scholarly journals Irrelevant Confusion

Author(s):  
Mark Lemley

Trademark law centers its analysis on consumer confusion. With somesignificant exceptions, the basic rule of trademark law is that adefendant’s use of a mark is illegal if it confuses a substantial number ofconsumers and not otherwise.As a general matter, this is the right rule. Trademark law is designed tofacilitate the workings of modern markets by permitting producers toaccurately communicate information about the quality of their products tobuyers, and therefore to encourage them to invest in making qualityproducts in circumstances in which that quality wouldn’t otherwise beapparent. If competitors can falsely mimic that information, they willconfuse consumers, who won’t know whether they are in fact getting a highquality product and therefore won’t be willing to pay as much for thatquality. I won’t pay as much for an iPod if I think there is a chance it isa cheap knock-off masquerading as an iPod.The law of false advertising operates as an adjunct to trademark law. Whiletrademark law prevents competitors from misrepresenting the source of theirproducts by mimicking another’s brand name, the law of false advertisingprevents false or misleading statements about the quality of one’s own or acompetitor’s products. Like trademark law, false advertising law isdesigned to protect the integrity of markets by allowing consumers to relyon statements made by sellers.Unfortunately, trademark law has taken the concept of confusion too far.Between 1930 and 1980, courts expanded the concept of confusion beyondconfusion as to the source of a product to include the possibility thatconsumers are confused as to whether the trademark owner sponsors or isaffiliated with the defendant’s goods. This expansion began for plausiblereasons: consumers might be confused to their detriment in a variety ofcircumstances in which the plaintiff and the defendant do not actuallycompete directly. But sponsorship and affiliation confusion has taken on alife of its own, resulting in a large number of cases in which companies orindividuals are prevented from doing things that might conceivably confuseconsumers, but do not confuse consumers in any way that harms theirdecision-making process or that the law should care about. In Part I, weoffer a number of examples of “confusion” that courts have found actionableeven in circumstances in which that confusion was unlikely to matter to theoperation of the market. Part II explains how we arrived at thisunfortunate pass.We suggest in Part III that trademark law should focus its attention onconfusion that is actually relevant to purchasing decisions. We would makethe source of the goods the central element of confusion analysis. It isconfusion as to source that is most obviously relevant to the purposesbehind trademark law. That does not mean, however, that confusion as to therelationship between plaintiff and defendant can never be actionable.Confusion as to affiliation should be actionable when consumers are likelyto believe that the trademark owner stands behind or guarantees the qualityof the goods the defendant sells. Even if consumers understand thatindividual franchisees, rather than the McDonald’s Corporation, actuallymake their hamburgers, they are likely to expect that McDonald’s standsbehind whatever quality that brand represents.Finally, the fact that confusion as to sponsorship or affiliation shouldnot generally be trademark infringement does not mean that it will never beactionable. Some statements that create confusion as to sponsorship oraffiliation will be actionable as a form of false advertising. We addressthe scope of false advertising in Part IV. Notably, proof of a falseadvertising claim requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that themisrepresentation is material – that it is likely to affect a productpurchasing decision. Indeed, the statute specifies the sorts ofmisrepresentations that are forbidden. We continue the discussion in PartV, which explores some of the implications of shunting some cases into thefalse advertising framework, and discusses how to handle some close cases.

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 466
Author(s):  
Heri Gunawan ◽  
Joni Emirzon ◽  
Muhammad Syaifuddin

Intellectual Property Rights or what is often abbreviated as HAKI is a legal protection given by a certain country to a person or group of individuals who express their ideas in the form of works. This law is a state territory. This means that a work will only be protected by rights in the country where the work originated to obtain IPR. As stated in the Copyright Laws, Intellectual Property Rights are exclusive rights granted by a regulation to a person or group of people for their copyrighted works. This protected work is in the form of intangible objects such as copyrights, patents, and trademarks and tangible objects in the form of information, technology, literature, art, skills, science, and so on. The idea of compensation law for copyright and trademark infringement in Indonesia, of course, can imitate the copyright law and trademark law of the People's Republic of China in regulating more clearly the calculation of the value of losses for copyright and trademark infringement in order to be able to provide legal certainty for the owner / rights holders whose rights have been violated. The research use normative juridical approach. The purpose of writing is to analyze and explain the calculation of compensation by looking at the criteria, evidence, basis, form and formulation of calculating compensation for copyright and trademark infringement. The results of the study stated that the law for compensation that arises as a result of copyright and trademark infringement according to positive law in Indonesia still does not regulate in detail the calculation of the value of the loss of both copyrights and trademarks. Copyright Act No.28 of 2014 and Trademark Act No.20 of 2016 only gives rights to the right owner/right holder to file a claim for compensation, but the law does not regulate how to determine the value of the loss for a copyright infringement as well as brands.


1998 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacob Jacoby ◽  
Maureen Morrin

After discussing the value of trademarks to consumers and businesses, the authors outline the major objectives of trademark law. The authors review recent federal trademark infringement cases that involve the use of disclaimers, in terms of the extent to which disclaimers reduce the likelihood of consumer confusion. The authors then note recent trends and provide suggestions for further research.


2020 ◽  
Vol 58 (3) ◽  
pp. 141-155
Author(s):  
Jelena Ćeranić-Perišić

Secondary liability, according to the general rules on liability, is based on the issue of conscientiousness, in other words whether the intermediary knew or should have known that the right was infringed through his service. In U.S. law, the secondary liability standard is a result of case law. This paper presents the evolution of case law regarding the interpretation of secondary liability standard in U.S. trademark law. This standard was announced by the U.S. Supreme Court in Inwood Laboratories Inc. v. Ives Laboratories Inc. regarding the liability of manufacturers and distributors. In the decades that followed, the U.S. Courts, with their creative interpretations, extended the scope of application of this standard, first to intermediary market operators, and later to online service providers (internet intermediaries). Also, the development of digital technology has influenced the case law to adapt the secondary liability standard for trademark infringement to the new circumstances in the digital environment. The most significant cases in this context are Hard Rock Café Licensing v. Concession Services, Inc., Tiffany Inc. v. eBay Inc. and Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google Inc. Finally, 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc. demonstrates a slight turn of the U.S. Courts' practices towards a more flexible interpretation of secondary liability standard to online service providers.


Author(s):  
D.V. Tat'yanin

The law of criminal procedure contains a number of rules with different content, which raises a number of questions in their interpretation and application. Decisions made using rules with different content lead to their appeal, often to annulment, which does not ensure the achievement of the appointment of criminal proceedings, but leads to unjustified red tape in criminal proceedings and the delay in making final decisions on them. The need to harmonize criminal procedure rules is related to ensuring high-quality and effective criminal proceedings, ensuring the protection of the rights of participants in criminal proceedings, the quality of the evidence process, both in pre-trial and judicial proceedings. The article addresses the problems of unification of criminal procedure rules containing such concepts as an investigator and urgent investigative actions. It is proposed to eliminate the contradictions in them in order to ensure their uniform application. The introduction of a single concept of investigator and refusal to use the profession of "forensic investigator" in this concept is justified, it is proposed to expand the number of participants who have the right to carry out urgent investigative actions, as well as to assign to them investigative actions carried out at the stage of initiating a criminal case.


2013 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
Romanița Elena Iordache

Abstract In January 2013, the Romanian Law on Religious Freedom and the General Status of Religious Denominations reached five years of implementation—the right time to assess the quality of the law, its fairness and enforceability, the way it responded to foreseeable challenges but, most importantly, to unexpected ones. Though, at the time of its adoption, law-makers, practitioners and religious denominations alike considered the law a working compromise doomed to be amended soon, no amendments were made so far. In spite of criticisms concerning the over-restrictive three tier system of registration for religious entities, voiced during the adoption process and subsequently, the biggest challenge for the law came however from a different direction through a little known case decided by the European Court of Human Rights in January 2012 and referred to the Grand Chamber in July 2012. The domestic proceedings as well as the chamber judgment in Sindicatul Păstorul Cel Bun v. Romania highlight that the principle of religious autonomy and the relation between state and Church still need to be defined and enforced in the Romanian context.1


2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Lemley

The debate over trademark use has become a hot-button issue in intellectualproperty (IP) law. In Confusion over Use: Contextualism in Trademark Law,Graeme Dinwoodie and Mark Janis characterize it as a dispute over whetherto limit trademark holder rights in a new and unanticipated way. Yet thereis another - in our view more historically accurate - way to frame thetrademark use debate: the question is whether courts should, absentspecific statutory authorization, allow trademark holders to assert a newand unprecedented form of trademark infringement claim. The pop-up andkeyword cases involve attempts to impose third-party liability under theguise of direct infringement suits. Dinwoodie and Janis's thorough accountnotwithstanding, it remains the fact that, before the recent spate ofInternet-related cases, no court had ever recognized a trademark claim ofthe sort that trademark holders are now asserting. Trademark infringementsuits have always involved allegations of infringement by parties who usemarks in connection with the promotion of their own goods and services. Thequestion raised by the trademark use cases, as we view it, is whethercourts should countenance a radical departure from that traditional modelwithout specific instruction from Congress. We think they should not.In this paper, we explain the origins of trademark use doctrine intraditional limits on the scope of the trademark right and in thedistinction between direct and contributory infringement. We also explainwhy we cannot simply rely on the likelihood of consumer confusion test tosolve the problems the trademark use doctrine addresses, and we examine thedifficult problem of defining the scope of the trademark use doctrine.


2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 105
Author(s):  
Monika Żuraw

F u n c t io n s o f a T r a d e m a r k A c c o r d in g t o t h e J u r is d ic t io n o f t h e E u r o p e a n C o u r t o f J u s t ic eSummaryThe scope of protection of the functions fulfilled by trademarks determines most of the issues of the trademark law. The formulation of relevant provisions of the First Directive 89/104/EEC of the Council, of 21 December 1988, to Approximate the Laws of the Member States Relating to Trade Marks („Directive”) leave most of the issues open for interpretation. Therefore, it is the role of the European Court of Justice („ECJ”) to define to what extent the origin, quality and advertising functions should be protected. The article presents in chronological order all ECJ’s verdicts referring to the functions of a trademark issued both before and after entering into force of the Directive. The verdicts above all regard the issues of the trademark infringement, the distinguishing capability of a trademark, exhaustion and the limitations of the right to a trademark. It transpires from the review of the verdicts that ECJ refers most of the issues to the ‘essential function of a trademark’, which is distinguishing goods originating form different enterprises, the concept worked out long before the Directive was introduced. As a result, it is still the origin function that is protected vast more broadly than other functions, which - as it seems - does not meet the needs of the contemporary turnover. Nevertheless, the formulation of most of ECJ’s rulings is so general that it allows future modifications for the benefit of broadening the protection of the quality and advertising functions.


2014 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Miro Cerar

In its ideal form, the law is a guardian of the freedom and autonomy of the school system. On the other hand, the school system must, as part of its responsibility, establish a respectful and responsible attitude toward the rule of law. In Slovenia, practice deviates from such ideal to too great an extent. Excessive and inappropriate legal regulation reduces the freedom and autonomy of the school system. The consequences within this system are: partly ignored legal regulations, and the resulting ineffectiveness; excessive legal administration in schools; increased teachers’ opposition to the law; a lack of teachers’ motivation; and, as a consequence, worsened quality of the educational process. The law, however, is only a part of the problem. The latter has its roots mainly in a general disorientation of society with regard to its values. In order to establish the right measure and manner of the legal regulation of the school system, the moral and common sense basis of society must first be healed and strengthened.


2007 ◽  
Vol 8 (6) ◽  
pp. 635-655
Author(s):  
Bjørn Kunoy

Shakespeare's famed citation “What's in a name? That which we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet” may be one of the most used quotations in contemporary literature. It serves to provide guidance in reviewing ones assessment of new perspectives on a given topic. The implications of the quotation induce the reader to feel concordant with the assumption that whatever name a given phenomenon is accorded, it is of little importance because the objects are similar and hence there is no reason to emphasise a peripheral and meaningless concept such as a name and the idea which it embraces. By contrast, intellectual property rights, and therein trademark law, is conceptually based on the assumption that a verbal mark, figure or colour of a given good or service need to be protected since these immaterial notions give rise to patrimonial rights conferred to the owner of the registered trademark. A well known slogan or figurative mark is capable of having significant commercial value as demonstrated in the recent dispute between Apple and Cisco concerning the right of the former to use the trademark iPhone. However, it is important to note that the essential raison d'ětre of trademark law is not only to confer patrimonial rights to a legal or natural person and thus prevent an abusive use by a third party, but essentially to guarantee the origin of goods or services to the consumer and hence enable him, without any danger of confusion, to distinguish the goods or services from others which have another origin. Having said that it should also be noted that traditional trademark theory is perceived on the assumption that trademarks serve to minimize the likelihood of consumer confusion and prohibits the use of a trademark with regard to competing or similar goods only. However the “dilution theory” challenges this approach to trademark law as it also disseminates the postulate to prohibit the use of certain famous and/or characteristic trademarks on non-competing goods on the ground that such use dilutes and possibly erodes a given trademark's commercial value and its hold on the consumer.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 225-242
Author(s):  
Titin Mariatul Qiptiyah ◽  
Ahmad Rosidi ◽  
Muhamad Mukit

The quality of an educational institution depends on the principal as an educational leader. The principal has a very important role in advancing the institution he leads, so the madrasa principal serves as a supervisor, supervisor in everything that happens at school. All problems that occur in the madrasa must get the right solution from the head of the madrasa. The problem of student delinquency is no exception, in this case the head of the madrasa must make every effort to suppress student delinquency cases in order to create a conducive learning environment so that educational goals can be achieved. This study aims to: 1) describe the forms of delinquency committed by students of MTs Al Imam Cumedak, 2) describe the factors that cause student delinquency, 3). Describes the efforts and impacts of the madrasa principal in tackling student delinquency at MTs Al Imam Cumedak. And this type of research is descriptive qualitative. From the results of the research that has been carried out, it can be concluded that in general the forms of student delinquency at MTs Al Imam Cumedak, Sumberjambe sub-district, Jember Regency are classified as mild delinquency not breaking the law such as truancy, crowded in class, not wearing uniforms and others. The causes of student delinquency at MTs Al Imam are family and school factors. Meanwhile, what is done by the principal in tackling student delinquency is to increase exemplary behavior and instill the noble values ​​of the teachings of ahlusunnah waljamaah so that students can get used to having akhlaqul karimah wherever they are.


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