Populist and nativist attitudes: Does ingroup-outgroup thinking spill over across domains?

2021 ◽  
pp. 146511652199287
Author(s):  
Matthijs Rooduijn ◽  
Bart Bonikowski ◽  
Jante Parlevliet

What are the attitudinal consequences of the growing pervasiveness of populism and nativism? We conceive of both populism and nativism as binary moral frameworks predicated on an antagonistic relationship between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Our study investigates the presence of spillover effects between these two forms of ingroup-outgroup thinking among survey respondents in the Netherlands. We posit that exposure to populist (nativist) messages fuels nativism (populism), but only among those positively predisposed toward these messages in the first place. A first survey experiment, focusing on antipathies toward refugees and Muslim immigrants, confirms the former expectation, but a second experiment calls into question the latter hypothesis. Moreover, the second experiment does not replicate the effects of populist message exposure on general immigration attitudes. We discuss several possible reasons for these mixed results.

2021 ◽  
pp. 019791832110634
Author(s):  
Michael Neureiter

Drawing on intergroup threat theory, this article argues that immigrant integration policies can improve public attitudes toward immigrants and, particularly, toward refugees and asylum-seekers. Examining evidence from an original survey experiment conducted in the United Kingdom, I find that support for admitting asylum-seekers increases when respondents are made aware that prospective asylum-seekers will be required to partake in language and civic-education courses. This effect is particularly strong among respondents who were more likely to perceive asylum-seekers as a symbolic threat (i.e., conservatives). Similarly, support for admitting asylum-seekers increases when respondents are told that future asylum-seekers will only have limited access to welfare. This effect is stronger among respondents who were more likely to view asylum-seekers as a material threat (i.e., conservatives and individuals with low socioeconomic status). These findings have important implications for the literatures on immigrant integration policies, intergroup threat theory, and public immigration attitudes generally. Importantly, the results reported in this article illustrate the significance of structural determinants for the study of immigration attitudes and demonstrate the importance of disaggregating immigrant integration policies when evaluating their effects.


Author(s):  
Müge Simsek ◽  
Konstanze Jacob ◽  
Fenella Fleischmann ◽  
Frank van Tubergen

In this chapter we explore how religious minority and majority youth are in England, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. We find that minority youth are on average more often affiliated to a religion than majority youth, and mostly affiliated as Christians. We also study religious salience, praying and service attendance. The share of minority and majority youth who expresses that religion is important in their lives is higher than the share of youth who engages in daily prayer or weekly service attendance. Specifically, Muslim youth stand out as the most religious on all accounts. Our further comparison of the religious salience of youth with that of their parents reveals that intergenerational religious change has a declining tendency, though also quite some stability exists, especially among Muslim immigrants. Together, these findings suggest overall low levels of religious salience and practice among majority youth, in contrast to minority youth—in particular Muslims—and a general pattern of intergenerational decline in the importance of religion.


2010 ◽  
Vol 104 (3) ◽  
pp. 624-624 ◽  
Author(s):  
JENS HAINMUELLER ◽  
MICHAEL J. HISCOX

In their article in the February 2010 issue of APSR, Jens Hainmueller and Michael J. Hiscox (2010) asserted that they had “conducted a unique survey experiment that, for the first time, explicitly and separately examine[d] individuals’ attitudes toward highly skilled and low-skilled immigrants.” That claim was in error. A prior survey experiment, also published in the American Political Science Review, in February 2004, examined attitudes toward highly skilled and low-skilled immigrants in the Netherlands and assigned respondents randomly to alternative questions (Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004).


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Pickup ◽  
Eline de Rooij ◽  
Matthew Goodwin ◽  
Clifton van der Linden

A key issue in Britain’s referendum on European Union membership was the free movement of labour into Britain, with Brexit ‘Leavers’ having more negative attitudes towards immigrants compared to ‘Remainers’. Such anti-immigrant attitudes are driven by feelings of threat. As Brexit negotiations continued, the coronavirus pandemic presented a new threat, potentially heightening anti-immigrant attitudes. However, the prominent sacrifices of migrant workers in the fight against coronavirus suggests a potential for softening public attitudes. We ask: how did the COVID-19 pandemic, in the context of ongoing Brexit negotiations, affected anti-immigrant attitudes and how did these effects differ between Leavers and Remainers? Through a survey experiment, we test the effects of priming COVID-19 thoughts, showing that COVID-19 may exacerbate anti-immigrant attitudes among Leavers while having little effect on Remainers. In doing so, we explore the effect of a viral threat on immigration attitudes and heterogeneity in that effect, based on political identities.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louise H. Dekker ◽  
Richard H Rijnks ◽  
Jochen O. Mierau

Abstract Background: While differences in population health across neighborhoods with different socioeconomic characteristics are well documented, health disparities across neighborhoods with similar socioeconomic characteristics are less well understood. Studying the determinants of variation of health among neighborhoods with similar socio-economic characteristics is pivotal for gaining insight into where health potential lies. We aimed to estimate population health inequalities, both within and between neighborhoods with similar socio-economic status, and assessed the association of neighborhood characteristics and socio-economic spillover effects from adjacent neighborhoods. Methods: Based on whole-population data from the Netherlands we determined the percentage of inhabitants with good/very good self-assessed health (SAH) as well as the percentage of inhabitants with at least one chronic disease (CD) in 11,504 neighborhoods. Neighborhoods were classified by quintiles of a composite NSES score. Spatial models were estimated by including the spatially weighted NSES of adjacent neighborhoods. Results: Substantial population health disparities in SAH and CD both within and between neighborhoods NSES quintiles were observed, with the largest SAH variance in the lowest NSES group. These differences were partially explained by neighborhood density and the percentage of inhabitants ≥65 years old. Neighborhoods adjacent to higher SES neighborhoods showed a higher SAH and a lower prevalence of CD, adjusted for other explanatory variables. Policy simulations indicate how modest changes in NSES among groups of neighborhoods with similar socio-economic characteristics can contribute to population health, partially due to spatial spillovers. Conclusion: Population health differs substantially among neighborhoods with similar socioeconomic characteristics, which can partially be explained by a spatial socio-economic spillover effect. This provides interesting leads to policy design aimed at improving population health outcomes of deprived neighborhoods focusing on health potential.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hendrik Marten Koolma ◽  
Catharina Frederika van Dreven

In this contribution we intend to shed light on the social dimension of sustainability. Thereby, we follow adhere to the goals for sustainable development as issued by the United Nations. The majority of the goals concerns social topics in the national societies. We intend to research in what way resilience lead to social progress and, through that, to sustainability. The attainment of the goals is hindered by the phenomenon of negative spillover effects between countries. In addition, we assume the presence of intra-national spillover effects which means that advancements in some areas are accompanied by deteriorations in other parts of the country. The negative effects concentrate and accumulate disadvantages into distinct neighborhoods. Inhabitants who try to overcome the disadvantages can be fostered in their resilience by beneficial interventions and conditions. However, they will be faced with impeding interventions and conditions as well. A case in the Netherlands shows that by resilience inspired policy reforms rather inflict additional problems on disadvantaged inhabitants. A set of interviews with key persons sheds light on the question of how resilience in the neighborhoods could be fostered instead. It requires support of individuals who take the initiative to improve the living conditions of themselves and others. The processes need some guidance by professional workers who do relate to everyday live in the neighborhoods, and who build relationship op the basis of trust. In their situational work, they need to be enabled and backed by their superiors.


2022 ◽  
pp. 019791832110548
Author(s):  
Mathew J. Creighton ◽  
Éamonn Fahey ◽  
Frances McGinnity

Newcomers to Ireland confront a context of reception shaped by large-scale historical emigration and more recent immigration defined by an increasingly diverse set of origin contexts, both within and outside the European Union (EU). How has the Irish population responded to these groups, and how openly do Irish residents express their views toward different immigrant groups? We test this response using a survey experiment, which offered respondents an anonymous way to express any negative attitudes to immigrant groups they may have had. Results from the survey experiment show that Irish residents’ support for Black and Polish immigrations is overstated when expressed directly. In contrast, their sentiment toward Muslim immigrants is notably insensitive to the level of anonymity provided, indicating little difference between overt and covert expression of support (or antipathy). In other words, when race/ethnicity or EU origin is made salient, Irish respondents are more likely to mask negative sentiment. When Islam is emphasized, however, Irish antipathy is not masked. We find that in-group preferences, instead of determining support in an absolute sense, shape the reluctance with which opposition to immigrant groups is overtly expressed.


2020 ◽  
pp. 003232172094616
Author(s):  
Omer Solodoch

Does opposition to immigration mostly stem from prejudice or from sociotropic concerns about broad economic and cultural implications on the nation as a whole? Previous work on immigration preferences cannot answer this question because the two explanations are observationally equivalent when focusing on the attitudes of natives. I analyze a unique survey experiment that asks both natives and immigrants of various origins to evaluate different profiles of visa applicants to the Netherlands. The experiment also assigns an “ingroup treatment”—applications by individuals of the same ethnocultural background as the respondent. Using this rich data, I show that sociotropic concerns are the major source of immigration preferences, while ethnic biases play a moderate role. Remarkably, the ingroup treatment has limited effects on admission. However, bias against specific immigrant groups is detected in preferences of immigrant respondents and of those who sympathize with the far-right Freedom Party.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
Eelco Harteveld ◽  
Philipp Mendoza ◽  
Matthijs Rooduijn

Abstract Do populist radical right (PRR) parties fuel affective polarization? If so, how and under which circumstances? Based on a comparative cross-country analysis covering 103 elections in 28 European countries and an examination of longitudinal data from the Netherlands, we show that PRR parties occupy a particular position in the affective political landscape because they both radiate and receive high levels of dislike. In other words, supporters of PRR parties are uniquely (and homogeneously) negative about (supporters of) mainstream parties and vice versa. Our analyses suggest that these high levels of antipathy are most likely due to the combination of these parties' nativism and populism – two different forms of ingroup–outgroup thinking. Our findings also suggest that greater electoral success by PRR parties reduces dislike towards them, while government participation appears threatening to all voters except coalition partners.


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