5. Measurement in the behavioural sciences

2016 ◽  
pp. 73-89
Author(s):  
David J. Hand
Keyword(s):  
Physical Sciences ◽  
Psychological Measurement ◽  
Success Stories ◽  
Psychological Attributes ◽  
High Level ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Behavioural Sciences

Concepts of measurement in psychology are particularly noteworthy for having encountered scepticism. While people have been happy to accept that psychological attributes can be compared, many are suspicious about the possibility of assigning numerical scores to such concepts. The earliest success stories in psychological measurement occurred in the realm of psychophysics, the area most closely linked to the physical sciences. ‘Measurement in the behavioural sciences’ explains that there are different high level purposes for which psychological measurement might be undertaken, and that these purposes require different kinds of procedures. It looks at some particular challenges of measuring the mind, including the measurement of sensation and of intelligence.

Similarity of Computations Across Domains Does Not Imply Shared Implementation: The Case of Language Comprehension

2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (6) ◽  
pp. 526-534
Author(s):  
Evelina Fedorenko ◽  
Cory Shain
Keyword(s):  
Language Processing ◽  
Language Comprehension ◽  
Fluid Intelligence ◽  
Linguistic Knowledge ◽  
Domain Specific ◽  
Cognitive Operations ◽  
High Level ◽  
General Circuits ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Language Network

Understanding language requires applying cognitive operations (e.g., memory retrieval, prediction, structure building) that are relevant across many cognitive domains to specialized knowledge structures (e.g., a particular language’s lexicon and syntax). Are these computations carried out by domain-general circuits or by circuits that store domain-specific representations? Recent work has characterized the roles in language comprehension of the language network, which is selective for high-level language processing, and the multiple-demand (MD) network, which has been implicated in executive functions and linked to fluid intelligence and thus is a prime candidate for implementing computations that support information processing across domains. The language network responds robustly to diverse aspects of comprehension, but the MD network shows no sensitivity to linguistic variables. We therefore argue that the MD network does not play a core role in language comprehension and that past findings suggesting the contrary are likely due to methodological artifacts. Although future studies may reveal some aspects of language comprehension that require the MD network, evidence to date suggests that those will not be related to core linguistic processes such as lexical access or composition. The finding that the circuits that store linguistic knowledge carry out computations on those representations aligns with general arguments against the separation of memory and computation in the mind and brain.

scholarly journals Redundancy and reducibility in the formats of spatial representations

2022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sami Ryan Yousif
Keyword(s):  
Mental Representations ◽  
Spatial Scales ◽  
Spatial Location ◽  
Spatial Behavior ◽  
Polar Coordinates ◽  
Levels Of Analysis ◽  
Spatial Representations ◽  
High Level ◽  
The Mind

Mental representations are the essence of cognition. Yet, to understand how the mind works, we must understand not just the content of mental representations (i.e., what information is stored), but also the format of those representations (i.e., how that information is stored). But what does it mean for representations to be formatted? How many formats are there? Is it possible that the mind represents some pieces of information in multiple formats at once? To address these questions, I discuss a ‘case study’ of representational format: the representation of spatial location. I review work (a) across species and across development, (b) across spatial scales, and (c) across levels of analysis (e.g., high-level cognitive format vs. low-level neural format). Along the way, I discuss the possibility that the same information may be organized in multiple formats simultaneously (e.g., that locations may be represented in both Cartesian and polar coordinates). Ultimately, I argue that seemingly ‘redundant’ formats may support the flexible spatial behavior observed in humans, and that we should approach the study of all mental representations with this possibility in mind.

Denying Descartes and wary of Wittgenstein: Response to Franz

2021 ◽  
pp. 095935432110462
Author(s):  
Joel Michell
Keyword(s):  
Construct Validity ◽  
Empirical Research ◽  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Quantitative Structure ◽  
Major Premise ◽  
Psychological Measurement ◽  
Empirical Question ◽  
Psychological Attributes

In his article, “‘Are Psychological Attributes Quantitative?’ is not an Empirical Question: Conceptual Confusions in the Measurement Debate,” Franz (2021) concludes that psychological measurement does not rest on empirical hypotheses but rather on linguistic deceptions. His major premise is that psychometrics is inherently Cartesian. History shows otherwise: the mantras of operationism and the rituals of construct validity were intended to exorcise psyche from psychometrics. These mainstays of psychometrics ensured that theoretical constructs were more frequently dispositional concepts than they were mental concepts. It is with the latter, however, especially with attempts to measure currently occurring mental states, such as anxiety, that Franz’s argument looks more promising, but nevertheless it fails because it rests upon Wittgenstein’s views about the grammar of mental discourse. I conclude that conceptual analysis, realistically construed and applied to mental concepts, may show that they exclude quantitative structure. Despite that, it is always possible that empirical research might elicit quantitative-friendly revisions of mental concepts.

scholarly journals The Effect of the Glossary on the Reliability and Performance of the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET)

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
José Toloza-Muñoz ◽  
Jean González-Mendoza ◽  
Ramón D. Castillo ◽  
Diego Morales-Bader
Keyword(s):  
Undergraduate Students ◽  
Secondary Task ◽  
Temporal Stability ◽  
Mental States ◽  
The Self ◽  
Validity And Reliability ◽  
Before And After ◽  
And Performance ◽  
High Level ◽  
The Mind

AbstractThe Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET) is used to measure high-level Theory of Mind. RMET consists of images of the regions surrounding the eyes and a glossary of terms that defines words associated with the gazes depicted in the images. People must identify the meaning associated with each gaze and can consult the glossary as they respond. The results indicate that typically developed adults perform better than adults with neurodevelopmental disorders. However, the evidence regarding the validity and reliability of the test is contradictory. This study evaluated the effect of the glossary on the performance, internal consistency, and temporal stability of the test. A total of 89 undergraduate students were randomly assigned to three conditions. The first group used the original glossary (Ori-G). The second group developed a self-generated glossary of gazes (Self-G). Finally, the third group developed a glossary that did not define gazes, but unrelated words instead (No-G). The test was administered before and after participants drew a randomly assigned image as a secondary task. The findings show that the number of correct answers was similar among the three conditions before and after the secondary task. However, the Self-G and No-G groups took less time to finish the test. The type of glossary affected the consistency and stability of the test. In our case, the Self-G condition made the responses faster, more consistent, and more stable. The results are discussed in terms of levels of processing and the detection of mental states based on gazes.

scholarly journals THE CONSTRUCTION OF STUDENTS’ TYPOLOGY BY THE RELATION OF AESTHETIC SENSIBILITY AND DEPRESSION

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Fedir Podshyvailov ◽  
◽  
Lidiia Podshyvailova ◽  
Mariia Shepelova ◽  
◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Low Level ◽  
Psychological Attributes ◽  
Psychological Indicators ◽  
Educational Establishment ◽  
Educational Production ◽  
High Level ◽  
Social Display ◽  
Aesthetic Sensibility ◽  
Theoretical Analyses ◽  
Integral Indicator

Basing on theoretical analyses the attributes of personality as a social display of a human, and the attributes of individity as a social display of an individual are defined. Besides, the integral indicator of personality is aesthetic sensibility, and the integral indicator of individity – depression. The generalized analysis of modern students’ peculiarities empiric research results allowed to build the typology of students by the relation of aesthetic sensibility and depression as personality and individity integral attributes. 4 types of students were distinguished: I type «+ +» – high level of aesthetic sensibility and high level of depression (named “Avatarity”); II type «– +» – low level of aesthetic sensibility and high level of depression (named “Individity”); III type «– –» – low level of aesthetic sensibility and low level of depression (conditionally named “Vitality”); IV type «+ –» – high level of aesthetic sensibility and low level of depression (actually the type “Personality”). Basing on the revealed differences between types of students, defined by the relation of aesthetic sensibility and depression, in the level of the most studied psychological indicators, the typical psychological attributes are defined. The constructed students’ typology gives us a possibility for better understanding of the destructive influence of educational surrounding and other social influences, coinciding with the time of study in a higher educational establishment, on the student’s personality transformation. The perspective are the development and improvement of the method of personality (and its attributes) empiric researches application as an indicator for estimation of educational (production etc) surrounding favourableness / unfavourableness for the human vital activity and the development of his personality.

scholarly journals Invisible gorillas in the mind: Internal inattentional blindness and the prospect of introspection training

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Morris
Keyword(s):  
Indirect Evidence ◽  
Inattentional Blindness ◽  
Mental Processes ◽  
Perceptual Consciousness ◽  
Psychological Science ◽  
Mindfulness Practices ◽  
Internal Event ◽  
High Level ◽  
The Mind

Much of high-level cognition appears inaccessible to consciousness. Countless studies have revealed mental processes -- like those underlying our choices, beliefs, judgments, intuitions, etc. -- which people do not notice or report, and these findings have had a widespread influence on the theory and application of psychological science. However, the interpretation of these findings is uncertain. Making an analogy to perceptual consciousness research, I argue that much of the unconsciousness of high-level cognition is plausibly due to internal inattentional blindness: missing an otherwise consciously-accessible internal event because your attention was elsewhere. In other words, rather than being structurally unconscious, many higher mental processes might instead be "preconscious", and would become conscious if a person attended to them. I synthesize existing indirect evidence for this claim, argue that it is a foundational and largely untested assumption in many applied interventions (such as therapy and mindfulness practices), and suggest that, with careful experimentation, it could form the basis for a long-sought-after science of introspection training.

scholarly journals A theory inspired proposal for a novel medical treatment in autism. The cerebellar model of autism and the hypothesis of dorsal stream dysfunction: evidence from idiopathic and syndromic cases.

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Costa Vakalopoulos
Keyword(s):  
Animal Studies ◽  
Sensory Modality ◽  
Dorsal Stream ◽  
Theoretical Models ◽  
Medical Intervention ◽  
Efference Copy ◽  
Attentional Deficits ◽  
Component Theory ◽  
High Level ◽  
The Mind

The cerebellum figures prominently in the pathophysiology of idiopathic autism. Many syndromic comorbid cases and animal studies also highlight cerebellar involvement. The role of the cerebellum is implicated in cognitive and affective disorders. However, there remains a profound gap in understanding the route from genes, the effect of mutations on Purkinje cells and ultimately the behavioural phenotype. Given that conditions like autism are disorders of consciousness it is likely that progress will be made beyond the data generating enterprise, by improved theoretical models of the mind-body gap. A way forward is the proposal of consciousness as embodiment of a process of world discovery through motor efference copy. The cerebellum and basal ganglia are essential to a component theory of motor efference copy, providing a heuristic for understanding the structure of cortical dorsal and ventral stream pathways of a sensory modality. This then, further suggests that autism results from a selective dorsal stream dysfunction with all the attendant and hierarchical features that follow such a model and lead to both high level social and attentional deficits as well as lower level motor and restrictive interests. The paper aims to present evidence for dorsal stream dysfunction and how it may relate to a primary cerebellar pathology. The involvement of the cerebellum in most if not all syndromic cases of comorbid ASD is then presented. Finally, it is shown how such insights can be used to propose a general medical intervention based on the use of cerebellar rTMS across the disorder spectrum.

scholarly journals Sentience and the Origins of Consciousness: From Cartesian Duality to Markovian Monism

Entropy ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (5) ◽  
pp. 516 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karl J. Friston ◽  
Wanja Wiese ◽  
J. Allan Hobson
Keyword(s):  
Probability Distributions ◽  
Information Geometry ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Extrinsic Information ◽  
Physical Sciences ◽  
Markov Blanket ◽  
Internal States ◽  
Mental Properties ◽  
Intentional Systems ◽  
The Mind

This essay addresses Cartesian duality and how its implicit dialectic might be repaired using physics and information theory. Our agenda is to describe a key distinction in the physical sciences that may provide a foundation for the distinction between mind and matter, and between sentient and intentional systems. From this perspective, it becomes tenable to talk about the physics of sentience and ‘forces’ that underwrite our beliefs (in the sense of probability distributions represented by our internal states), which may ground our mental states and consciousness. We will refer to this view as Markovian monism, which entails two claims: (1) fundamentally, there is only one type of thing and only one type of irreducible property (hence monism). (2) All systems possessing a Markov blanket have properties that are relevant for understanding the mind and consciousness: if such systems have mental properties, then they have them partly by virtue of possessing a Markov blanket (hence Markovian). Markovian monism rests upon the information geometry of random dynamic systems. In brief, the information geometry induced in any system—whose internal states can be distinguished from external states—must acquire a dual aspect. This dual aspect concerns the (intrinsic) information geometry of the probabilistic evolution of internal states and a separate (extrinsic) information geometry of probabilistic beliefs about external states that are parameterised by internal states. We call these intrinsic (i.e., mechanical, or state-based) and extrinsic (i.e., Markovian, or belief-based) information geometries, respectively. Although these mathematical notions may sound complicated, they are fairly straightforward to handle, and may offer a means through which to frame the origins of consciousness.

Behavioural genetics: An introduction

1999 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 42-44
Author(s):  
F. Sluyter ◽  
B.A. Ellenbroek
Keyword(s):  
Natural Selection ◽  
Charles Darwin ◽  
Behavioural Genetics ◽  
Human Thought ◽  
Behavioural Patterns ◽  
Famous Book ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Descent Of Man ◽  
Behavioural Sciences

Behavioural genetics is the study of the hereditary influence on behaviour, and can therefore be regarded as the intersection between behavioural sciences and genetics. As with most other fields of research it is difficult to exactly pinpoint when behavioural genetics started. In fact, one might say that the notion behavioural traits can be inherited may have appeared in human thought as early at 8000 BC, when the domestication of the dog began.The scientific era of behavioural genetics is generally considered to start with Charles Darwin. In his famous book On the Origin of Species by Means of natural Selection, or the Preservation of favoured Races in the Struggle for Life, published in 1859 (and sold out the first day), he devoted an entire chapter on instinctive behavioural patterns. Some years later, in his book The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex, he clearly stated that the difference between the mind of a human being and the mind of an animal ‘is certainly one of degree and not of kind’. Moreover he gave considerable thought that mental powers (and insanity) are heritable aspects.

scholarly journals Cross-cultural Reading the Mind in the Eyes: An fMRI Investigation

2010 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Reginald B. Adams ◽  
Nicholas O. Rule ◽  
Robert G. Franklin ◽  
Elsie Wang ◽  
Michael T. Stevenson ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Group Membership ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Neural Correlates ◽  
Cross Cultural ◽  
Cultural Groups ◽  
White American ◽  
High Level ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Preliminary Support

The ability to infer others' thoughts, intentions, and feelings is regarded as uniquely human. Over the last few decades, this remarkable ability has captivated the attention of philosophers, primatologists, clinical and developmental psychologists, anthropologists, social psychologists, and cognitive neuroscientists. Most would agree that the capacity to reason about others' mental states is innately prepared, essential for successful human social interaction. Whether this ability is culturally tuned, however, remains entirely uncharted on both the behavioral and neural levels. Here we provide the first behavioral and neural evidence for an intracultural advantage (better performance for same- vs. other-culture) in mental state decoding in a sample of native Japanese and white American participants. We examined the neural correlates of this intracultural advantage using fMRI, revealing greater bilateral posterior superior temporal sulci recruitment during same- versus other-culture mental state decoding in both cultural groups. These findings offer preliminary support for cultural consistency in the neurological architecture subserving high-level mental state reasoning, as well as its differential recruitment based on cultural group membership.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document