“Are psychological attributes quantitative?” is not an empirical question: Conceptual confusions in the measurement debate

Theory & Psychology ◽

10.1177/09593543211045340 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 095935432110453

Author(s):

David J. Franz

Keyword(s):

Conceptual Problem ◽

Psychological Measurement ◽

Empirical Question ◽

Psychological Phenomena ◽

Psychological Attributes ◽

Empirical Hypothesis

Critics of psychological measurement have accused quantitative psychologists of ignoring the empirical hypothesis that psychological phenomena are quantitative (Michell), or have claimed that it is impossible in principle to find out whether psychological phenomena are actually quantitative (Trendler). By drawing on Bennett and Hacker (2003), I argue that both criticisms do not go far enough because they sidestep the fundamental conceptual problem of the measurement debate: It is impossible to give concrete formulations of the question “Are psychological attributes quantitative?” without transgressing the boundaries of meaningful language. Conceptual confusions and questionable philosophical assumptions have contributed to the misguided idea that the quantity of psychological phenomena must or can be demonstrated empirically. First, the measurement debate is characterized by misleading examples and ambiguous terminology. Second, the idea of psychological measurement is inherently Cartesian. In summary, psychological measurement is even more problematic than Michell and Trendler have argued.

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Denying Descartes and wary of Wittgenstein: Response to Franz

Theory & Psychology ◽

10.1177/09593543211046204 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 095935432110462

Author(s):

Joel Michell

Keyword(s):

Construct Validity ◽

Empirical Research ◽

Conceptual Analysis ◽

Mental States ◽

Quantitative Structure ◽

Major Premise ◽

Psychological Measurement ◽

Empirical Question ◽

Psychological Attributes

In his article, “‘Are Psychological Attributes Quantitative?’ is not an Empirical Question: Conceptual Confusions in the Measurement Debate,” Franz (2021) concludes that psychological measurement does not rest on empirical hypotheses but rather on linguistic deceptions. His major premise is that psychometrics is inherently Cartesian. History shows otherwise: the mantras of operationism and the rituals of construct validity were intended to exorcise psyche from psychometrics. These mainstays of psychometrics ensured that theoretical constructs were more frequently dispositional concepts than they were mental concepts. It is with the latter, however, especially with attempts to measure currently occurring mental states, such as anxiety, that Franz’s argument looks more promising, but nevertheless it fails because it rests upon Wittgenstein’s views about the grammar of mental discourse. I conclude that conceptual analysis, realistically construed and applied to mental concepts, may show that they exclude quantitative structure. Despite that, it is always possible that empirical research might elicit quantitative-friendly revisions of mental concepts.

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Conjoint measurement underdone: Comment on Günter Trendler (2019)

Theory & Psychology ◽

10.1177/0959354318814962 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 29 (1) ◽

pp. 138-143 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Joel Michell

Keyword(s):

Measuring Instruments ◽

Conjoint Measurement ◽

Psychological Phenomena ◽

Psychological Attributes ◽

Mental Tests

Trendler’s (2019) critique of conjoint measurement fails because he neglects to distinguish standard sequences (human constructions) from series of equal magnitudes (features of quantitative structures). The latter, not the former, is presumed in conjoint measurement. Furthermore, in so far as some mental tests use humans as measuring instruments, the only questionable assumption involved is that the relevant psychological attributes are quantitative, and that assumption is potentially testable using conjoint measurement. Finally, contrary to Trendler, psychological phenomena can be captured and the structure of psychological attributes investigated using conjoint measurement.

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The Taxonic Latent Structure and Taxometrics in Forensic Mental Health

Psychological Reports ◽

10.1177/0033294116662443 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 119 (2) ◽

pp. 450-486

Author(s):

Michael D. Maraun ◽

Stephen D. Hart

Keyword(s):

Mental Health ◽

Latent Variable ◽

Quantitative Methods ◽

Latent Structure ◽

Forensic Mental Health ◽

Psychological Measurement ◽

Empirical Question ◽

Clinical Problems

Recently, researchers in the field of forensic mental health have attempted to address the technical, empirical question of whether important clinical problems, such as psychopathy or malingering, constitute taxa (i.e., discrete conditions). In this paper, we provide a detailed elucidation of the foundational logic of the quantitative methods employed to answer this question, focusing on the taxometric procedures developed by Paul Meehl and colleagues. We attempt to demonstrate that research on taxonicity is hampered by (a) researchers’ unfamiliarity with or misunderstanding of the logic underlying latent variable technologies and (b) the fundamental incapacity of Meehlian procedures to provide a test of taxonicity. We conclude by discussing the utility of taxometric procedures to research in forensic mental health and, more broadly, in the field of applied psychological measurement.

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5. Measurement in the behavioural sciences

Measurement: A Very Short Introduction ◽

10.1093/actrade/9780198779568.003.0005 ◽

2016 ◽

pp. 73-89

Author(s):

David J. Hand

Keyword(s):

Physical Sciences ◽

Psychological Measurement ◽

Success Stories ◽

Psychological Attributes ◽

High Level ◽

The Mind ◽

Behavioural Sciences

Concepts of measurement in psychology are particularly noteworthy for having encountered scepticism. While people have been happy to accept that psychological attributes can be compared, many are suspicious about the possibility of assigning numerical scores to such concepts. The earliest success stories in psychological measurement occurred in the realm of psychophysics, the area most closely linked to the physical sciences. ‘Measurement in the behavioural sciences’ explains that there are different high level purposes for which psychological measurement might be undertaken, and that these purposes require different kinds of procedures. It looks at some particular challenges of measuring the mind, including the measurement of sensation and of intelligence.

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The Persnickety Pervasiveness of Rating Enhancement in Personality Assessment

European Journal of Psychological Assessment ◽

10.1027/1015-5759/a000610 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 1-13

Author(s):

Alicia A. Stachowski ◽

John T. Kulas

Keyword(s):

Response Bias ◽

Personality Assessment ◽

Current Paper ◽

Psychological Measurement ◽

Shared Sets ◽

Self Reports ◽

Original Target ◽

Target Profile ◽

Do So ◽

Normative Influences

Abstract. The current paper explores whether self and observer reports of personality are properly viewed through a contrasting lens (as opposed to a more consonant framework). Specifically, we challenge the assumption that self-reports are more susceptible to certain forms of response bias than are informant reports. We do so by examining whether selves and observers are similarly or differently drawn to socially desirable and/or normative influences in personality assessment. Targets rated their own personalities and recommended another person to also do so along shared sets of items diversely contaminated with socially desirable content. The recommended informant then invited a third individual to additionally make ratings of the original target. Profile correlations, analysis of variances (ANOVAs), and simple patterns of agreement/disagreement consistently converged on a strong normative effect paralleling item desirability, with all three rater types exhibiting a tendency to reject socially undesirable descriptors while also endorsing desirable indicators. These tendencies were, in fact, more prominent for informants than they were for self-raters. In their entirety, our results provide a note of caution regarding the strategy of using non-self informants as a comforting comparative benchmark within psychological measurement applications.

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First-Person Experiments in Thinking

European Psychologist ◽

10.1027/1016-9040/a000301 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 23 (3) ◽

pp. 189-205 ◽

Cited By ~ 8

Author(s):

Renatus Ziegler ◽

Ulrich Weger

Keyword(s):

Physiological Parameters ◽

The Self ◽

First Person ◽

Psychological Phenomena ◽

Third Person ◽

Current Article ◽

Thinking Process ◽

Mental Contents

Abstract. In psychology, thinking is typically studied in terms of a range of behavioral or physiological parameters, focusing, for instance, on the mental contents or the neuronal correlates of the thinking process proper. In the current article, by contrast, we seek to complement this approach with an exploration into the experiential or inner dimensions of thinking. These are subtle and elusive and hence easily escape a mode of inquiry that focuses on externally measurable outcomes. We illustrate how a sufficiently trained introspective approach can become a radar for facets of thinking that have found hardly any recognition in the literature so far. We consider this an important complement to third-person research because these introspective observations not only allow for new insights into the nature of thinking proper but also cast other psychological phenomena in a new light, for instance, attention and the self. We outline and discuss our findings and also present a roadmap for the reader interested in studying these phenomena in detail.

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Combining Defaults and Transparency Information to Increase Policy Compliance

Social Psychology ◽

10.1027/1864-9335/a000419 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 51 (5) ◽

pp. 354-359 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Yavor Paunov ◽

Michaela Wänke ◽

Tobias Vogel

Keyword(s):

Independent Effect ◽

Online Experiment ◽

Policy Compliance ◽

Empirical Question ◽

Theoretical Predictions

Abstract. Combining the strengths of defaults and transparency information is a potentially powerful way to induce policy compliance. Despite negative theoretical predictions, a recent line of research revealed that default nudges may become more effective if people are informed why they should exhibit the targeted behavior. Yet, it is an open empirical question whether the increase in compliance came from setting a default and consequently disclosing it, or the provided information was sufficient to deliver the effect on its own. Results from an online experiment indicate that both defaulting and transparency information exert a statistically independent effect on compliance, with highest compliance rates observed in the combined condition. Practical and theoretical implications are discussed.

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