A Game Theoretic Analysis of Competition Between Vaccine and Drug Companies during Disease Contraction and Recovery

Background Infectious diseases such as COVID-19 and HIV/AIDS are behaviorally challenging for persons, vaccine and drug companies, and donors. Methods In 3 linked games in which a disease may or may not be contracted, [Formula: see text] persons choose risky or safe behavior (game 1). Two vaccine companies (game 2) and 2 drug companies (game 3) choose whether to develop vaccines and drugs. Each person chooses whether to buy 1 vaccine (if no disease contraction) or 1 drug (if disease contraction). A donor subsidizes vaccine and drug developments and purchases. Nature probabilistically chooses disease contraction, recovery versus death with and without each drug, and whether vaccines and drugs are developed successfully. COVID-19 data are used for parameter estimation. Results Each person chooses risky behavior if its utility outweighs safe behavior, accounting for nature’s probability of disease contraction which depends on how many are vaccinated. Each person buys a vaccine or drug if the companies produce them and if their utilities (accounting for side effects and virus mutation) outweigh the costs, which may be subsidized by a sponsor. Discussion Drug purchases depend on nature’s recovery probability exceeding the probability in the absence of a drug. Each company develops and produces a vaccine or drug if nature’s probability of successful development is high, if sufficiently many persons buy the vaccine or drug at a sales price that sufficiently exceeds the production price, and if the donor sponsors. Conclusion Accounting for all players’ interlinked decisions allowing 14 outcomes, which is challenging without a game theoretic analysis, the donor maximizes all persons’ expected utilities at the societal level to adjust how persons’ purchases and the companies’ development and production are subsidized. Highlights A game theoretic approach can help explain the production decisions of vaccine and drug companies, and the decisions of persons and a donor, impacted by Nature. In 3 linked games, N persons choose risky behavior if its utility outweighs safe behavior. Vaccine and drug companies develop vaccines and drugs sponsored by a donor if profitable, allowing 14 outcomes.

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A game theoretic approach reveals that discretizing clinical information can reduce antibiotic misuse

Nature Communications ◽

10.1038/s41467-021-21088-5 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 12 (1) ◽

Author(s):

Maya Diamant ◽

Shoham Baruch ◽

Eias Kassem ◽

Khitam Muhsen ◽

Dov Samet ◽

...

Keyword(s):

Antibiotic Prescription ◽

Clinical Information ◽

Social Optimum ◽

Theoretic Approach ◽

Theoretic Analysis ◽

Game Theoretic Analysis ◽

Optimal Output ◽

The Social ◽

Game Theoretic ◽

Game Theoretic Approach

AbstractThe overuse of antibiotics is exacerbating the antibiotic resistance crisis. Since this problem is a classic common-goods dilemma, it naturally lends itself to a game-theoretic analysis. Hence, we designed a model wherein physicians weigh whether antibiotics should be prescribed, given that antibiotic usage depletes its future effectiveness. The physicians’ decisions rely on the probability of a bacterial infection before definitive laboratory results are available. We show that the physicians’ equilibrium decision rule of antibiotic prescription is not socially optimal. However, we prove that discretizing the information provided to physicians can mitigate the gap between their equilibrium decisions and the social optimum of antibiotic prescription. Despite this problem’s complexity, the effectiveness of the discretization solely depends on the type of information available to the physician to determine the nature of infection. This is demonstrated on theoretic distributions and a clinical dataset. Our results provide a game-theory based guide for optimal output of current and future decision support systems of antibiotic prescription.

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Game theoretic analysis of persons, the pharmaceutical industry, and donors in disease contraction and recovery

Humanities and Social Sciences Communications ◽

10.1057/s41599-020-00626-4 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 7 (1) ◽

Author(s):

Kjell Hausken ◽

Mthuli Ncube

Keyword(s):

Pharmaceutical Industry ◽

Drug Development ◽

Pharmaceutical Company ◽

Risky Behavior ◽

Model Parameters ◽

Strategic Choices ◽

Drug Availability ◽

Game Theoretic Analysis ◽

Safe Behavior ◽

Game Theoretic

AbstractDisease contraction and recovery depend on complex interaction between persons potentially contracting and recovering from the disease, the pharmaceutical industry potentially developing drugs, and donors potentially subsidizing drug development and drug purchases. Instead of analyzing each of these three kinds of players separately, assuming the behavior of the other two kinds of players to be given, this article analyzes the three kinds of players holistically and how they mutually interact and react to each other. A five-period game between N persons and a pharmaceutical company is developed. Each person chooses safe or risky behavior, and whether or not to buy a drug. The objectives are to determine which strategies the N persons and the pharmaceutical company choose depending on the model parameters. The pharmaceutical company develops the drug if sufficiently many persons contract the disease and buy the drug. A donor chooses parametrically whether to subsidize drug development and drug purchases. Nature chooses probabilistically disease contraction, and recovery versus death with and without applying the drug. The methodological procedure is to solve the game with backward induction specifying the conditions for each of five outcomes ranging from safe behavior to risky behavior and buying the drug. The results in the form of five outcomes for a person are safe behavior, risky behavior and no disease contraction, disease contraction without drug availability, disease contraction with drug availability but without buying the drug, and disease contraction and buying the drug. These five outcomes are spread across two outcomes for the pharmaceutical company which are not to develop versus to develop the drug. The utility for the donor is specified for these two outcomes. A procedure for estimating the parameters is presented based on HIV/AIDS data. The results are discussed in terms of how various parameter combinations cause the five outcomes. An example illustrates the players’ strategic choices.

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Discretizing clinical information can reduce antibiotic misuse: a game theoretic approach

10.1101/2020.08.23.20180117 ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

Maya Diamant ◽

Shoham Baruch ◽

Eias Kassem ◽

Khitam Muhsen ◽

Dov Samet ◽

...

Keyword(s):

Antibiotic Prescription ◽

Clinical Information ◽

Social Optimum ◽

Theoretic Approach ◽

Game Theoretic Analysis ◽

Optimal Output ◽

The Social ◽

Game Theoretic ◽

Available Information ◽

Game Theoretic Approach

The overuse of antibiotics is exacerbating the antibiotic resistance crisis. Since this problem is a classic common-goods dilemma, it naturally lends itself to a game-theoretic analysis. Hence, we designed a model wherein physicians weigh whether antibiotics should be prescribed, given that antibiotic usage depletes its future effectiveness. The physicians' decisions rely on the probability of a bacterial infection before definitive laboratory results are available. We show that the physicians' equilibrium decision-rule of antibiotic prescription is not socially optimal. However, we prove that discretizing the information provided to physicians can mitigate the gap between their equilibrium decisions and the social optimum of antibiotic prescription. Despite this problem's complexity, the effectiveness of the discretization solely depends on the distribution of available information. This is demonstrated on theoretic distributions and a clinical dataset. Our results provide a game-theory based guide for optimal output of current and future decision support systems of antibiotic prescription.

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