scholarly journals The European Central Bank’s intricate independence versus accountability conundrum in the post-crisis governance framework

2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 165-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabian Amtenbrink

In the wake of the European financial and sovereign debt crisis there is a revived interest in the constitutional position of the European Central Bank (ECB) in the European Union legal order, notably its independence and democratic legitimacy. A new generation of researchers, witnessing and in part affected by the course of events during the crisis, is currently discovering this field of research. These contemporary contributions are more than reiterations of debates at the time of the establishment of the European System of Central Banks. Indeed, the (legal) landscape pertaining to the position of the ECB has transformed significantly during the crisis, not only raising concerns about the legitimacy of the position and actions of the ECB, but, somewhat paradoxically, also about the compatibility of its functions and actions with the basic EU Treaty preference for an independent, inflation-averse and thus, conservative central bank. This contribution provides a broader picture of the independence-versus-accountability conundrum in the post-crisis governance framework by discussing main determinants of the independence and democratic legitimacy of the ECB today, as well as identifying risks emanating from the ECB’s position in the EU legal order. Based on this assessment areas of improvement are identified.

2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-93 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna-Lena Högenauer ◽  
David Howarth

This article presents the argument that European Central Bank (ECB) policy-making from the start of the sovereign debt crisis in 2010 undermined the democratic legitimacy of the ECB. We start with the argument – defended by a number of scholars including Majone and Moravcsik – that where European Union (EU) policy-making is technocratic and does not have significant redistributive implications it can benefit from depoliticization that does not undermine the democratic legitimacy of this policy-making. This is notably the case where EU institutions have narrow mandates and are constrained by super-majoritarian decision-making. Prior to the international financial crisis, the ECB’s monetary policies were shaped entirely by the interpretation that its mandate was primarily to ensure low inflation. From the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis, the ECB adopted a range of policies which pushed its role well beyond that interpretation and engaged in a form of redistribution that directly undermined treaty provisions.


Author(s):  
Maria Kontochristou

The Greek sovereign debt crisis has not only raised concerns about the deficiencies of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the effects of the Eurozone crisis on member states' politics and administration, but also has challenged the establishment of the Eurozone itself. The crisis has revealed a lack of democratic legitimacy whereas has severely questioned ‘Europeanness'. The chapter examines solidarity as one of the fundamental principles of the European Union (EU) and pylons of the European society and identity. In particular, the chapter discusses the concept of solidarity within the EU and examines the role of discourse at the EU level. Especially, it examines what type of discourse the EU political elites and the media have engendered regarding European solidarity in the case of Greece.


Author(s):  
Michael Ioannidis

The European Central Bank (ECB) is the only central bank governed by supranational constitutional law. As such, it is not only the most important institution of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), but it also marks a new stage in the history of central banking in general. Historically, the tasks and functions of the ECB have reflected the different stages of development of the EMU. The basic principles governing its function were set out in Maastricht, reflecting the interests and ideas about Europe’s economic constitution prevailing at that time. The sovereign debt crisis that hit Europe in 2010 was the second defining moment for the ECB after Maastricht. It posited the ECB–like the rest of the EMU–to challenges that some of the drafters of the Maastricht Treaty had not fully anticipated. These new challenges led to the adoption of novel instruments and the further clarification of fundamental rules and principles. Most important of these developments was the entrustment of the ECB with a new task, banking supervision, and the adoption of unconventional measures, which proved necessary to fulfil its monetary-policy mandate. Ultimately, not only did the ECB withstand the crisis but it emerged as a protagonist in securing the unity and integrity of the EMU.


2021 ◽  
pp. 113-150
Author(s):  
Robert Schütze

This chapter focuses on the internal composition, internal powers, and internal procedures of the European Commission, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the European Central Bank (ECB), and the Court of Auditors. The Commission constituted the centre of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), where it was ‘to ensure that the objectives set out in [that] Treaty [were] attained’. In guiding the European Union, it acts (together with the European Council) like the Union’s ‘government’. The CJEU constitutes the judicial branch of the European Union. However, it is not the only one to interpret and apply European law. From the very beginning, the European legal order intended to recruit national courts in the interpretation and application of European law. Meanwhile, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) defines the ‘primary objective’ of the European Central Bank as the maintenance of price stability. Finally, the Court of Auditors is staffed by accountants, whose primary task is to ‘carry out the Union’s audit’.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jakob Vestergaard ◽  
◽  
Daniela Gabor ◽  

Despite much attention to unconventional monetary policies after the financial crisis, the collateral policies of central banks are rarely discussed. And when they are, the haircuts applied to assets pledged to access central bank liquidity tend not to be analyzed. An exception to these trends is the recent work by Nyborg (2017), who argues that the collateral policies adopted by the European Central Bank (ECB) aggravated the sovereign debt crisis and put the survival of the euro at risk. Taking our point of departure in the money view literature (Mehrling 2011), we argue however that Nyborg’s critique of the ECB’s crisis response is misguided and that his proposal to deepen and reinforce the ECBs role in the fiscal disciplining of member states would be procyclical and destabilizing. Through our analysis of Nyborg’s work and the ECBs crisis response, we identify core principles for countercyclical collateral policies suitable for market-based financial systems.


Ekonomika ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 92 (2) ◽  
pp. 20-31
Author(s):  
Deimantė Andriuškevičiūtė ◽  
Norbertas Balčiūnas

Abstract. The European Central Bank was forced to start using non-standard measures in order to manage the situation determined by the global financial and sovereign debt crisis, namely to sort out liquidity problems and expand credit supply. The European Central Bank is criticized for applying non-standard tools because of increase in inflation risk. However, the analysis shows that the inflation could be managed by the absorption of liquidity surplus. However, there is a negative side of using non-standard measures, such as a significant increase in the credit risk, which arises due to having government bonds in the balance sheet of the European Central Bank. In addition, this indicates that the European Central Bank indirectly finances governments.Key words: monetary policy, inflation, sovereign debt crisis, credit risk, quantitative easing


2021 ◽  
pp. 113-150
Author(s):  
Robert Schütze

This chapter focuses on the internal composition, internal powers, and internal procedures of the European Commission, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the European Central Bank (ECB), and the Court of Auditors. The Commission constituted the centre of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), where it was ‘to ensure that the objectives set out in [that] Treaty [were] attained’. In guiding the European Union, it acts (together with the European Council) like the Union's ‘government’. The CJEU constitutes the judicial branch of the European Union. However, it is not the only one to interpret and apply European law. From the very beginning, the European legal order intended to recruit national courts in the interpretation and application of European law. Meanwhile, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) defines the ‘primary objective’ of the European Central Bank as the maintenance of price stability. Finally, the Court of Auditors is staffed by accountants, whose primary task is to ‘carry out the Union's audit’.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document