Weber and Legal Rule Evolution: The Closing of the Iron Cage?

2005 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 621-653 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. Devereaux Jennings ◽  
Martin Schulz ◽  
David Patient ◽  
Caroline Gravel ◽  
Ke Yuan
Keyword(s):  
2017 ◽  
Vol 47 (188) ◽  
pp. 453-470 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans-Peter Büttner

While the majority of the scientific community holds Marxian Value and Price Theory to be internally inconsistent because of the so-called “transformation problem”, these claims can be sufficiently refuted. The key to the solution of the “transformation problem” is quite simple, so this contribution, because it requires the rejection of simultanism and physicalism, which represent the genuine method of neoclassical economics, a method that is completely incompatible with Marxian Critique of Political Economy. Outside of the iron cage of neoclassical equilibrium economics, Marxian ‘Capital’ can be reconstructed without neoclassical “pathologies” and offers us a whole new world of analytical tools for a critical theory of capitalist societies and its dynamics.


1991 ◽  
Vol 16 (02) ◽  
pp. 205-248 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen M. Feldman

Among legal scholars, Anthony T. Kronman and David M. Trubek have provided the leading interpretations of Weber's theory of law. Kronman and Trubek agree on two important points: Weber's theory is fundamentally contradictory, and Weber's theory relates primarily to private law subjects such as contracts. This article contests both of these points. Building on a foundation of Weber's neo-Kantian metaphysics and his sociological categories of economic action, this article shows that Weber's theory of law is not fundamentally inconsistent; rather it explores the inconsistencies that are inherent within Western society itself, including its legal systems. Furthermore, Weber's insights can be applied to modern constitutional jurisprudence. Weberian theory reveals that modern constitutional law is riddled with irreconcilable tensions between process and substance—between formal and substantive rationality. In the context of racial discrimination cases involving equal protection and the Fifteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court's acceptance of John Hart Ely's theory of representation-reinforcement demonstrates the Court's resolute pursuit of formal rationality, which insures that the substantive values and needs of minorities will remain unsatisfied.


2020 ◽  
pp. 219-241
Author(s):  
Timothy William Waters

This chapter explores strategies to achieve acceptance of a right to secede, whether as a legal rule or as a model for individual states. Secession is a hard sell, and the principal battleground is moral and political. A shift in attitudes must precede the legal project; only then will people see doctrinal arguments lining up and making sense. And, after all, the goal is not a new legal right for its own sake, but a change in how societies and states behave. The chapter then considers why a formal right of secession is implausible, and what that implies about the best strategies to adopt—the narrow but real possibilities that exist. The path is indirect: It relies on transnational diffusion of norms, and for this people can draw lessons from once-improbable projects that have become orthodoxies, such as decolonization and human rights; also, recent secession attempts suggest that constitutional projects could serve as models. The path leads through many small changes, rather than a single, quixotic swerve toward a new legal rule. But because the existing global norm limits the ability to create change within states, people cannot abandon the idea of a new rule: Advocates of secession need a point of triangulation outside the state to advance their cause, and that point will be found in international law.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emad H. Atiq

Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy, ForthcomingLegal anti-positivism is widely believed to be a general theory of law that generates far too many false negatives. If anti-positivism is true, certain rules bearing all the hallmarks of legality are not in fact legal. This impression, fostered by both positivists and anti-positivists, stems from an overly narrow conception of the kinds of moral facts that ground legal facts: roughly, facts about what is morally optimific — morally best or morally justified or morally obligatory given our social practices. A less restrictive view of the kinds of moral properties that ground legality results in a form of anti-positivism that can accommodate any legal rule consistent with positivism, including the alleged counterexamples. I articulate an ‘inclusive’ form of anti-positivism that is not just invulnerable to extensional challenge from the positivist. It is the only account that withstands extensional objections, while incorporating, on purely conceptual grounds, a large part of the content of morality into law.


2016 ◽  
Vol 70 (1) ◽  
pp. 8-20
Author(s):  
Łukasz Albański

Young people are confronting a world in which they may not achieve economic strides their parents did. Almost all will have been awarded university degree, worth far less (in the terms and conditions of their employment) than that of their parents, if they themselves graduated from university. In the article the author discusses the relationship between higher education and stratification. The concepts of meritocracy and credentialism are considered and a particular attention is paid to an equal/unequal access to education dilemma. Discussed is why a liberal arts education is losing ground and why it is being made a scapegoat for graduate unemployment. Does the nightmare of Weber’s “iron cage of rationalization” come true and is the contemporary university in the service of an economic order with all the related technical requirements of machine production? In the second part of the article the role of meritocratic discourse and educational credential inflation is considered as well as the growth of menial jobs for young people as a case in Poland. Key words: education at post-secondary level, liberal arts, youth unemployment, inequality, Poland.


2014 ◽  
Vol 66 (4) ◽  
pp. 1339-1344
Author(s):  
Branislav Ristivojevic ◽  
Tatjana Bugarski

The criminal offence ?killing and torturing animals? under Article 269 of the Criminal Code says that it can be committed only ?contrary to regulations?. The regulations governing the treatment of experimental animals are the Animal Welfare Law from 2009 and the Law on the Ratification of the European Convention for the Protection of Vertebrate Animals used for experimental and other scientific purposes amended by the Protocol of amendment to the European Convention for the Protection of Vertebrate Animals used for experimental and other scientific purposes from 2010. The first one imposes numerous obligations and introduces numerous prohibitions in the treatment of experimental animals, which at first sight make the possibilities of committing this criminal offence greater. The other law does not contain most of the prohibitions and restrictions that are included in the Animal Welfare Law. Thanks to a legal rule which says that a later law regulating the same subject replaces the former one (lex posterior derogate legi priori) and the aforementioned unconstitutionality of many provisions of the Animal Welfare Law, researchers and teachers in Serbia are not in particular danger of criminal prosecution.


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