“Not Manufactured or Authorized by …”: Recent Federal Cases Involving Trademark Disclaimers

1998 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacob Jacoby ◽  
Maureen Morrin

After discussing the value of trademarks to consumers and businesses, the authors outline the major objectives of trademark law. The authors review recent federal trademark infringement cases that involve the use of disclaimers, in terms of the extent to which disclaimers reduce the likelihood of consumer confusion. The authors then note recent trends and provide suggestions for further research.

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Lemley

The debate over trademark use has become a hot-button issue in intellectualproperty (IP) law. In Confusion over Use: Contextualism in Trademark Law,Graeme Dinwoodie and Mark Janis characterize it as a dispute over whetherto limit trademark holder rights in a new and unanticipated way. Yet thereis another - in our view more historically accurate - way to frame thetrademark use debate: the question is whether courts should, absentspecific statutory authorization, allow trademark holders to assert a newand unprecedented form of trademark infringement claim. The pop-up andkeyword cases involve attempts to impose third-party liability under theguise of direct infringement suits. Dinwoodie and Janis's thorough accountnotwithstanding, it remains the fact that, before the recent spate ofInternet-related cases, no court had ever recognized a trademark claim ofthe sort that trademark holders are now asserting. Trademark infringementsuits have always involved allegations of infringement by parties who usemarks in connection with the promotion of their own goods and services. Thequestion raised by the trademark use cases, as we view it, is whethercourts should countenance a radical departure from that traditional modelwithout specific instruction from Congress. We think they should not.In this paper, we explain the origins of trademark use doctrine intraditional limits on the scope of the trademark right and in thedistinction between direct and contributory infringement. We also explainwhy we cannot simply rely on the likelihood of consumer confusion test tosolve the problems the trademark use doctrine addresses, and we examine thedifficult problem of defining the scope of the trademark use doctrine.


2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Lemley

Trademark law centers its analysis on consumer confusion. With somesignificant exceptions, the basic rule of trademark law is that adefendant’s use of a mark is illegal if it confuses a substantial number ofconsumers and not otherwise.As a general matter, this is the right rule. Trademark law is designed tofacilitate the workings of modern markets by permitting producers toaccurately communicate information about the quality of their products tobuyers, and therefore to encourage them to invest in making qualityproducts in circumstances in which that quality wouldn’t otherwise beapparent. If competitors can falsely mimic that information, they willconfuse consumers, who won’t know whether they are in fact getting a highquality product and therefore won’t be willing to pay as much for thatquality. I won’t pay as much for an iPod if I think there is a chance it isa cheap knock-off masquerading as an iPod.The law of false advertising operates as an adjunct to trademark law. Whiletrademark law prevents competitors from misrepresenting the source of theirproducts by mimicking another’s brand name, the law of false advertisingprevents false or misleading statements about the quality of one’s own or acompetitor’s products. Like trademark law, false advertising law isdesigned to protect the integrity of markets by allowing consumers to relyon statements made by sellers.Unfortunately, trademark law has taken the concept of confusion too far.Between 1930 and 1980, courts expanded the concept of confusion beyondconfusion as to the source of a product to include the possibility thatconsumers are confused as to whether the trademark owner sponsors or isaffiliated with the defendant’s goods. This expansion began for plausiblereasons: consumers might be confused to their detriment in a variety ofcircumstances in which the plaintiff and the defendant do not actuallycompete directly. But sponsorship and affiliation confusion has taken on alife of its own, resulting in a large number of cases in which companies orindividuals are prevented from doing things that might conceivably confuseconsumers, but do not confuse consumers in any way that harms theirdecision-making process or that the law should care about. In Part I, weoffer a number of examples of “confusion” that courts have found actionableeven in circumstances in which that confusion was unlikely to matter to theoperation of the market. Part II explains how we arrived at thisunfortunate pass.We suggest in Part III that trademark law should focus its attention onconfusion that is actually relevant to purchasing decisions. We would makethe source of the goods the central element of confusion analysis. It isconfusion as to source that is most obviously relevant to the purposesbehind trademark law. That does not mean, however, that confusion as to therelationship between plaintiff and defendant can never be actionable.Confusion as to affiliation should be actionable when consumers are likelyto believe that the trademark owner stands behind or guarantees the qualityof the goods the defendant sells. Even if consumers understand thatindividual franchisees, rather than the McDonald’s Corporation, actuallymake their hamburgers, they are likely to expect that McDonald’s standsbehind whatever quality that brand represents.Finally, the fact that confusion as to sponsorship or affiliation shouldnot generally be trademark infringement does not mean that it will never beactionable. Some statements that create confusion as to sponsorship oraffiliation will be actionable as a form of false advertising. We addressthe scope of false advertising in Part IV. Notably, proof of a falseadvertising claim requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that themisrepresentation is material – that it is likely to affect a productpurchasing decision. Indeed, the statute specifies the sorts ofmisrepresentations that are forbidden. We continue the discussion in PartV, which explores some of the implications of shunting some cases into thefalse advertising framework, and discusses how to handle some close cases.


Author(s):  
Devi Marlita Martana

Act Number 15 Year 2001 regarding  Trademark has set the provisional charges. Provisional charges may be filed by the plaintiff while the investigation process of trademark infringement lawsuit in court of commerce is still ongoing. In a civil proceeding, the provisional charge must not be the primary charge, however the provisional charge that is set out in the Trademark Act has already concerned the primary charge. Actions that can be requested in the provisional charge according to Article 78 paragraph (1) in the  Trademark Act include cessation of production, cessation of circulation of goods and / or services using Plaintiff's trademark illegally. Using literature study that utilizes primary legal materials and secondary legal materials as the research object, the results of the discussion are expected to be based on sufficient arguments to provide benefits for those who are interested to learn the trademark law enforcement.


Author(s):  
Jason Allen Cody

This Article follows on the heels of an article I recently wrote that focuses on the online advertising activities of The Gator Corporation and legal implications of the preliminary injunction issued in that case.4 I previously concluded that Gator’s pop-up advertising scheme did not violate copyright law,5 but that it did violate trademark law, based in large on survey results showing significant consumer confusion at that point in time.6 To remove consumer confusion, I recommended that Gator: (1) notify Internet users more prominently about downloading Gator software; (2) remind consumers that they authorized pop-up ads to appear; (3) adequately display its trademarks in its pop-up ads; and (4) disclaim affiliation with URLs that have not authorized its ads.7


1978 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 48 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Miaoulis ◽  
Nancy D'Amato

2020 ◽  
Vol 58 (3) ◽  
pp. 141-155
Author(s):  
Jelena Ćeranić-Perišić

Secondary liability, according to the general rules on liability, is based on the issue of conscientiousness, in other words whether the intermediary knew or should have known that the right was infringed through his service. In U.S. law, the secondary liability standard is a result of case law. This paper presents the evolution of case law regarding the interpretation of secondary liability standard in U.S. trademark law. This standard was announced by the U.S. Supreme Court in Inwood Laboratories Inc. v. Ives Laboratories Inc. regarding the liability of manufacturers and distributors. In the decades that followed, the U.S. Courts, with their creative interpretations, extended the scope of application of this standard, first to intermediary market operators, and later to online service providers (internet intermediaries). Also, the development of digital technology has influenced the case law to adapt the secondary liability standard for trademark infringement to the new circumstances in the digital environment. The most significant cases in this context are Hard Rock Café Licensing v. Concession Services, Inc., Tiffany Inc. v. eBay Inc. and Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google Inc. Finally, 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc. demonstrates a slight turn of the U.S. Courts' practices towards a more flexible interpretation of secondary liability standard to online service providers.


2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 189-200
Author(s):  
Sungho Cho ◽  
J. Lucy Lee ◽  
June Won ◽  
Jong Kwan (Jake) Lee

Under the federal trademark law, owners of famous sport trademarks may bring legal claims against unauthorized users of their marks under the infringement and dilution theory. Although the rationale of trademark infringement has been supported by various notions of consumer psychology and law and economics, the theory of dilution has been criticized for the lack of empirical support. This study investigated whether the junior use of major sport trademarks would have dilutive effects on the senior marks in financial terms. The study employed the contingent valuation method, a technique designed to estimate the economic values of nonpecuniary assets such as trademarks. A total of 140 subjects were exposed to dilutive information while they purchased sport brand merchandise. A series of pre- and posttests revealed that moderately famous sport trademarks suffered dilutive harm from junior use, whereas exceptionally famous marks were immune to the dilutive effects. Theoretical and practical implications were discussed.


1978 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 48-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Miaoulis ◽  
Nancy D'Amato

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 362-385
Author(s):  
Yanan Zhang

Punitive damages were introduced into the intellectual property field in China by legislation permitting their imposition for malicious and serious infringements. This paper offers a comprehensive legal framework of punitive damages regarding trademark infringement and a critical analysis of the application of punitive damages in trademark infringement disputes in Chinese judicial practice. My research reveals that punitive damages have rarely been imposed since the punitive damages provision, Article 63 of the Trademark Law, took effect in 2014, whereas statutory damages have been applied extensively. The reason for this is that there are few guidelines for the application of this provision. The challenges to the application include undefined statutory requirements, difficulties in not only assessing compensation but also providing evidence and determining the multiple of compensation, and an unclear relationship between statutory damages and punitive damages. The 2019 Amendment of the Trademark Law retains these problems. Fortunately, the recently released Judicial Interpretation and typical cases concerning punitive damages contribute to resolving them. Moreover, those cases in which punitive damages have been applied have gradually revealed some basic principles for their application. Reform suggestions are offered in order to stimulate the development of a more thorough and uniform application of the punitive damages provision.


2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 105
Author(s):  
Monika Żuraw

F u n c t io n s o f a T r a d e m a r k A c c o r d in g t o t h e J u r is d ic t io n o f t h e E u r o p e a n C o u r t o f J u s t ic eSummaryThe scope of protection of the functions fulfilled by trademarks determines most of the issues of the trademark law. The formulation of relevant provisions of the First Directive 89/104/EEC of the Council, of 21 December 1988, to Approximate the Laws of the Member States Relating to Trade Marks („Directive”) leave most of the issues open for interpretation. Therefore, it is the role of the European Court of Justice („ECJ”) to define to what extent the origin, quality and advertising functions should be protected. The article presents in chronological order all ECJ’s verdicts referring to the functions of a trademark issued both before and after entering into force of the Directive. The verdicts above all regard the issues of the trademark infringement, the distinguishing capability of a trademark, exhaustion and the limitations of the right to a trademark. It transpires from the review of the verdicts that ECJ refers most of the issues to the ‘essential function of a trademark’, which is distinguishing goods originating form different enterprises, the concept worked out long before the Directive was introduced. As a result, it is still the origin function that is protected vast more broadly than other functions, which - as it seems - does not meet the needs of the contemporary turnover. Nevertheless, the formulation of most of ECJ’s rulings is so general that it allows future modifications for the benefit of broadening the protection of the quality and advertising functions.


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