Pronoun Usage as a Measure of Power Personalization: A General Theory with Evidence from the Chinese-Speaking World

How can the growing personalization of power be identified and measured ex ante? Extant measures in the authoritarian literature have traditionally focused on institutional constraints and more recently on individual behaviour – such as purging opposition members from (and packing allies into) government bodies. This article offers a different strategy that examines leaders’ individual rhetoric. It focuses on patterns of pronoun usage for the first person. The author argues that as leaders personalize power, they are less likely to use ‘I’ (a pronoun linked to credit claiming and blame minimizing) and more likely to use ‘we’ (the leader speaks for – or with – the populace). To test this argument, the study focuses on all major, scheduled speeches by all chief executives in the entire Chinese-speaking world – that is, China, Singapore and Taiwan – since independence. It finds a robust pattern between first-person pronouns and political constraints. To ensure the results are not driven by the Chinese sample, the rhetoric of four other political leaders is considered: Albania's Hoxha, North Korea's Kim Il Sung, Hungary's Orbán and Ecuador's Correa. The implications of this project suggest that how leaders talk can provide insights into how they perceive their rule.

Relacje chińsko-północnokoreańskie za rządów Xi Jinpinga – szorstka przyjaźń czy długotrwałe partnerstwo?

The main purpose of my considerations will be to present the most important determinants and relationships that characterize China-North Korea relations during the presidency of Xi Jinping. Based on the available literature on the subject, I would like to try to answer the question whether the relations of the two entities should be considered as rough friendship or long-term partnership. In addition, I intend to state whether mutual ties should be expected in the future.At the beginning I will describe the relations between China and North Korea during the Cold War, when both countries fought in the Korean conflict against the United States and the United Nations. In addition, it would be appropriate to look at the relations of both entities from 1955 to the fall of the USSR, when the North Korean dictator, Kim Il-sung, as part of his doctrine of independence (Juche) balanced in foreign policy between China and the Soviet Union. Post-Cold War times and Beijing’s relationship with Pyongyang will also be of interest to me until 2013, when the North Korean nuclear program became an increasingly contentious issue. In the rest of the work, it will be important to describe the relationship of both countries since Xi Jinping took power in China and Kim Jong Un in North Korea. At that time, despite official declarations of cooperation, relations between the two countries remained cool. It was only the direct negotiations between North Korea and the United States since 2018 that increased its importance in Chinese policy, as evidenced by the visit of the to Pyongyang discussed in the text in June 2019. In the article I intend to raise economic contacts between both entities.In summary, I am trying to answer the question of how relations between China and North Korea will develop in the future. I intend to assess whether the growing role of the DPRK in an international configuration it can contribute to wider, strategic ties with Beijing.

The religious phenomenon of Juche ideology as a political tool

This study aims to determine the motive that led to the establishment of Juche by Kim Il Sung amidst the influence of communism and its transformation into religion in North Korea. North Korea is a communist country dictated by Kim Jong-Un of the Kim dynasty and known for its cruelty. The country underwent several changes from Marxism-Leninism to familism to determine its strength in Juche. This ideology that acts as a religion was influenced and strengthened Kim Jong Il to Kim Jong-Un and built by shifting the concept of marxism-Leninism to construct a new understanding of Juche. It will be demonstrated that this ideology was influenced by Confucianism, Christianity, Nationalism, Chinese Communism, and Russian Communism. In the modern era, imperialism was used as an ideological tool to restrict backwardness. This theory allegedly helped Kim Il-Sung establish a unitary, one-person rule over North Korea. ‘It will be examined whether Juche ideology is a tool the state has used to convince people of their government. Pronouncements, an intentional religion in which the people were to believe that their Ruler (Kim Il Sung) was a supreme human or an ideology that morphed into a religion’. It will be demonstrated that, when they started honoring Kim as their god, no other religion was permitted.Contribution: This research offers readers an understanding of the value of humanity in the binding ideology of Juche. However, the Juche Ideology can serve as a missiological bridge towards mission goals, which require the experience of spiritual, physical, and social liberation.

Urban development of Pyongiang under the influence of Juche idea

In the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), urban planning and urban architecture reflect the interest of the working class. The goal for the working class was to develop a specific type of urban planning, as a result of which the DPRK introduced a socialist model of urban planning. Until the beginning of 1970, the DPRK depended on the influence of the USSR, it wanted to go beyond that framework, especially in the field of urban planning and architecture. In the early 1970s, Kim Il-sung presented the thesis of Juche's idea, which encompasses all aspects of society. During the 1980s, Pyongyang was promoted to the world as the socialist capital of the world. However, in the 21st century, Korean architecture has noticed many changes compared to the past. In addition to remaining faithful to rationality and monumentality, social differences were given to special groups. Since the arrival and rise of Kim Jong-un to power, the newly built parts of Pyongyang are reminiscent of the physiognomy of capitalist cities.

Korean National Liberation and Communist Movement in Korea (Late 1910-s, 1920-s and Early 1930-s). Concepts of Russian Orientalists

The colonial history has been a topic for scientific research for Russian and foreign orientalists in the 20th and 21th centuries. At present some of the historical events and processes, the liberation movement in the Asian colonies for instance, are being revised and reviewed. At the same time a search for new sources, documents and information is becoming one of the priorities in historical science. This is true about Korean liberation studies in the former USSR and Russia. Soviet and Russian orientalists carried out a number of significant works on the topic. However, as many scholars say themselves, these publications need revision. Furthermore, formerly in their publications Soviet researchers were obliged to follow the concepts of the official North-Korean historiography, which was to serve the cult of Kim Il- Sung and the “Chuchhe” doctrine and misinterpreted historical events, those related to the 1920-s and the 1930-s particularly. As a result some misinterpreted conceptions, missing and unexplained data about Korea’s liberation movement appeared. Hence there was a necessity to broaden the scientific source of research, a need for new information and data. The article is devoted to Korean colonial history, particularly to the Korean struggle for independence during the first 25 years of Japanese colonial governance. The author seeks to find out the way national liberation and communist movement are depicted in the conceptions of Soviet and Russian orientalists. Korean struggle against Japanese colonial rule has been reflected in special editions for official use of the Japanese colonial administration. These books were written in Japanese by the General-Governor’s office, police and court and were used by senior Japanese officials. They prove to be an original source of scientific research concerning forms and methods of Japanese governance in the colony, general situation on the Korean Peninsula before WWII. These Japanese publications also provide important data that shed light on Korea’s struggle for independence. The author makes an attempt to compare, where possible, the conceptions of Russian orientalists concerning national liberation and communist movement in Korea in the late 1910-s, 1920-s and early 1930-s with the interpretation given in the above mentioned Japanese publications.