scholarly journals To Merge, Sell, or Liquidate? Socioemotional Wealth, Family Control, and the Choice of Business Exit

2019 ◽  
Vol 46 (8) ◽  
pp. 1342-1379 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco Chirico ◽  
Luis R. Gómez-Mejia ◽  
Karin Hellerstedt ◽  
Michael Withers ◽  
Mattias Nordqvist

We take the perspective that considering the affective motives of dominant owners is essential to understanding business exit. Drawing on a refinement of behavioral agency theory, we argue that family-controlled firms are less likely than non-family-controlled firms to exit and tend to endure increased financial distress to avoid losses to the family’s socioemotional wealth (SEW) embodied in the firm. Yet, when confronted with different exit options and when performance heuristics suggest that exit is unavoidable, family firms are more likely to exit via merger, which we argue saves some SEW, although it is less satisfactory financially. In contrast, nonfamily firms are more likely to exit via sale or dissolution, options that are more prone to offer higher financial returns than mergers. Family and nonfamily firms thus show different orders of exit options. We find support for these arguments in a longitudinal matched sample of privately held firms.

2018 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 397-416 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mary Beth Rousseau ◽  
Franz Kellermanns ◽  
Thomas Zellweger ◽  
Tammy E. Beck

We investigate how family relationship conflict and family and firm name congruence influence subjective firm valuations by family firm owner-managers. Drawing on the socioemotional wealth perspective, behavioral agency theory and mixed gamble reasonings, we hypothesize and find a U-shaped association between relationship conflict inside the family firm and subjective firm valuation. While we do not find a direct effect between name congruence and subjective firm valuation, we show that name congruence interacts with relationship conflict to affect valuations in a complex fashion. Implications and contributions of our findings are discussed.


2015 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 1369-1397 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luis R. Gomez-Mejia ◽  
Pankaj C. Patel ◽  
Thomas M. Zellweger

We posit that family firms often face a dilemma in their strategic decision making: whether to maintain current socioemotional wealth or pursue prospective financial wealth. Applying such a mixed gamble perspective to acquisitions, family owners assess potential acquisitions with regard to their impact on both wealth dimensions. In line with this reasoning, our results show that family control implies a general reluctance to acquire and, when an acquisition happens, a preference for related targets. Because financial and socioemotional viewpoints lead to largely incompatible predictions about the occurrence and relatedness of acquisitions, family firm owners use their firm’s vulnerability as a signal. Increased vulnerability leads to a heightened propensity to prioritize financial over socioemotional wealth problem framing, which is reflected in the acquisition of unrelated targets. Empirical results are supportive of these predictions.


Author(s):  
Shainaz Firfiray ◽  
Martin Larraza-Kintana ◽  
Luis R. Gómez-Mejía

This chapter analyzes the relationship between family control of the firm and its labor productivity. It builds upon the socioemotional wealth (SEW) perspective of family firms to develop a set of propositions that connect SEW priorities, trust, leadership style, nonfamily managers, and the implementation of high performance work practices with labor productivity. The authors argue that SEW priorities warrant adoption of a set of policies and behaviors among the controlling family managers that shape the behaviors and attitudes of the workforce, and these in turn affect labor productivity. This model helps explain observed differences in labor productivity between family and nonfamily firms across different firm sizes, as well as differences in labor productivity among family firms.


2021 ◽  
pp. 234094442110517
Author(s):  
Carlos Fernández Méndez ◽  
Rubén Arrondo García ◽  
Shams Pathan

We study the effects of family control on CEO pay from the perspective of behavioral agency model (BAM), with particular focus on family firm’s generational stage and CEO family ties. Using a panel of Australian listed firms, we find that family firms present lower total and variable CEO pay, showing also less pay disparity between the CEO and other top executives. We also find that multi-generational family firms and those run by non-family CEOs offer higher total and variable CEO pay and present high pay disparity. The BAM and family’s aversion to socioemotional wealth loss can explain the effects of family control based on the pursuing of non-financial family goals. The decline of these goals derived from the aging of the firm and the hiring of external CEOs shape family control and should be considered in the design of executive compensation policies and by external parties when assessing their suitability. JEL CLASSIFICATION: G30; G32; G34; G38


2017 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 1713-1738 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luis R. Gomez-Mejia ◽  
Ionela Neacsu ◽  
Geoffrey Martin

We combine behavioral agency and family business literature to analyze the role of dominant firm principals in constraining the managerial agent’s (CEO’s) response to equity-based pay. Behavioral agency research has made progress in understanding CEO risk behavior in response to equity-based incentives and family firm risk behavior driven by concentrated socioemotional and financial firm-specific risk bearing. However, both literatures have evolved independently, which has limited our understanding of how the risk bearing of agent and principal influences the predictions of the behavioral agency model (BAM). We combine these literatures in order to enhance BAM’s predictive validity with regard to firm risk-taking as a function of both agent and principal risk preferences. Our findings suggest that family principals are more likely than nonfamily principals to constrain CEO risk behavior that is perceived as immoderate (excessively risk averse or excessively risk seeking). We also offer evidence that CEO ties to the family influence the CEO’s response to equity-based incentives. In doing so, we offer refinements to BAM’s formulation and advance our understanding of the unique nature of agency problems within family firms.


2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 468-496 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohammad Rezaur Razzak ◽  
Suaad Jassem

Purpose Although family business literature acknowledges that family firms owners are motivated by a set of socioemotional wealth (SEW) goals along with firm-centric business goals, yet a consistently predictable pattern of relationship between SEW and financial wealth is yet to be discerned. The purpose of this paper is to propose a theoretical model based on the stakeholder approach to suggest that family commitment mediates the association between the dimensions of SEW and firm performance. Design/methodology/approach A set of hypotheses are proposed that are tested using structural equation modeling with data collected from 357 medium to large sized privately held family firms in Bangladesh. The data analysis is done with SmartPLS (v.3.2). Findings The results indicate that family commitment partially mediates the relationships between family control and influence, family identification, emotional attachment and renewal of family bonds through dynastic succession and firm performance. The only non-significant relationship was between binding social ties and firm performance. The results provide a more nuanced understanding of the link between SEW goals and firm performance, and present important implications for theory and practice. Research limitations/implications The cross-sectional nature of the study exposes it to the specter of common method bias despite the fact that procedural remedies were initiated to minimize the impact of such occurrence. A longitudinal study with data obtained from multiple individuals at different levels of the organization would possibly yield more robust findings. Furthermore, in the absence of a multi-country and multi-sector analysis, a broad generalization of the findings may not be feasible. Practical implications The knowledge that family identity, emotional attachment and renewal of family bonds through dynastic succession may be leveraged to enhance the commitment of subsequent generation of family firm owners to the firm that may be pertinent to incumbents who desire to see their successors more engaged in the family enterprise. Furthermore, knowing that excessive focus on family control over the firm leads to negative outcomes is also pertinent to family firm leaders. Social implications Survival of family businesses is vital to the global economy as one of the primary drivers of global GDP growth and source of new employment. Policy makers can benefit from the findings of this study to customize policies that take into cognizance the importance of SEW owners of family firms and the fact that some of these SEW goals actually benefit the firm in terms of enhanced commitment to the enterprise and consequently superior firm performance. Originality/value The role of family commitment as a mediator between SEW and firm performance has not been dominant in the literature. By providing a finer-grained understanding of how family commitment accounts for the relationship between family-centric non-economic goals such as SEW and firm-centric goals such as business performance, the study presents a theoretical link between sociomemotional wealth and financial wealth in the context of private family firms.


2010 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 70-90
Author(s):  
Sugiarto Sugiarto

Compared to non-family controlled firms, family controlled firms  have a stronger desire to maintain control to protect their highly valuable private benefits of control and firm-specific human capital. With substantial wealth and human capital at risk, family owners tend to be more risk averse than non-family owners, and also have stronger intention to reduce the prospect of financial distress and bankruptcy. These unique characteristics of family firms potentially make their capital structure decisions different from those of non-family firms. Panel data from 137 publicly listed firms in Indonesia from 1996 to 2005 were used to investigate the impact of family control on capital structure, particularly on debt maturity decisions. Keywords: Family controlled firms, capital structure decisions, debt maturity


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document