From IMF Poster Child to Wayward Student

Financial System ◽

The United States ◽

Fiscal Discipline ◽

Enforcement Mechanism ◽

International Financial System ◽

The Imf

This chapter considers why the International Monetary Fund (IMF) did it not prevent Argentina's record default of 2001. It suggests that the IMF was both unable and unwilling to stop it. While the second enforcement mechanism of conditional IMF lending was initially fully operative, helping to enforce Argentina's compliance in the first years of the crisis, the outcome of the megaswap greatly reduced the risk of an Argentine default to the international financial system. Combined with mounting domestic opposition in the United States to further international bailout loans, this greatly weakened the IMF's capacity to impose fiscal discipline on Argentina, eventually leading the Fund to pull the plug on its own bailout program, causing the second enforcement mechanism to break down altogether. The chapter recounts the process through which this breakdown occurred.

The West’s Teeth: IMF Conditionality During the Cold War

10.31235/osf.io/vxbw9 ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

Ariel Kessel Akerman ◽

Leonardo Weller ◽

Joao Paulo Pessoa

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

Cold War ◽

Strong Evidence ◽

The United States ◽

Political Pressure ◽

The Cold War ◽

Communist Countries ◽

The Imf

Was the International Monetary Fund (IMF) susceptible to political pressure from the United States and its Western allies during the Cold War? To answer this question, we construct a new database containing the number of conditions applied to over 500 IMF loans since 1970 and analyze how the distance from a borrowing country to its closet communist neighbor affected the IMF conditionality. We show that the fund imposed fewer conditions on loans to countries geographically closer to the communist bloc. Results are stronger when neighboring communist countries were not part of the Warsaw Pact. This pattern persisted during the 1990s, when the fund helped former communist countries in their transition to market economies. However, we find no strong evidence of such discretionary treatment by the IMF after 2001, when thecontainment of communism had ceased to be the West’s top priority.

The BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement: A Subversive Power Against the IMF’s Conditionality?

The Journal of World Investment & Trade ◽

10.1163/22119000-12340099 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 19 (3) ◽

pp. 570-593

Author(s):

Aike I. Würdemann

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

The United States ◽

Strategic Decisions ◽

Legal Personality ◽

Brics Countries ◽

Voting System ◽

Research Facilities ◽

Abstract In 2014, the BRICS countries established the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) purportedly to compensate for the BRICS’ frustration over the non-materialization of reforms in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that had long been promised but blocked by the United States until late 2015. A contractual analysis of the CRA reveals that though all BRICS countries enjoy equality for strategic decisions, the CRA strongly resembles the IMF’s quota-based voting distribution where operational decisions are taken. It nevertheless provides a more balanced voting system, as it does not provide one single party with a veto position. The CRA further lacks legal personality and other fundamental features such as its own staff or macroeconomic research facilities. Financing approvals are thus linked to IMF on-track arrangements, which undermines the CRA’s significance. The CRA nonetheless holds the potential to be developed into a viable BRICS alternative to the IMF in the long term.

Insuring Against Instability: United States and the Future of the International Monetary Fund

Global Economy Journal ◽

10.2202/1524-5861.1650 ◽

2010 ◽

Vol 10 (3) ◽

pp. 1850206

Author(s):

Kati Suominen

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

World Economy ◽

Private Insurance ◽

The United States ◽

Insurance Markets ◽

Public And Private ◽

Systemic Risks ◽

Financial Arrangements ◽

The International Monetary Fund (IMF), only a few years ago fading into obscurity in the thriving world economy, made a comeback during the 2008-2009 crisis. The G-20 re-tasked the Fund and tripled its lending capacity. Notwithstanding its new windfall and duties, the Fund’s legitimacy and effectiveness are in doubt. The main challenges center on disagreements between the Western European nations and emerging markets over the Fund’s governance and focus, a specter of disintegration of the global crisis management architecture by way of bilateral and regional financial arrangements (particularly in Asia), and limitations to the Fund’s responsiveness to major crises. Yet the threat of global financial instability persists, and the Fund is uniquely qualified to counter it. The United States, the Fund’s founder and main shareholder, has sponsored sound reforms to the Fund in the context of the G-20. However, farther-reaching paradigmatic changes are required for the Fund to effectively manage global economic instability in the 21st century: focusing the Fund’s analytical powers squarely on systemic risks and largest economies rather than on small, developing nations; turning the Fund from a crisis firefighter into a global preventive care unit that rewards members for sound policies; and making the Fund a bridge between public and private insurance markets.

The Military and the Politics of Change in Guyana

Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs ◽

10.2307/165833 ◽

1991 ◽

Vol 33 (2) ◽

pp. 141-174 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Ivelaw L. Griffith

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

Public Sector ◽

The United States ◽

Jimmy Carter ◽

The Public ◽

English Speaking ◽

International Pressures ◽

The Military ◽

The death of forbes burnham in August 1985 and the passing of power to Hugh Desmond Hoyte have produced dramatic changes in Guyana, South America's only English-speaking republic. Some of these have involved: (1) privatization of the public sector, (2) abolition of overseas voting, (3) negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), (4) rapprochement with the United States, plus (5) an agreement that observers — including former President Jimmy Carter and representatives from the London-based Commonwealth Secretariat—are being invited to oversee the upcoming elections scheduled for either August or September 1991.Precipitated by domestic and international pressures, these changes have taken place within the context of a change in regimes as well, in which one dominant leader, Forbes Burnham, has been succeeded by another equally dominant, Desmond Hoyte.

Silent Revolution: The International Monetary Fund 1979–1989. By James M. Boughton. Washington, DC: The International Monetary Fund, 2001. Pp. xxvii, 1111. $75. The Chastening: Inside the Crisis that Rocked the Global Financial System and Humbled the IMF. By Paul Blustein. New York: Public Affairs, 2001. Pp. xvi, 431. $30.

The Journal of Economic History ◽

10.1017/s0022050702001596 ◽

2002 ◽

Vol 62 (03) ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Michele Fratianni

Keyword(s):

New York ◽

Financial System ◽

Public Affairs ◽

Washington Dc ◽

Silent Revolution ◽

Global Financial System ◽

The Imf

International Monetary Fund

International Organization ◽

10.1017/s0020818300029209 ◽

1950 ◽

Vol 4 (2) ◽

pp. 322-323

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

The United States ◽

United States Dollar ◽

The United Kingdom ◽

British Honduras ◽

The Government ◽

United Kingdom Government ◽

Fine Gold

During the month of November 1949 the International Monetary Fund sold $22.5 million to Brazil, and the government of Costa Rica repurchased $1.25 million. The Fund concurred in a change proposed by the United Kingdom government in the par value of the British Honduras dollar effective December 31, 1949. In terms of gold and in terms of the United States dollar of the weight and fineness in effect on July 1, 1944, the parities for the British Honduras dollar were: 0.622 grams of fine gold per British Honduras dollar and 1.429 British Honduras dollars per United States dollar.

International Monetary Fund

International Organization ◽

10.1017/s0020818300022700 ◽

1955 ◽

Vol 9 (2) ◽

pp. 277-278

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

The United States ◽

Sharp Decline ◽

On December 24, 1954, Colombia purchased $25 million from the International Monetary Fund with Colombian pesos. The purchase, Colombia's first transaction with the Fund, was equivalent to 50 percent of Colombia's quota, and required a waiver under Article V, section 4, of the Fund's Articles of Agreement. Colombia under took the purchase with the understanding that its pesos would be repurchased from the Fund within a period of three of five years. The drawing was designed to meet payments difficulties of a temporary nature that had resulted in the development of commercial arrears, particularly with the United States; the difficulties were attributed to a sharp decline in the price of coffee and a slackening of demand for it, beginning about the middle of August 1954.

Appendix: Methods of Presenting the Balance of Payments of the United States

National Institute Economic Review ◽

10.1177/002795016503300104 ◽

1965 ◽

Vol 33 ◽

pp. 33-34

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

The United States ◽

Balance Of Payments ◽

Perfect Measure ◽

There is no perfect measure of a country's balance of payments and no ideal way to present it. Some valuable standardisation has been achieved by the International Monetary Fund, but Official presentations still vary quite widely between one country and another and between different periods for the same country.

International Monetary Fund

International Organization ◽

10.1017/s0020818300014636 ◽

1949 ◽

Vol 3 (3) ◽

pp. 536-538

Keyword(s):

United States ◽

The United States ◽

Exchange System ◽

Control Laws ◽

United States Dollar ◽

The Government ◽

One Year ◽

Exchange Control ◽

In its monthly summary of transactions, the International Monetary Fund announced in April 1949, that it had sold U.S. $7,500,000 to India for rupees during March. There were no other currency exchanges that month. In April, Brazil and Egypt made their first currency purchase from the Fund: Brazil exchanged cruzeiros for $15 million and Egypt $3 million for Egyptian pounds. This brought the total of currency transactions made by member countries of the Fund to $725,483,380.91 since the beginning of operations in March 1947. On May 24, the Fund announced the establishment of the initial par value for the Yugoslav dinar at 50 dinars per United States dollar, the rate proposed by the government of Yugoslavia. On May 3, the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development were signed by the Siamese ambassador to the United States on behalf of Siam. This brought to a total of 48 the number of countries that were members of the two organizations. The Fund announced on May 27, the conclusion of consultations with the government of Ecuador on Ecuador's exchange system, and on related matters of credit and monetary policies. As a result of previous consultations with the Fund, Ecuador in June 1947 had introduced certain modifications in her then existing exchange control laws and regulations which were contained in the Emergency Law for International Transfers. As a result of discussions concluded in May the Emergency Law was to be continued for one year more on the understanding that in the meantime consultations between Ecuador and the Fund would take place regarding modifications in the present exchange system.

International Monetary Fund and Its Impact on the Financial System of Ukraine

Business Inform ◽

10.32983/2222-4459-2021-10-298-304 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 10 (525) ◽

pp. 298-304

Author(s):

N. А. Plieshakova ◽

◽

O. S. Lialkin ◽

Keyword(s):

Public Debt ◽

Financial System ◽

Economic Consequences ◽

Scientific Article ◽

Scientific Papers ◽

Credit Programs ◽

The Impact ◽

The Imf

The proposed scientific article is devoted to the topical issue of the need for Ukraine’s cooperation with the International Monetary Fund. In the context of the growing socio-economic crisis phenomena in the world and taking into account the significant problems that have been taking place in the Ukrainian economy in recent years, it is advisable to assess the IMF’s impact on the financial system of Ukraine. The article is aimed at studying in-depth the key problems of Ukraine’s cooperation with the International Monetary Fund, covering the impact of loans granted to Ukraine from the IMF on the country’s financial system and developing possible directions and ways to ensure effective cooperation between Ukraine and the IMF for the future. In analyzing and generalizing the scientific papers of domestic and foreign scientists, the authors consider the views on strengthening the role of the International Monetary Fund, which is caused by the spread of COVID-19, analyze the key functions of the International Monetary Fund and criticism on the part of the IMF for servicing the economic and political interests of the countries that have the highest quota, and not those in need of financial assistance. The article considers the dynamics of Ukraine’s use of IMF credit programs, in particular: dynamics of borrowings and repayments by Ukraine of the borrowed resources from the IMF; credit programs within the framework of Ukraine’s cooperation with the IMF in 2014–2021; share of debt to the IMF in the external and total public debt of Ukraine; critical indicators of Ukraine’s public debt and economic consequences. Prospects for further research in this direction are finding ways to improve the debt policy strategy, as well as to implement a coherent strategy for managing the external public debt.