scholarly journals Conjoint measurement underdone: Comment on Günter Trendler (2019)

2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 138-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joel Michell

Trendler’s (2019) critique of conjoint measurement fails because he neglects to distinguish standard sequences (human constructions) from series of equal magnitudes (features of quantitative structures). The latter, not the former, is presumed in conjoint measurement. Furthermore, in so far as some mental tests use humans as measuring instruments, the only questionable assumption involved is that the relevant psychological attributes are quantitative, and that assumption is potentially testable using conjoint measurement. Finally, contrary to Trendler, psychological phenomena can be captured and the structure of psychological attributes investigated using conjoint measurement.

1944 ◽  
Vol 90 (378) ◽  
pp. 127-151 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. B. Brody

Increased use of mental tests for the study of psychoses and allied disorders is conspicuous in recent psychiatric practice. This increase is most prominent first in the use of Rorschach's ink-blots; second, in the investigation of conceptual thinking with methods originated by Goldstein; third, in the study of psychometric pattern; fourth, in the diagnosis and measurement of intellectual deterioration; fifth, in assessing prognosis and the effects of treatment. It is partially attributable to sharpening of interest, due to the war, in the prediction of break-down under stress, in the stability and social potentialities of border-line groups, and in estimating the effects of head injury. Another factor is that popular modern treatments such as shock therapy and prefrontal leucotomy appear to involve cerebral areas intimately associated with intelligence. The greatest advances, however, have been made by the followers of Rorschach and of Goldstein and their contributions began before these factors arose. Their methods are also much applied in investigations under the fourth and fifth headings. Their influence, too, is discernible in a change now developing in the way of using mental tests. Whereas in most early investigations tests were used quantitatively as instruments for studying how intelligence level affects and is affected by psychosis, the modern tendency is to use tests not as measuring instruments, but as standard interviews or situations in which the quality rather than the level of the subject's behaviour is studied. On the other hand, perhaps it was growing recognition of the unsuitability of most quantitative tests for application to adults, and of the additional difficulties of interpreting results in psychoses, that first induced search for other techniques.


2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 309-328
Author(s):  
Joel Michell

Endorsing a priori the conviction that any science worthy of the name must measure the attributes it investigates, psychometricians adopted a metaphysical paradigm (without acknowledging it as such) to secure its claim that mental tests measure psychological attributes, a claim that was threatened by the inadequacy of test data to secure it. The fundamental axiom of this paradigm was Thorndike’s Credo (“All that exists, exists in some amount and can be measured”; 1918, p. 16), which entails its central lemma, the psychometrician’s fallacy (“All ordered attributes are quantitative”; Michell, 2009, p. 41), and which, in turn, supplies psychometrics’ primary methodological principle (“interval scales can be derived from ordinal data”). Logically, this framework is flawed at every level: Thorndike’s Credo is metaphysical overreach; the psychometrician’s fallacy is just that—a logical fallacy; and their primary methodological principle, a prioristic thinking.


2021 ◽  
pp. 095935432110453
Author(s):  
David J. Franz

Critics of psychological measurement have accused quantitative psychologists of ignoring the empirical hypothesis that psychological phenomena are quantitative (Michell), or have claimed that it is impossible in principle to find out whether psychological phenomena are actually quantitative (Trendler). By drawing on Bennett and Hacker (2003), I argue that both criticisms do not go far enough because they sidestep the fundamental conceptual problem of the measurement debate: It is impossible to give concrete formulations of the question “Are psychological attributes quantitative?” without transgressing the boundaries of meaningful language. Conceptual confusions and questionable philosophical assumptions have contributed to the misguided idea that the quantity of psychological phenomena must or can be demonstrated empirically. First, the measurement debate is characterized by misleading examples and ambiguous terminology. Second, the idea of psychological measurement is inherently Cartesian. In summary, psychological measurement is even more problematic than Michell and Trendler have argued.


2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 144-151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Günter Trendler

Although Krantz and Wallsten (2019) claim that interval and ratio scales abound in psychology, they miss the opportunity to deliver specific evidence for their existence. Michell (2019), on the other hand, misconstrues my objection against the practical usefulness of conjoint measurement (Trendler, 2019). Furthermore, he underestimates the critical role humans play as measurement instruments—that is, as detectors of magnitudes of psychological attributes as derived quantities—and he also misunderstands the meaning of the Millean Quantity Objection. Finally, in answer to Krantz and Wallsten, I specify my position with regard to the connection between scientific stagnation, measurability, and reproducibility.


2003 ◽  
Vol 42 (4) ◽  
pp. 515-534 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joel Michell

Five episodes in the history of quantitative science provided the occasions for changes in the understanding of measurement important for attempts at quantification in the social sciences. First, Euclid's generalization of the ancient concept of measure to the concept of ratio provided a clear rationale for the use of numbers in quantitative science, a rationale that has been important through the history of science and one that contradicts the definition of measurement currently fashionable within the social sciences. Second, Duns Scotus's modelling of qualitative change upon quantitative change provided the opportunity to extend measurement from extensive to intensive attributes, a shift that makes it clear that the possibility of measuring qualitative attributes in the social sciences is not one that can be ruled out a priori. Third, Hölder's specification of the character of quantitative attributes showed that quantitative structure is a specific kind of empirical structure, one that is not logically necessary and, therefore, it shows that it is not necessary that any psychological attributes must be quantitative either. Taking the points emanating from Duns Scotus and Hölder together, the issue of whether psychological attributes are quantitative is shown to be an empirical issue. Fourth, Campbell's delineation of the categories of fundamental and derived measurement, and his subsequent critique of psychophysical measurement, showed that attempts at psychological measurement raised new challenges for measurement theory. Fifth, the articulation of the theory of conjoint measurement by Luce and Tukey reveals one way in which those challenges might be met. Taken as a whole, these episodes show that attempts at measurement in the social sciences are continuous with the rest of science in the sense that the issue of whether social science attributes can be measured raises empirical questions that can be answered only in the light of scientific evidence.


1978 ◽  
Vol 48 ◽  
pp. 271-278
Author(s):  
Chr. Kühne

The PZT according to MARKOWITZ, undoubtedly one of the most accurate measuring instruments, has become an integral part of astronomy in the last years. Yet there are two reasons why I still tried to improve the MARKOWITZ basic idea.For the MARKOWITZ process the use of a lens objective is imperative. Because of the diameter limitations of the lens objectives the magnitude is reduced. Although a 65 cm PZT has been put into operation in Washington recently, the thermal difficulties encountered made it necessary to control the temperature actively. In addition, the 65 cm diameter of a lens equipped with 4 elements can be considered as the very limit, but not for a mirror system.In addition there are still more disadvantages using lens objectives. The useable field is restricted by astigmatism, reducing the range of declination. The transmission, especially in the blue wavelengths, decreases very rapidly with the thickness of lenses. For large multilens objectives the transmission is less than for a mirror system.


2018 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 189-205 ◽  
Author(s):  
Renatus Ziegler ◽  
Ulrich Weger

Abstract. In psychology, thinking is typically studied in terms of a range of behavioral or physiological parameters, focusing, for instance, on the mental contents or the neuronal correlates of the thinking process proper. In the current article, by contrast, we seek to complement this approach with an exploration into the experiential or inner dimensions of thinking. These are subtle and elusive and hence easily escape a mode of inquiry that focuses on externally measurable outcomes. We illustrate how a sufficiently trained introspective approach can become a radar for facets of thinking that have found hardly any recognition in the literature so far. We consider this an important complement to third-person research because these introspective observations not only allow for new insights into the nature of thinking proper but also cast other psychological phenomena in a new light, for instance, attention and the self. We outline and discuss our findings and also present a roadmap for the reader interested in studying these phenomena in detail.


1998 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. I. J. M. Kempen ◽  
M. J. G. van Heuvelen ◽  
E. van Sonderen ◽  
R. H. S. van den Brink ◽  
A. C. Kooijman ◽  
...  

1971 ◽  
Vol 78 (5) ◽  
pp. 457-458 ◽  
Author(s):  
David H. Krantz ◽  
Amos Tversky
Keyword(s):  

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