scholarly journals Cold War North Korea and United States naval intelligence

2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 387-409
Author(s):  
Hunter Hollins

On 23 January 1968, the North Korean Navy attacked and captured the USS Pueblo, a United States naval intelligence collection ship in international waters off the coast of North Korea. The USS Pueblo was one of a group of AGER ships created to provide intelligence from the Sea of Japan during the Cold War. This article discusses the growing hostilities of North Korea during the Cold War and uses recently declassified documents to illustrate the naval intelligence efforts of the United States to monitor the North Korean threat.

2010 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 273
Author(s):  
Michael J Kelly ◽  
Sean Watts

In the aftermath of the Cold War, many began to question the continuing efficacy, or at least call for reform, of collective security structures such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the United Nations Security Council. Yet, North East Asia never enjoyed a formal, institutionalised collective security structure. As Russia and the United States recede and China emerges in North East Asia, this article questions whether now is the time to consider such an arrangement. Financially, Japan and South Korea are locked into a symbiotic relationship with China (as is the United States), while the government in Beijing continues to militarise and lay territorial and maritime claims to large areas of the region. Moreover, the regime in North Korea, with its new nuclear capabilities, remains unpredictable. Consequently, central components to the question of collective security in North East Asia are the equally vexing questions of what to do about North Korea and whether a new formalised security arrangement would include or exclude the People's Republic of China.


2021 ◽  
Vol 73 (3) ◽  
pp. 171-208
Author(s):  
Paweł Bielicki

The main purpose of my considerations will be to present the most important determinants and relationships that characterize China-North Korea relations during the presidency of Xi Jinping. Based on the available literature on the subject, I would like to try to answer the question whether the relations of the two entities should be considered as rough friendship or long-term partnership. In addition, I intend to state whether mutual ties should be expected in the future.At the beginning I will describe the relations between China and North Korea during the Cold War, when both countries fought in the Korean conflict against the United States and the United Nations. In addition, it would be appropriate to look at the relations of both entities from 1955 to the fall of the USSR, when the North Korean dictator, Kim Il-sung, as part of his doctrine of independence (Juche) balanced in foreign policy between China and the Soviet Union. Post-Cold War times and Beijing’s relationship with Pyongyang will also be of interest to me until 2013, when the North Korean nuclear program became an increasingly contentious issue. In the rest of the work, it will be important to describe the relationship of both countries since Xi Jinping took power in China and Kim Jong Un in North Korea. At that time, despite official declarations of cooperation, relations between the two countries remained cool. It was only the direct negotiations between North Korea and the United States since 2018 that increased its importance in Chinese policy, as evidenced by the visit of the to Pyongyang discussed in the text in June 2019. In the article I intend to raise economic contacts between both entities.In summary, I am trying to answer the question of how relations between China and North Korea will develop in the future. I intend to assess whether the growing role of the DPRK in an international configuration it can contribute to wider, strategic ties with Beijing.


Author(s):  
Richard Mason

The Korean War, which broke out very closely upon the heels of the Communist victory in China, immediately assumed global implications beyond the boundaries of the Korean Peninsula. Essentially a Korean civil war, it immediately became a major ‘hot war’ in the Cold War in Asia. This paper discusses the relations between the United States and Indonesia in the aftermath of the North Korean attack on South Korea, covering the period from the outbreak of the war in 1950 through to the end of the war in 1954. The paper explores the various ways in which the United States attempted to co-opt and coerce Indonesia into the Western camp in the Cold War, and Indonesia’s responses thereto. The central theme of the paper is the interplay between the United States’ policy of containment and the Indonesian policy of non-alignment in the Cold War. An examination of the United States’ policy toward Indonesia, a non-communist but non-aligned nation, vis-à-vis the Korean War, would serve to illustrate the dynamics and nature of the Cold War in Southeast Asia.  


2005 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 3-20
Author(s):  
William W. Boyer

This article first reviews the official policies of South Korea and the United States toward reunification, second examines the division of Korea during the Cold War, third the division since the Cold War, fourth analyzes the North's nuclear issue, and finally discusses the continuing impasse to reunification and what constructive role the United States should play. The paper shows that there are some striking dissimilarities between the postures of the U.S. and South Korea toward North Korea. The article concludes that South Korea's dramatic change from confrontation to reconciliation toward North Korea, that promises eventual reunification, presents an opportunity for the United States to do the same.


2010 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 110-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mary Elise Sarotte

Washington and Bonn pursued a shared strategy of perpetuating U.S. preeminence in European security after the end of the Cold War. As multilingual evidence shows, they did so primarily by shielding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) from potential competitors during an era of dramatic change in Europe. In particular, the United States and West Germany made skillful use in 1990 of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's political weakness and his willingness to prioritize his country's financial woes over security concerns. Washington and Bonn decided “to bribe the Soviets out,” as then Deputy National Security Adviser Robert Gates phrased it, and to move NATO eastward. The goal was to establish NATO as the main post–Cold War security institution before alternative structures could arise and potentially diminish U.S. influence. Admirers of a muscular U.S. foreign policy and of NATO will view this strategy as sound; critics will note that it alienated Russia and made NATO's later expansion possible. Either way, this finding challenges the scholarly view that the United States sought to integrate its former superpower enemy into postconflict structures after the end of the Cold War.


This book uses trust—with its emotional and predictive aspects—to explore international relations in the second half of the Cold War, beginning with the late 1960s. The détente of the 1970s led to the development of some limited trust between the United States and the Soviet Union, which lessened international tensions and enabled advances in areas such as arms control. However, it also created uncertainty in other areas, especially on the part of smaller states that depended on their alliance leaders for protection. The chapters in this volume look at how the “emotional” side of the conflict affected the dynamics of various Cold War relations: between the superpowers, within the two ideological blocs, and inside individual countries on the margins of the East–West confrontation.


Author(s):  
Anne Searcy

During the Cold War, the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union developed cultural exchange programs, in which they sent performing artists abroad in order to generate goodwill for their countries. Ballet companies were frequently called on to serve in these programs, particularly in the direct Soviet-American exchange. This book analyzes four of the early ballet exchange tours, demonstrating how this series of encounters changed both geopolitical relations and the history of dance. The ballet tours were enormously popular. Performances functioned as an important symbolic meeting point for Soviet and American officials, creating goodwill and normalizing relations between the two countries in an era when nuclear conflict was a real threat. At the same time, Soviet and American audiences did not understand ballet in the same way. As American companies toured in the Soviet Union and vice versa, audiences saw the performances through the lens of their own local aesthetics. Ballet in the Cold War introduces the concept of transliteration to understand this process, showing how much power viewers wielded in the exchange and explaining how the dynamics of the Cold War continue to shape ballet today.


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