scholarly journals The Unintended Consequences of the Things We Say: What Generic Statements Communicate to Children About Unmentioned Categories

2021 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 189-203
Author(s):  
Kelsey Moty ◽  
Marjorie Rhodes
Keyword(s):  
Young Children ◽  
Social Groups ◽  
Unintended Consequences ◽  
Social Stereotypes ◽  
Generic Language ◽  
Pragmatic Reasoning

Adults frequently use generic language (e.g., “Boys play sports”) to communicate information about social groups to children. Whereas previous research speaks to how children often interpret information about the groups described by generic statements, less is known about what generic claims may implicitly communicate about unmentioned groups (e.g., the possibility that “Boys play sports” implies that girls do not). Study 1 (287 four- to six-year-olds, 56 adults) and Study 2 (84 four- to six-year-olds) found that children as young as 4.5 years draw inferences about unmentioned categories from generic claims (but not matched specific statements)—and that the tendency to make these inferences strengthens with age. Study 3 (181 four- to seven-year-olds, 65 adults) provides evidence that pragmatic reasoning serves as a mechanism underlying these inferences. We conclude by discussing the role that generic language may play in inadvertently communicating social stereotypes to young children.

scholarly journals The unintended consequences of the things we say: What generics communicate to children about unmentioned categories

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kelsey Moty ◽  
Marjorie Rhodes
Keyword(s):  
Young Children ◽  
Unintended Consequences ◽  
Social Stereotypes ◽  
Social Kinds ◽  
Generic Language ◽  
Pragmatic Reasoning

Adults frequently use generic language (e.g., "Boys play sports”) to communicate information about social kinds to children. Whereas previous research speaks to how children often interpret information about the kinds described by generics, less is known about what generics may implicitly communicate about unmentioned kinds (e.g., the possibility that “Boys play sports” implies that girls do not). Studies 1 (N = 287 4- to 6-year-olds, 56 adults) and 2 (N = 84 4- to 6-year-olds) found that children as young as 4.5 years draw inferences about unmentioned categories from generic claims (but not matched specific statements)—and that the tendency to make these inferences strengthens with age. Study 3 (N = 181 4- to 7.25-year-olds, 65 adults) provides evidence that pragmatic reasoning serves as a mechanism underlying these inferences. This paper concludes by discussing the role that generic language may play in inadvertently communicating social stereotypes to young children.

scholarly journals Are Category Labels Primary? Children Use Similarities to Reason About Social Groups

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ashley Jordan ◽  
Yarrow Dunham
Keyword(s):  
Young Children ◽  
Social Groups ◽  
Structure Study ◽  
Group Representations ◽  
Common Assumption ◽  
Low Level ◽  
Coalitional Structure ◽  
Category Labels ◽  
Types Of Information ◽  
Social Inferences

While interpersonal similarities impact young children’s peer judgments, little work has assessed whether they also guide group-based reasoning. A common assumption has been that category labels rather than “mere” similarities are unique constituents of such reasoning; the present work challenges this. Children (ages 3–9) viewed groups defined by category labels or shared preferences, and their social inferences were assessed. By age 5, children used both types of information to license predictions about preferences (Study 1, n = 129) and richer forms of coalitional structure (Study 2, n = 205). Low-level explanations could not account for this pattern (Study 3, n = 72). Finally, older but not younger children privileged labeled categories when they were pitted against similarity (Study 4, n = 51). These studies show that young children use shared preferences to reason about relationships and coalitional structure, suggesting that similarities are central to the emergence of group representations.

scholarly journals Ações afirmativas e estereótipos sociais: Desconstruindo o mito da inferioridade cotista

2019 ◽  
Vol 27 ◽  
pp. 75
Author(s):  
Eloisio Moulin de Souza
Keyword(s):  
Qualitative Research ◽  
Social Justice ◽  
Affirmative Action ◽  
Social Groups ◽  
Structured Interviews ◽  
Social Stereotypes ◽  
Documentary Analysis ◽  
Quota Management ◽  
Management Students ◽  
Structural Inequalities

Affirmative action aimed at promoting access for groups considered minority to universities are important for combating structural inequalities and promoting social justice. However, in spite of their importance, affirmative actions are frequently questioned by certain social groups, especially socially privileged groups, who argue that such policies are not meritocratic, constituting stereotypes aimed at quota and non-quota students. Thus, this article analyzes the possible stereotypes directed to quota students attending the course of administration of a Brazilian federal university. For this, a qualitative research was carried out with the accomplishment of 38 semi-structured interviews with quota and non-quota management students and documentary analysis. It is observed in the students' discourse the construction of the myth of the intellectual and academic inferiority of quota students, constituting social stereotypes that base the construction of an essential identity on who the quota holders are. However, there are spaces for resistance and the documentary analysis of students' performance, as well as their discourses, deconstruct the myth of shareholder inferiority and the stereotypes attributed to them. Therefore, in order to avoid the construction of stereotypes it is argued that affirmative actions should be conceived within nonessential identity logic. 

The Will Rogers Illusion in Judgments About Social Groups

1993 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 46-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
David M. Messick ◽  
Arlene G. Asuncion
Keyword(s):  
Social Groups ◽  
The Other ◽  
Social Stereotypes ◽  
Will Rogers ◽  
The Will ◽  
The Mean ◽  
The Way

Subjects' judgments of the mean of 12 scores were influenced by the way in which the scores were dichotomized. The estimated mean was higher when the three highest scores formed one group (e.g., payments for women) and the nine lowest formed the other (e.g., payments for men) than when the nine highest were one group and the three lowest the other. We call this phenomenon the Will Rogers Illusion (WRI). The WRI occurred only when estimates of the subgroup means were made prior to the estimates of the mean of the whole group. When the latter mean was judged first, the WRI was reversed. These and other data indicate that the means of subgroups can influence judgments of group means, a finding that is relevant to research on social stereotypes.

scholarly journals Young children seek out biased information about social groups

2017 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. e12580 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harriet Over ◽  
Adam Eggleston ◽  
Jenny Bell ◽  
Yarrow Dunham
Keyword(s):  
Young Children ◽  
Social Groups ◽  
Biased Information

The inherence heuristic: A key theoretical addition to understanding social stereotyping and prejudice

2014 ◽  
Vol 37 (5) ◽  
pp. 483-484 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rebecca S. Bigler ◽  
Caitlin Clark
Keyword(s):  
Social Groups ◽  
Prior Work ◽  
Social Stereotypes

AbstractPrior work has detailed the constructivist processes that lead individuals to categorize others along particular dimensions (e.g., gender) and generate the content (e.g., stereotypes) and affect (e.g., prejudices) associated with social groups. The inherence heuristic is a novel mechanism that appears to shape the content and rigidity of children's social stereotypes and prejudices.

scholarly journals Verbally Highlighting Extrinsic Causes of Novel Social Disparities Helps Children View Low-Status Groups as Structurally Disadvantaged Rather Than Personally Inferior

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rebecca Peretz-Lange ◽  
Paul Muentener
Keyword(s):  
Young Children ◽  
Social Status ◽  
Social Groups ◽  
Social Attitudes ◽  
Social Disparities ◽  
Two Measures

As part of their “essentialist” intuitions, young children tend to form personal attributions for observed intergroup differences – attributing them to groups’ intrinsic natures or inborn characteristics. Much research has linked this essentialist view of social groups with prejudiced attitudes. However, less research has explored children’s capacity to form structural attributions for observed intergroup differences – attributing them to groups’ extrinsic circumstances or access to opportunities – or how structural attributions relate to social attitudes. Structural attributions could enable children to view low-status groups as extrinsically disadvantaged rather than intrinsically inferior. We were interested in whether verbally highlighting the extrinsic causes of novel social status disparities could support young children in forming structural attributions for them, thereby mitigating the formation of prejudice toward novel low-status groups. To investigate, we introduced participants (n=106 5- and 6-year olds) to novel social status disparities that could be attributed to either intrinsic or extrinsic causes, and we framed the disparities in either intrinsic, neutral, or extrinsic terms. We then assessed children’s attributions for the disparities (through two measures: explanations and interventions) and their social attitudes toward the groups (through two measures: friendship preferences and prize allocations). Results indicated that participants tended to provide mostly personal attributions overall but that extrinsic framing led them to provide significantly more structural attributions. Extrinsic framing did not significantly impact social attitudes overall, but exploratory analyses revealed that it impacted participants’ friendship preferences in particular. Together, results suggest that verbally highlighting extrinsic causes can disrupt children’s intuitive tendency toward personal attributions, with promising implications for their views of low-status groups.

There is no privileged link between kinds and essences early in development

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Noyes ◽  
Frank Keil
Keyword(s):  
Young Children ◽  
Biological Properties ◽  
Social Category ◽  
Category Representation ◽  
Older Children ◽  
Social Categories ◽  
Cultural Properties ◽  
Generic Language ◽  
American Children ◽  
Causal Structures

[Please note the Y-axis for Figure 1 is incorrect. It should read: "Percent endorsing formal explanations."] According to the dominant view of category representation, people preferentially infer that kinds (richly structured categories) reflect essences. Generic language (“Boys like blue”) often occupies the central role in accounts of the formation of essentialist interpretations – especially in the context of social categories. In a pre-registered study (N = 240 American children, ages 4-9), we tested whether children assume essences in the presence of generic language or whether they flexibly assume diverse causal structures. Children learned about a novel social category described with generic statements containing either biological properties or cultural properties. Although generic language always led children to believe that properties were non-accidental, young children (4-5) in this sample inferred the non-accidental structure was socialization. Older children (6-9) flexibly interpreted the category as essential or socialized depending on the type of properties that generalized. We uncovered early-emerging flexibility and no privileged link between kinds and essences.

Groups as institutions: The use of constitutive rules to attribute group membership

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Noyes ◽  
Yarrow Dunham
Keyword(s):  
Social Network ◽  
Young Children ◽  
Social Relationships ◽  
Group Membership ◽  
Social Groups ◽  
Older Children ◽  
Group Member

Across four experiments we tested children’s (N = 229, aged 4-9) beliefs about what makes an individual a member of a group. One model (groups as institutions) predicts children believe groups are based in constitutive rules, i.e. collectively agreed-upon rules that ground membership. Another model (groups as social network) predicts children believe groups are based in patterns of social relationships. We tested whether and to what extent children rely on constitutive rules to attribute group membership. We found that young children can reason about constitutive rules as a means of becoming a group member, and their reasoning about constitutive rules is relatively sophisticated (Study 1-3). But, when constitutive rules are pitted against friendship, young children (4-5) prioritize friendship and older children (6-9) prioritize constitutive rules. Therefore, both models contribute to the understanding of children’s concepts of social groups across development.

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