The Attorneys’ Gender: Exploring Counsel Success before the U.S. Supreme Court

2021 ◽  
pp. 106591292110172
Author(s):  
Jonathan S. Hack ◽  
Clinton M. Jenkins

Stereotypes are powerful heuristics structuring decision-making, with research suggesting that gender-based stereotypes place women at a professional disadvantage. This paper tests whether attorneys’ gender influences Supreme Court outcomes. We construct an attorney-focused data set combining personal and professional attributes with case-level characteristics from 1946 to 2016. Our approach brings clarity to previous findings, enabling a longitudinal analysis of women participation before the Court. We find that attorney gender does not influence party success. In doing so, we show that a more nuanced approach is needed when studying the intersection between judicial outcomes and attorney traits.

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Heise

Proponents of judicial elections and related campaign activities emphasize existing First Amendment jurisprudence as well as similarities linking publicly-elected state judges and other publicly-elected state officials. Opponents focus on judicial campaign contributions’ corrosive effects, including their potential to unduly influence judicial outcomes. Using a comprehensive data set of 2,345 business-related cases decided by state supreme courts across all fifty states between 2010–12, judicial election critics, including Professor Joanna Shepherd, emphasize the potential for bias and find that campaign contributions from business sources to state supreme court judicial candidates corresponded with candidates’ pro-business votes as justices. While Shepherd’s main findings generally replicate, additional (and alternative) analyses introduce new findings that raise complicating wrinkles for Shepherd’s strong normative claims. Findings from this study illustrate that efforts to influence judicial outcomes are not the exclusive domain of business interests. That is, judicial campaign contributions from non- (and anti-) business interests increase the probability of justices’ votes favoring non-business interests. As a result, critiques of judicial elections cannot properly rely exclusively on the influence of business interests. Moreover, that both business and non-business interests can successfully influence judicial outcomes through campaign contributions point in different (and possibly conflicting) normative directions. On the one hand, even if one agrees that the judicial branch qualitatively differs from the political and executive branches in terms of assessing campaign contributions’ proper role, that the potential to influence judicial outcomes is available to any interest group (willing to invest campaign contributions) complicates popular critiques of judicial elections. On the other hand, the same empirical findings also plausibly strengthen critiques of judicial elections, especially for those who view the judicial domain differently than other political domains.


1993 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 511-529 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph A. Ignagni

The U.S. Supreme Court, at various times, has changed the constitutional tests it claimed to use in order to settle free exercise of religion disputes. These changes in official doctrine and the manner in which many cases have been decided have left the Supreme Court open to much criticism from legal scholars. This study differs substantially from previous work in this area. It uses a fact-attitudinal model to analyze the cases from the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts. Its findings indicate that these decisions are, generally, explainable and predictable.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Heise

52 Valparaiso University Law Review 19 (2017).Proponents of judicial elections and related campaign activities emphasize existing First Amendment jurisprudence as well as similarities linking publicly elected state judges and other publicly-elected state officials. Opponents focus on judicial campaign contributions’ corrosive effects, including their potential to unduly influence judicial outcomes. Using a comprehensive data set of 2,345 business-related cases decided by state supreme courts across all fifty states between 2010–12, judicial election critics, including Professor Joanna Shepherd, emphasize the potential for bias and find that campaign contributions from business sources to state supreme court judicial candidates corresponded with candidates’ pro-business votes as justices. While Shepherd’s main findings generally replicate, additional (and alternative) analyses introduce new findings that raise complicating wrinkles for Shepherd’s strong normative claims. Findings from this study illustrate that efforts to influence judicial outcomes are not the exclusive domain of business interests. That is, judicial campaign contributions from non- (and anti-) business interests increase the probability of justices’ votes favoring non-business interests. As a result, critiques of judicial elections cannot properly rely exclusively on the influence of business interests. Moreover, that both business and non-business interests can successfully influence judicial outcomes through campaign contributions point in different (and possibly conflicting) normative directions. On the one hand, even if one agrees that the judicial branch qualitatively differs from the political and executive branches in terms of assessing campaign contributions’ proper role, that the potential to influence judicial outcomes is available to any interest group (willing to invest campaign contributions) complicates popular critiques of judicial elections. On the other hand, the same empirical findings also plausibly strengthen critiques of judicial elections, especially for those who view the judicial domain differently than other political domains.


2019 ◽  
pp. 37-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kelsey S. Henderson

In the landmark Gideon v. Wainwright decision (1963), the U.S. Supreme Court established the federal standard of appointed counsel for indigent defendants as fundamental to fairness. This right has been upheld throughout the years and is central to our adversarial system. The attorney’s responsibility is to zealously serve as the accused’s strongest counselor and advocate. In the context of plea bargaining, the attorney can assist the defendant in making a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent plea decision. The attorney may act as a “debiaser,” counteracting irrationality on the defendant’s part. However, research suggests structural influences and psychological processes may impede the role of the attorney. This chapter explores how legal and extralegal factors affect attorneys’ plea decision-making, which ultimately influence defendants’ decisions to waive or invoke their right to trial.


Author(s):  
Elizabeth Ford

Chapter 7 describes three cases that involve an individual’s right, in certain circumstances, to choose death. Cruzan v. Missouri is more specifically about a right to refuse life-sustaining treatment and surrogate decision-making; Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill are physician-assisted suicide cases, both decided on the same day by the U.S. Supreme Court and both declaring the practice unconstitutional.


2007 ◽  
Vol 35 (5) ◽  
pp. 694-725 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard L. Pacelle ◽  
Bryan W. Marshall ◽  
Brett W. Curry

Author(s):  
Timothy R. Johnson

The U.S. Supreme Court is but one of three political institutions within the structure of the U.S. federal government. Within this system of separated powers it rules on the constitutionality of some of the nation’s most important legal and political issues. In making such decisions, the nation’s highest court may be considered the most powerful of the three branches of the U.S. federal government. Understanding this process will allow scholars, students of the Court, and Court watchers alike to gain a better understanding of the way in which the justices conduct their business and to come to terms with some of the most important legal and political decisions in our nation’s history. Combining a theoretical account of Supreme Court decision-making with an examination of its internal decision-making process illuminates this opaque institution.


2016 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 232-245 ◽  
Author(s):  
Todd A. Collins ◽  
Christopher A. Cooper

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