Music and affordances

2012 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 102-120 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. Luke Windsor ◽  
Christophe de Bézenac

This paper explores the extent to which ideas developed in The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems and further refined in The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception ( Gibson, 1966 ; 1979 ) can be applied to the analysis of perception and action in musical settings. The ecological approach to perception has rarely been applied to music, although some recent work in ecological acoustics, music theory and music psychology has begun to show an interest in direct perception of events and objects. We would argue that despite this pioneering work, Gibson’s most radical and controversial idea, that of the direct perception of affordances ( Gibson, 1979 ), has not been adequately addressed in a musical context. Following an introduction to the theoretical background to affordances and a review of the ways in which previous authors have investigated ecological approaches to auditory perception, we show how both the production and perception of music can fruitfully be analysed using the concept of affordances, and how such an approach neatly integrates seemingly active and passive engagement with music. In addition, we place this ecological approach to music within a broader empirical context, giving examples of music-psychological, ethnomusicological and neuroscientific evidence which complement our more theoretical approach. In conclusion, we argue that the links between the performance, composition and reception are underpinned by the mutuality of perception and action.

2001 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 195-213 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas A. Stoffregen ◽  
Benoît G. Bardy

In this target article we question the assumption that perception is divided into separate domains of vision, hearing, touch, taste, and smell. We review implications of this assumption for theories of perception and for our understanding of ambient energy arrays (e.g., the optic and acoustic arrays) that are available to perceptual systems. We analyze three hypotheses about relations between ambient arrays and physical reality: (1) that there is an ambiguous relation between ambient energy arrays and physical reality, (2) that there is a unique relation between individual energy arrays and physical reality, and (3) that there is a redundant but unambiguous relation, within or across arrays, between energy arrays and physical reality. This is followed by a review of the physics of motion, focusing on the existence and status of referents for physical motion. Our review indicates that it is not possible, in principle, for there to be a unique relation between physical motion and the structure of individual energy arrays. We argue that physical motion relative to different referents is specified only in the global array, which consists of higher-order relations across different forms of energy. The existence of specificity in the global array is consistent with the idea of direct perception, and so poses a challenge to traditional, inference-based theories of perception and cognition. However, it also presents a challenge to much of the ecological approach to perception and action, which has accepted the assumption of separate senses.


2007 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-10 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sérgio T. Fonseca ◽  
Christina D. C. M. Faria ◽  
Juliana M. Ocarino ◽  
Marisa C. Mancini

The objective of the present study is to introduce the philosophical position and the core concepts of the Ecological Approach to Perception and Action, emphasizing its principles and its uniqueness in relation to other theories related to motor behavior. The Ecological Approach, as opposed to other approaches, assumes the direct realism as its philosophical standpoint. Thus, the Ecological Approach to Perception and Action proposes the concepts of specificity, direct perception and affordance. By assuming the direct realism, the Ecological Approach to Perception and Action commits to the mutuality animal  environment and perception and action, and proposes that the dualism, commonly found in other theories, does not contribute to the understanding of human motor behavior. The choice of a given theory, during the process of scientific investigation, implies in a commitment to the philosophical views and to the principles and assumptions in which it is based. The knowledge about the core concepts of the Ecological Approach may support the decision making process about accepting or rejecting the ideas advanced by James Gibson and, consequently, direct the use of this theory to the development of investigations on perception and action.


1999 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 731-732 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul J. Treffner

Millikan's discussion of substance concepts in terms of their information-gathering role ignores the analyses of information-based perception and action developed within the tradition of ecological psychology. Her introduction and use without definition of key Gibsonian terms such as “affordance” and “direct perception” leaves those of us investigating such concepts uncertain of the extent to which she appreciates their theoretical importance. Due recognition of the realist account of categorical perception developed by J. J. Gibson would provide mutual benefit to modern externalist philosophy as well as to experimental psychology and to those investigating the ecological approach to perception–action.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew D Wilson

Interface theory (Hoffman, Singh & Prakesh, 2015) is the hypothesis that inferential, representational theories of perception entail that fitness, not truth, dictates the evolution of perceptual systems. They show, with simulations, that ‘veridical’ perceptual mappings (ones that preserve at least some of the structure of the world) are routinely out-competed by ‘non-veridical’ interfaces (ones that make no attempt to preserve that structure). They therefore take particular aim at the direct perception, ecological approach to perception (Gibson, 1966, 1979; Turvey, Shaw Reed & Mace, 1981) and work to show that such a system, even if technically an option, would never be selected for by evolution.. This commentary defends the ecological approach from this novel attack by showing that a) Gibson does not make the mistakes he is accused of and, more substantively b) that the ecological hypothesis is so different in kind to the inferential, representational view of perception that it simply falls outside the scope of interface theory’s critiques. The heart of this defence is identifying the profoundly different ontologies (assumptions about the nature of the world to be perceived) underlying inferential and ecological approaches, and examining the consequences of these ontologies (including key problems for the inferential ontology that interface theory makes clear). Interface theory is a strong, clear formalisation of the inferential ontology, but it has no fatal implications for the ecological approach.


i-Perception ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 204166952098725
Author(s):  
Brian Rogers

In 1979, James Gibson completed his third and final book “The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception”. That book can be seen as the synthesis of the many radical ideas he proposed over the previous 30 years – the concept of information and its sufficiency, the necessary link between perception and action, the need to see perception in relation to an animal's particular ecological niche and the meanings (affordances) offered by the visual world. One of the fundamental concepts that lies beyond all of Gibson's thinking is that of optic flow: the constantly changing patterns of light that reach our eyes and the information it provides. My purpose in writing this paper has been to evaluate the legacy of Gibson's conceptual ideas and to consider how his ideas have influenced and changed the way we study perception.


2019 ◽  
pp. 171-182
Author(s):  
Justin London

Chapter 11 discusses the limits and mechanisms of our perceptual faculties for auditory rhythm. Perhaps more than vision, a consideration of auditory perception, and our auditory perception of rhythm in particular, reminds us that the perceptual process is not a linear chain of information from the external world to the mind, but an active interplay between mind and world. But while considering our senses as perceptual systems—as cross-modal—solves some problems of perception, it creates other, perhaps deeper ones, the author argues. In the case of musical rhythm, our rhythmic percepts are often non-veridical, as we add accents, beats, and grouping structure to otherwise undifferentiated stimuli.


Author(s):  
Carol A. Fowler

The theory of speech perception as direct derives from a general direct-realist account of perception. A realist stance on perception is that perceiving enables occupants of an ecological niche to know its component layouts, objects, animals, and events. “Direct” perception means that perceivers are in unmediated contact with their niche (mediated neither by internally generated representations of the environment nor by inferences made on the basis of fragmentary input to the perceptual systems). Direct perception is possible because energy arrays that have been causally structured by niche components and that are available to perceivers specify (i.e., stand in 1:1 relation to) components of the niche. Typically, perception is multi-modal; that is, perception of the environment depends on specifying information present in, or even spanning, multiple energy arrays. Applied to speech perception, the theory begins with the observation that speech perception involves the same perceptual systems that, in a direct-realist theory, enable direct perception of the environment. Most notably, the auditory system supports speech perception, but also the visual system, and sometimes other perceptual systems. Perception of language forms (consonants, vowels, word forms) can be direct if the forms lawfully cause specifying patterning in the energy arrays available to perceivers. In Articulatory Phonology, the primitive language forms (constituting consonants and vowels) are linguistically significant gestures of the vocal tract, which cause patterning in air and on the face. Descriptions are provided of informational patterning in acoustic and other energy arrays. Evidence is next reviewed that speech perceivers make use of acoustic and cross modal information about the phonetic gestures constituting consonants and vowels to perceive the gestures. Significant problems arise for the viability of a theory of direct perception of speech. One is the “inverse problem,” the difficulty of recovering vocal tract shapes or actions from acoustic input. Two other problems arise because speakers coarticulate when they speak. That is, they temporally overlap production of serially nearby consonants and vowels so that there are no discrete segments in the acoustic signal corresponding to the discrete consonants and vowels that talkers intend to convey (the “segmentation problem”), and there is massive context-sensitivity in acoustic (and optical and other modalities) patterning (the “invariance problem”). The present article suggests solutions to these problems. The article also reviews signatures of a direct mode of speech perception, including that perceivers use cross-modal speech information when it is available and exhibit various indications of perception-production linkages, such as rapid imitation and a disposition to converge in dialect with interlocutors. An underdeveloped domain within the theory concerns the very important role of longer- and shorter-term learning in speech perception. Infants develop language-specific modes of attention to acoustic speech signals (and optical information for speech), and adult listeners attune to novel dialects or foreign accents. Moreover, listeners make use of lexical knowledge and statistical properties of the language in speech perception. Some progress has been made in incorporating infant learning into a theory of direct perception of speech, but much less progress has been made in the other areas.


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