What roles can (educational) philosophy have within educational research? This question concerns the ways in which one can do philosophy as philosophy, not as something else with inspiration or data from philosophy. Further, it concerns doing philosophy within the field of educational research, that is, with the deliberate intention of engaging with educational research. The question is not how to do “philosophy of” education as a separate, outside reflection on the domain of education; instead, what is at stake is delineating the forms of cooperation that philosophy can engage in with educational research on matters of common interest. This question raises the further question of what kind of endeavor philosophy is in comparison with other kinds of investigations. A traditional answer to this question has been the claim that philosophizing consists of conceptual analysis and that philosophical analyses are a priori, providing the conceptual framework for a posteriori empirical investigations. There are several problems with the clear-cut distinction between a priori and a posteriori, but it can be made sense of if understood in a more relative sense rather than as designating absolute categories. Four different views on what philosophy is as regards other kinds of investigations are delineated, and it is pointed out which role each view correspondingly ascribes to philosophy in its cooperation with empirical educational research. The four roles are philosophy as (a) provider of a priori conceptual analyses, (b) clarifier of educational research concepts and their implications, (c) interpreter of educational research results, and (d) dialogue partner with a voice of its own.
The first view of philosophy is the educational variant of the traditional view that philosophy is “queen of the sciences,” acting as conceptual legislator on what it makes sense to say. Philosophy does the conceptual groundwork a priori, as a prerequisite for empirical study and practice implementation, and research and practice then a posteriori investigate the phenomenon delimited by philosophy. Philosophers often take on this role in practice through what they write: they provide analyses of concepts that are significant within educational research, such as “knowledge,” “learning,” “value,” “Bildung,” or “becoming,” and explications of the relationships of these concepts to one another or to other concepts. The second view of philosophy is the educational variant of the opposing traditional designation of philosophy as “handmaiden to the sciences.” Here, philosophy takes a posteriori state-of-the-art educational research as its premise and outset and provides help in clarifying a priori conceptual issues within these a posteriori bounds. The third view of philosophy also takes a posteriori state-of-the-art educational research as its outset but does not content itself with being a helper. Instead, philosophy’s role is to assist educational research in interpreting its results by engaging philosophical methods. In addition to conceptual analysis, this can involve, for example, phenomenological, hermeneutical, and critical-theory analyses. Both a priori and a posteriori philosophical investigations can be undertaken in intertwinement within the a posteriori bounds. The fourth view of philosophy sees the relationship between philosophy and empirical research as symmetrical. Each party can question, challenge, support, inspire, and develop the claims set forth by the other. In this view, philosophy and empirical research within education are concerned with the same subject matter, namely, the actual empirical phenomena of education, such as human knowledge and learning; educational practice; and design of education, curricula, and activities. The research aims of philosophy and empirical research do not coincide, however: Philosophy pursues normative and foundational questions that transcend empirical accounts, and engages intertwined a priori and a posteriori investigations, whereas the various strands of empirical research investigate empirical phenomena in much greater detail.
“Are psychological attributes quantitative?” is not an empirical question: Conceptual confusions in the measurement debate
