Appendix: Methods of Presenting the Balance of Payments of the United States

1965 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 33-34

There is no perfect measure of a country's balance of payments and no ideal way to present it. Some valuable standardisation has been achieved by the International Monetary Fund, but Official presentations still vary quite widely between one country and another and between different periods for the same country.

2007 ◽  
Vol 52 (03) ◽  
pp. 285-294 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHONG-YAH LIM

The article analyzes the limits of the IMF as a global multilateral economic agency to handle serious balance of payments disequilibria. Capital control and growth rates in developing Asia and the twin deficit problem of the United States are also discussed. It also assesses the probability of the reemergence of an exchange rate crisis in Southeast Asia and the wisdom of having an Asian IMF.


2019 ◽  
pp. 185-193
Author(s):  
Jerome Roos

This chapter considers why the International Monetary Fund (IMF) did it not prevent Argentina's record default of 2001. It suggests that the IMF was both unable and unwilling to stop it. While the second enforcement mechanism of conditional IMF lending was initially fully operative, helping to enforce Argentina's compliance in the first years of the crisis, the outcome of the megaswap greatly reduced the risk of an Argentine default to the international financial system. Combined with mounting domestic opposition in the United States to further international bailout loans, this greatly weakened the IMF's capacity to impose fiscal discipline on Argentina, eventually leading the Fund to pull the plug on its own bailout program, causing the second enforcement mechanism to break down altogether. The chapter recounts the process through which this breakdown occurred.


2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 570-593
Author(s):  
Aike I. Würdemann

Abstract In 2014, the BRICS countries established the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) purportedly to compensate for the BRICS’ frustration over the non-materialization of reforms in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that had long been promised but blocked by the United States until late 2015. A contractual analysis of the CRA reveals that though all BRICS countries enjoy equality for strategic decisions, the CRA strongly resembles the IMF’s quota-based voting distribution where operational decisions are taken. It nevertheless provides a more balanced voting system, as it does not provide one single party with a veto position. The CRA further lacks legal personality and other fundamental features such as its own staff or macroeconomic research facilities. Financing approvals are thus linked to IMF on-track arrangements, which undermines the CRA’s significance. The CRA nonetheless holds the potential to be developed into a viable BRICS alternative to the IMF in the long term.


2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 1850206
Author(s):  
Kati Suominen

The International Monetary Fund (IMF), only a few years ago fading into obscurity in the thriving world economy, made a comeback during the 2008-2009 crisis. The G-20 re-tasked the Fund and tripled its lending capacity. Notwithstanding its new windfall and duties, the Fund’s legitimacy and effectiveness are in doubt. The main challenges center on disagreements between the Western European nations and emerging markets over the Fund’s governance and focus, a specter of disintegration of the global crisis management architecture by way of bilateral and regional financial arrangements (particularly in Asia), and limitations to the Fund’s responsiveness to major crises. Yet the threat of global financial instability persists, and the Fund is uniquely qualified to counter it. The United States, the Fund’s founder and main shareholder, has sponsored sound reforms to the Fund in the context of the G-20. However, farther-reaching paradigmatic changes are required for the Fund to effectively manage global economic instability in the 21st century: focusing the Fund’s analytical powers squarely on systemic risks and largest economies rather than on small, developing nations; turning the Fund from a crisis firefighter into a global preventive care unit that rewards members for sound policies; and making the Fund a bridge between public and private insurance markets.


1991 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 141-174 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivelaw L. Griffith

The death of forbes burnham in August 1985 and the passing of power to Hugh Desmond Hoyte have produced dramatic changes in Guyana, South America's only English-speaking republic. Some of these have involved: (1) privatization of the public sector, (2) abolition of overseas voting, (3) negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), (4) rapprochement with the United States, plus (5) an agreement that observers — including former President Jimmy Carter and representatives from the London-based Commonwealth Secretariat—are being invited to oversee the upcoming elections scheduled for either August or September 1991.Precipitated by domestic and international pressures, these changes have taken place within the context of a change in regimes as well, in which one dominant leader, Forbes Burnham, has been succeeded by another equally dominant, Desmond Hoyte.


1950 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 322-323

During the month of November 1949 the International Monetary Fund sold $22.5 million to Brazil, and the government of Costa Rica repurchased $1.25 million. The Fund concurred in a change proposed by the United Kingdom government in the par value of the British Honduras dollar effective December 31, 1949. In terms of gold and in terms of the United States dollar of the weight and fineness in effect on July 1, 1944, the parities for the British Honduras dollar were: 0.622 grams of fine gold per British Honduras dollar and 1.429 British Honduras dollars per United States dollar.


1955 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 277-278

On December 24, 1954, Colombia purchased $25 million from the International Monetary Fund with Colombian pesos. The purchase, Colombia's first transaction with the Fund, was equivalent to 50 percent of Colombia's quota, and required a waiver under Article V, section 4, of the Fund's Articles of Agreement. Colombia under took the purchase with the understanding that its pesos would be repurchased from the Fund within a period of three of five years. The drawing was designed to meet payments difficulties of a temporary nature that had resulted in the development of commercial arrears, particularly with the United States; the difficulties were attributed to a sharp decline in the price of coffee and a slackening of demand for it, beginning about the middle of August 1954.


1949 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 536-538

In its monthly summary of transactions, the International Monetary Fund announced in April 1949, that it had sold U.S. $7,500,000 to India for rupees during March. There were no other currency exchanges that month. In April, Brazil and Egypt made their first currency purchase from the Fund: Brazil exchanged cruzeiros for $15 million and Egypt $3 million for Egyptian pounds. This brought the total of currency transactions made by member countries of the Fund to $725,483,380.91 since the beginning of operations in March 1947. On May 24, the Fund announced the establishment of the initial par value for the Yugoslav dinar at 50 dinars per United States dollar, the rate proposed by the government of Yugoslavia. On May 3, the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development were signed by the Siamese ambassador to the United States on behalf of Siam. This brought to a total of 48 the number of countries that were members of the two organizations. The Fund announced on May 27, the conclusion of consultations with the government of Ecuador on Ecuador's exchange system, and on related matters of credit and monetary policies. As a result of previous consultations with the Fund, Ecuador in June 1947 had introduced certain modifications in her then existing exchange control laws and regulations which were contained in the Emergency Law for International Transfers. As a result of discussions concluded in May the Emergency Law was to be continued for one year more on the understanding that in the meantime consultations between Ecuador and the Fund would take place regarding modifications in the present exchange system.


Author(s):  
C. Randall Henning

The United States played an active role in the response to the euro crisis and decisions on the involvement of the International Monetary Fund. U.S. policymakers supported the use of the Fund in order to assist Europe and prevent contagion across the Atlantic. But the United States conditioned its support on euro-area-wide policies to extinguish the crisis, including creating the European Financial Stability Facility and European Stability Mechanism, using the European Central Bank balance sheet fully, and committing to banking union. This chapter traces the evolution of U.S. strategy during the crisis and the conversion of officials in Washington to the cause of completing the architecture of the euro area. The IMF staff also advocated deepening the euro area, and did so more strongly than many euro-area member states. The Fund’s advocacy, which is puzzling from the standpoint of its bureaucratic interest, reflects the preferences of the United States and other non-European members.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ariel Kessel Akerman ◽  
Leonardo Weller ◽  
Joao Paulo Pessoa

Was the International Monetary Fund (IMF) susceptible to political pressure from the United States and its Western allies during the Cold War? To answer this question, we construct a new database containing the number of conditions applied to over 500 IMF loans since 1970 and analyze how the distance from a borrowing country to its closet communist neighbor affected the IMF conditionality. We show that the fund imposed fewer conditions on loans to countries geographically closer to the communist bloc. Results are stronger when neighboring communist countries were not part of the Warsaw Pact. This pattern persisted during the 1990s, when the fund helped former communist countries in their transition to market economies. However, we find no strong evidence of such discretionary treatment by the IMF after 2001, when thecontainment of communism had ceased to be the West’s top priority.


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