scholarly journals There Are No Easy Counterexamples to Legal Anti-Positivism

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emad H. Atiq

Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy, ForthcomingLegal anti-positivism is widely believed to be a general theory of law that generates far too many false negatives. If anti-positivism is true, certain rules bearing all the hallmarks of legality are not in fact legal. This impression, fostered by both positivists and anti-positivists, stems from an overly narrow conception of the kinds of moral facts that ground legal facts: roughly, facts about what is morally optimific — morally best or morally justified or morally obligatory given our social practices. A less restrictive view of the kinds of moral properties that ground legality results in a form of anti-positivism that can accommodate any legal rule consistent with positivism, including the alleged counterexamples. I articulate an ‘inclusive’ form of anti-positivism that is not just invulnerable to extensional challenge from the positivist. It is the only account that withstands extensional objections, while incorporating, on purely conceptual grounds, a large part of the content of morality into law.

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Emad H Atiq

Legal anti-positivism is widely believed to be a general theory of law that generates far too many false negatives. If anti-positivism is true, certain rules bearing all the hallmarks of legality are not in fact legal. This impression, fostered by both positivists and anti-positivists, stems from an overly narrow conception of the kinds of moral facts that ground legal facts: roughly, facts about what is morally optimific—morally best or morally justified or morally obligatory given our social practices. A less restrictive view of the kinds of moral properties that ground legality results in a form of anti-positivism that can accommodate any legal rule consistent with positivism, including the alleged counter-examples. This form of “inclusive” anti-positivism is not just invulnerable to extensional challenges from the positivist. It is the only account that withstands extensional objections, while incorporating, on purely conceptual grounds, a large part of the content of morality into law.


Author(s):  
Kenneth Einar Himma

In his outstanding paper “How Facts Make Law,” Mark Greenberg argues for the antipositivist claim that descriptive facts about certain social practices are not the only necessary determinants of legal content; “value facts” – which he is committed to construing as moral facts – are another necessary determinant of legal content. In this essay, I argue that, construed as doing the work Greenberg believes it does in refuting positivism, his conclusion that legal content is not possible without value facts has certain implications about the nature of morality that no purely metaphysical considerations about the relationship between social practices and the content of social norms can plausibly have. In particular, Greenberg’s conclusion, together with the obvious (because extremely weak) truth that law is possible, seems to imply moral objectivism – a highly contested view in general ethical theorizing. I take this to be a reductio of his view, as it seems clear that no theory relying on general metaphysical claims about social practices can bear such weight.


2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (16) ◽  
Author(s):  
Agata C. Amato Mangiameli (Universidade de Roma – Tor Vergata)

This paper aims investigate the general theory and the elements of the computer crimes as well it social engineering, because as technology advances, more and more people use it according to their needs.


Author(s):  
Yulia Fanilevna Aitova ◽  

The article analyzes the issue of determining the legal status of the individual management body of a limited liability company. The author begins his research with the concept of legal status existing in the general theory of law, and then proceeds to consider the issue from the point of view of philosophical categories. In addition, the work explores the diversity of points of view existing in the doctrine regarding the legal status of the individual management body of economic societies.


Author(s):  
Iuliia Rossius

The goal of this article consists in demonstration of the impact of research in the field of history and theory of law alongside the hermeneutics of Emilio Betti impacted the vector of this philosophical thought. The subject of this article is the lectures read by Emilio Betti (prolusioni) in 1927 and 1948, as well as his writings of 1949 and 1962. Analysis is conducted on the succession of Betti's ideas in these works, which is traced despite the discrepancy in their theme (legal and philosophical). The author indicates “legal” origin of the canons of Bettis’ hermeneutics, namely the canon of autonomy of the object. Emphasis is placed on the problem of objectivity in Betti's theory, as well as on dialectical tension between the historicity of the interpreted subject and strangeness of the object that accompanies legal, as well as any other type of interpretation. The article reveals the key moment of Betti's criticism of Hans-Georg Gadamer. Regarding the question of historicity of the subject of interpretation. The conclusion is made that the origin of the general theory of interpretation lies in the approaches and methods developed and implemented by Betti back in legal hermeneutics and in studying history of law.   Betti's philosophical theory was significantly affected by the idea on the role of modern legal dogma in interpretation of the history of law. Namely this idea that contains the principle of historicity of the subject of interpretation, which commenced  the general hermeneutical theory of Emilio Betti, was realized in canon of the relevance of understanding in the lecture in 1948, and later in the “general theory of interpretation”. The author also underlines that the question of objectivity of understanding, which has crucial practical importance in legal hermeneutics, was transmitted into the philosophical works of E. Betti, finding reflection in dialectic of the subject and object of interpretation.


2021 ◽  
pp. 66
Author(s):  
Mikhail M. Brinchuk

The article explores the special legal regime of natural resources. The position is evaluated of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation also and the provisions of the General theory of law on a special legal regime are considered. Analyzed the special legal regime of natural resources. Nature is investigated as an exceptional value for society and, accordingly, the object of a special legal regime.


Author(s):  
Вадим Леонидович Афанасьевский

Предметом статьи является экспликация методологического базиса разработанной французским правоведом Жаном-Луи Бержелем концепции общей теории права. Автор фиксирует, что методология этой конструкции отличается принципиальной спецификой от классического рационализма научного знания. Бержель для разработки проблем теории права использовал импрессионистский метод, принципиально выходящий за рамки научной методологии. Это приводит к тому, что читатель превращается в соавтора, выстраивая свое представление о предмете теории права. Причем фантазия автора и читателя ничем не ограничена, ибо она уходит от исторических трансформаций развития правовой реальности и традиций теоретического правового дискурса. В статье показано, что предложенная методология привела Бержеля к размытости и непроясненности понятийного аппарата и «терминологическому анархизму». Представив свой анализ его концепции общей теории права, автор статьи приходит к выводу, что основанием методологии Бержеля являются характерные для французской социогуманитарной мысли принципы экзистенциальной философии и постмодернистских штудий. Именно в этом коренится отсутствие целостности в теоретических построениях, наличие эклектизма и туманности употребляемых терминов и понятий. В эту парадигму прекрасно укладывается импрессионистский метод, используемый французским правоведом. Если читатель сам определяет понимание читаемого текста, то смысл уже не определяется объективной реальностью. Он выступает проблемой изолированного индивида, находящегося в произвольно выстроенном им фрагментированном мире, в том числе и мире права The subject of the article is the explication of the methodological basis of the concept of the general theory of law developed by the French jurist Jean-Louis Bergel. The author notes that the methodology of this construction differs in fundamental specificity from the classical rationalism of scientific knowledge. Bergel used the impressionist method to develop problems in the theory of law, which fundamentally went beyond the framework of scientific methodology. This leads to the fact that the reader turns into a co-author, building his own idea of the subject of the theory of law. Moreover, the imagination of the author and the reader is not limited by anything, for it moves away from the historical transformations of the development of legal reality and the traditions of theoretical legal discourse. The article shows that the proposed methodology led Bergel to a vague and unclear conceptual apparatus and «terminological anarchism». Having presented his analysis of his concept of the general theory of law, the author of the article comes to the conclusion that the basis of Bergel's methodology is the principles of existential philosophy and postmodern studies that are characteristic of French socio-humanitarian thought. This is the root of the lack of integrity in theoretical constructions, the presence of eclecticism and the vagueness of the terms and concepts used. The impressionistic method used by the French jurist fits perfectly into this paradigm. If the reader himself determines the understanding of the text being read, then the meaning is no longer determined by objective reality. It acts as a problem of an isolated individual who is in a fragmented world arbitrarily built by him, including the world of law


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