scholarly journals Do Firm- and Board-specific Characteristics Corroborate Underpricing? A Study on the Indian IPOs

2019 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 86-102
Author(s):  
Ramit Anand ◽  
Balwinder Singh

The present research article is an attempt to add something new and revalidate the influence of already existing corporate governance dimensions related to the board of directors on listing-day performance of the Indian initial public offering (IPO) firms measured through underpricing. Like other emerging market economies, firms in the Indian economy are also characterized by concentrated ownership held by an owner or a promoter in the context of the Indian corporate environment. In the backdrop of this concentrated complex ownership structure, the present study analyses the influence of the board of directors on underpricing when the appointment of such directors is largely an affair handled by such owners, whom they are given the task to monitor. The sample consists of 471 IPO firms which went public during the time period from January 2003 to December 2017. Results obtained from the regression analysis show that the board size and board committees act as information signals for Indian IPO firms having a significant and negative relation with listing-day initial excess returns. Other board-related dimensions of governance do not have significant influence on underpricing. Overall board variables have a very miniscule contribution in explaining the underpricing in Indian IPO firms.

2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (6) ◽  
pp. 65
Author(s):  
Ahmad N. Obaidat

This study investigated the effect of ownership structure on the dividend policy of the financial firms listed on Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) for the period 2014-2016. The results indicated a positive relationship between dividend and institutional, managerial, and foreign ownership, and negative relationship between dividend and ownership concentration. The result also indicated that a large portion of the ownership is in the hand of the instructions and the board of directors, and the ownership is not highly concentrated.


2014 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 642-657 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fariss-Terry Mousa ◽  
William J. Ritchie ◽  
Richard Reed

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to extend governance research in the small business context by examining the moderating influence of top executive involvement on the board of directors on market valuation. Design/methodology/approach – Drawing on a sample of initial public offering (IPO) high-tech firms engaged in late-stage funding, the study uses stepwise regression to test board involvement moderation effects. Findings – Primary market investors reward governance structures that limit founder power. Originality/value – The current study introduces the notion that optimal market valuation depends not only on whether a CEO-founder governs the firm, but also on level of involvement on the board of directors.


Author(s):  
Fabio Bertoni ◽  
Michelle Meoli ◽  
Silvio Vismara

Establishing effective corporate governance is most important at the time of an initial public offering (IPO), because the IPO represents a significant step by a company toward moving to the public arena. This chapter focuses on three characteristics that help describe structure of the board of directors at the time of IPO: board size (i.e., the number of members on a board), board independence (i.e., the proportion of non-executive members on the board), and board leadership (i.e., the choice to overlap the roles of CEO and chairman of the board). The chapter presents empirical evidence from a sample of 969 companies that went public between 1995 and 2011 in France, Germany, and Italy that shows how these companies differ from their US and UK counterparts.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Novihana Noor Pradita ◽  
Cynthia Afriani Utama

Firms with concentrated ownership structures are commonly found in Southeast Asia. In Indonesia, the biggest control of the firm comes from the family. Concentrated ownership can lead to agency problem between controlling shareholders and non- controlling shareholders where, controlling shareholders together with management, can make decisions which bring personal benefit at the expense of non-controlling shareholders for example by investing on projects with negative NPV or known as overinvestment. This study explains the effect of the presence of directors and independent commissioners on relationship between family ownership and overinvestment. Using firms listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2011 to 2017 as research samples, the presence of independent director is negatively related to overinvestment. From the regression results, only independent directors were found to have a moderating effect in weakening the positive relationship between family ownership and overinvestment. This effect is seen more clearly if family ownership  in the company is low. This is because if family ownership in the company is low the process of selecting a board of directors can be more objective so that the possibility of a number of independent directors sitting on the board of directors is much greater. Thus the effect of moderation by independent directors will be greater in companies with lower family ownership. Keywords: ownership structure, board independence, overinvestment, corporate governance, Indonesia


2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 27
Author(s):  
Erick Lusekelo Mwambuli ◽  
Avitus Mwebembezi Dominick

The study was to assess on corporate governance and risk management in Tanzania. The study was guided by three objectives which were to assess if transparency, disclosure and audit have significant effect on risk management of the firm, to assess if the board of directors have significant effect on risk management of the firm and evaluate if the ownership structure have significant effect on risk management of the firm. Furthermore, we assess how corporate governance and particularly board of directors, ownership structure, transparency disclosure and audit can affect risk management practices in the context of Dar es Salaam stock exchange listed banks. By the use of a content in analysis approach, the level of exposing the risks in terms of likelihood, consequences of such risk and the strategies used for managing that risk were identified for each kind of risk by using attributes. The results show that corporate governance is related to board of directors, ownership structure, transparency, disclosure and audit play a positive significant and crucial role in establishing an integrative risk management approach. The results from data collected demonstrate that corporate governance has positive significant effect in determining the the good quality of risk management through the level of risk-taking in decisions, especially in terms of financial risks management.


2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 354-367
Author(s):  
Sani Hussaini Kalgo ◽  
Bany-Ariffin A.N. ◽  
Hairul Suhaimi Bin Nahar ◽  
Bolaji Tunde Matemilola

The article investigates whether Malaysian initial public offering (IPO) firms engage in real and accrual earnings management (AEM) and examines the impact of leverage on the earnings management’s discretionary behaviour of the firms for the period of 2003–2013. The Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995, The Accounting Review, 70[2], 193–225) cross-sectional modified Jones model was used to estimate discretionary accruals, while Roychowdhury’s (2006, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 42[3]), 335–370) cross-sectional models were used to investigate abnormal real activity discretionary behaviour. The results indicate Malaysian IPO firms engage in real and accrual discretionary behaviour. The graphical presentations of the earnings’ management proxies indicate higher real and AEM for high-leverage firms. Similarly, the multivariate analysis indicates a positive relationship between leverage and earnings management, which is in tandem with the agency cost of free cash flow theory and debt hypothesis. It is also consistent with the pecking-order theory of capital structure. This study suggests that regulatory agencies and standard setters should continue to improve quality of accounting reports in order to protect investors’ invested capital.


Author(s):  
Susan Chaplinsky ◽  
Kensei Morita ◽  
Xing Zeng

This case provides comprehensive coverage of a firm's decision to undertake an IPO and the process of going public. The case follows the sequence of events from the company's incorporation in 1999 through the completion of an IPO in September 2005. In addition to raising capital, the TRX IPO case also includes consideration of another motivation for going public. At the time of its incorporation in November 1999, TRX attempted to go public but in the ensuing dot-com collapse, the IPO was never completed. In response to the failed IPO, TRX president and CEO, Trip Davis, turned to strategic investors to raise $20 million in a note convertible into equity at $11 per share. Although Davis had hoped the strategic investors would provide guidance and business opportunities for TRX, they never materialized. By 2004, he had come to believe that the largest strategic investor, Sabre, Inc., was not working in TRX's best interest. Thus, the IPO is motivated by a twofold purpose: to raise money and to provide for a strategic reorganization of the firm's ownership structure.


1998 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 5-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Todd A. Finkle

Utilizing the entire population of public biotechnology firms from 1980-1994, three models were tested to determine If a relationship exists between the size and composition of the board of directors and performance. Results indicate significant positive relationships between director expertise and the size of a firm's initial public offering. Going public during hot markets and larger firms were also related to larger Initial public offerings. These findings will benefit practitioners in the formation of boards within the biotechnology Industry. Managers of firms within the biotechnology industry who are contemplating a public offering will be able to proactively address the composition of their boards.


2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 734-749 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rekha Handa ◽  
Balwinder Singh

The present research study contributes to the extant literature on underpricing rather uniquely by addressing the under-researched linkage of corporate governance to underpricing. The originality of this effort also lies in being one of the initial efforts of exploring governance in context of initial public offering (IPO) underpricing in Indian settings. The study comprises an empirical analysis of 404 Indian IPOs studied for their board structures and ownership attributes using IPO prospectuses. Drawing support from the signalling theory, the variables board size and board committees exhibit a significant positive relationship to the IPO returns on the listing day. In Indian markets characterized by concentrated family-owned firms, promoter ownership does work as an effective signal for investors who take cues of firm potential from ownership patterns. Corporate governance measures have a miniscule contribution in explaining the underpricing of Indian IPOs and indicating that investors do not incorporate these as a major consideration in their investment decision.


2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 92-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregorio Sanchez-Marin ◽  
J. Samuel Baixauli-Soler ◽  
M. Encarnacion Lucas-Perez

This study analyzes the influence of ownership structure and the board of directors on top management team (TMT) pay levels in a sample of Spanish listed firms. When panel data methodology is applied, the results show that TMT pay level is affected by the supervisory effectiveness of the board. This, in turn, is influenced by ownership concentration and the type of major shareholders. When ownership is dispersed, the board is more effective in their supervision and TMT pay level is lower. However, when ownership is concentrated, the quality of supervision and, consequently, TMT pay levels depend upon the type of shareholder that is predominant. Santrauka Analizuojama nuosavybes formos strukturos ir valdybos itaka aukšèiausio lygio Ispanijos kompaniju vadovu darbo užmokesèio dydžiui. Tyrimu duomenys parode, kad aukšèiausio lygio vadovu darbo užmokesèio dydis priklauso nuo valdybos kontroles ir jos efektyvumo itakos. Tai, žinoma, yra susijê su kompanijos savininko ir pagrindiniu akcininku pozicija. Kai savininko pozicija pasyvi, tuomet valdybos veiksmai kontroles srityje yra efektyvesni, taèiau aukšèiausio lygio vadovu darbo užmokesèio lygis yra gerokai mažesnis. Taèiau kai savininkas tiesiogiai dalyvauja kompanijos veikloje ir prisideda prie jos valdymo, tuomet kontroles kokybe ir aukšèiausio lygio vadovu darbo užmokesèio lygis priklauso nuo akcininko pozicijos.


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