
Dispute Settlement System

AbstractThe unprecedented enforcement of the mutually agreed solution (MAS) in the WTO Softwood Lumber disputes – but outside the WTO dispute settlement system – and the recent use of MAS to resolve important trade disputes should trigger a hard look at these dispute settlement instruments provided for by the DSU. This article seeks to provide a detailed framework of analysis of MAS under the DSU that allows the WTO dispute settlement system to adjudicate MAS-related disputes. WTO Members should not go outside the system to enforce MAS. The article illustrates that MAS can create binding obligations and that MAS are WTO law, given the explicit reference to them in the DSU, their intimate relation with the WTO-covered agreements and the requirement for compliance with these agreements. In addition, the article offers an interpretation of the DSU that allows panels and the Appellate Body to regard MAS as applicable law. This interpretation is offered in the view that there is no policy reason to sustain that these controversies – always fully related to WTO rights and obligations and framed under the corners of the covered agreements – have to be resolved by an adjudication system other than that of the WTO.

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