scholarly journals German–Norwegian relations in security and defence: What kind of partnership?

European View ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 178168582110012
Author(s):  
Bjørn Olav Knutsen

The article contributes to the debate on European defence cooperation and integration by analysing the German–Norwegian security and defence partnership. I define this partnership as being based upon mutual interests and values, and one in which the minor partner has important resources to contribute which accord with the larger partner’s interests and values. The article analyses this partnership within the framework of European integration and Atlantic cooperation, and in terms of how the discourse on strategic autonomy shapes the partnership. The article discusses two specific areas of cooperation, the High North and German–Norwegian collaboration on defence procurement. When analysing this relationship, I argue that Norway applies strategies such as acting as an external resource, adaptation and shielding to influence German policies vital to Norwegian security.

Author(s):  
Christian Leuprecht ◽  
Rhianna Hamilton

Responding to concerns about burden-sharing and aiming to improve internal defence cooperation, act more quickly and harness resource synergies, the European Union (EU) initiated the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in 2017. PESCO, however, is controversial. On the one hand, the United States (US) wants greater burden-sharing by European allies whilst concerned about greater European military autarky that would undermine US influence over NATO, Europe/EU and EU member states. Onthe other hand, at least one European NATO ally wants to leverage PESCO precisely as an instrument to shore up European “strategic autonomy”. This tension over competing European defence futures leaves participation by third countries in limbo. Arguably, third-country participation would hinder greater European defence autarky. The article makes the case for the mutual benefits of third-country participation, focusing on Canada. Canada has a major stake in the outcome. NATO is Canada’s most important multilateral institution and Europe is Canada’s second-most important strategic partner, after the US. Canada’s unequivocal strategic interests in Europe have long informed its expeditionary priorities -- from the two world wars, when Canada coming to Europe’s defence long before the USproved existential for both parties, to nowadays. Since the 1970s, Canada and Europe have worked consistently together bilaterally beyond NATO to advance regional stability and mutual security interests. Canada’s and Europe’s defence futures are thus interdependent. Excluding third countries from participating in PESCO would have detrimental consequences for Canadian, European and transatlantic defence interests. In contrast, with third country participation, PESCO will be instrumental to effective transatlantic and transeuropean defence integration.


Author(s):  
Darshana M. Baruah

Darshana Baruah, an emerging Indian maritime security analyst, examines India’s heightened focus on improving maritime domain awareness in the coastal domain, EEZ and far seas. This is increasingly being driven by growing naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Of particular concern is India’s ability to monitor the passage of PLA Navy submarine passages to Pakistan and elsewhere in the Indian Ocean. Despite improved maritime situational awareness in coastal waters, India still has difficulty in tracking surface and subsurface vessels transiting its EEZ or neighbouring waters. This will likely require coordination and collaboration with friendly states. Baruah concludes that despite India’s traditional attachment to strategic autonomy, the difficulties in any one country developing maritime domain awareness across the Indian Ocean will be a key driver in greater defence cooperation with the United States and its allies.


2020 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-80
Author(s):  
Sigfrido RAMIREZ PEREZ

The contribution of Spanish trade unions to the process of transition and consolidation of the Spanish democracy has been very much underestimated. The dominating historiographical interpretation has considered them as simple transmission belt of political parties. This general view has been extended to their role in the process of the adhesion of Spain to the European Economic Communities. In reality, Spanish trade unions had been Europeanised very early by their links to the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC). This article explores the adhesion process to the ETUC, showing the progressive convergence between trade unions in the field of European integration, which started with the adhesion of Spain to the EEC from 1977 to 1985 and continued in their position towards the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. The paper concludes that there has been a programmatic and strategic autonomy of Spanish trade unions from political parties in their agenda for European integration.


Subject India's challenge of increasing defence procurement. Significance Prime Minister Narendra Modi has pledged to modernise India's military. Newly appointed defence minister Nirmala Sitharaman will be under pressure to improve the government's handling of defence tenders. Impacts India will increase defence cooperation with Japan. Delhi will resist any calls to play a military role in Afghanistan. Controversy surrounding the locomotive deal between Indian Railways and General Electric may harm the ‘Make in India’ initiative.


2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 19-39
Author(s):  
Carlos Calvo

Defence has traditionally not been a priority within Community policies. However, in recent years it had become aware of the need to promote it, with special attention to the development of the industrial base. The most significant milestone for change comes in December 2013 when the Council discusses the future of security and defence. Until then, the Council took precedence over national optics and the Commission acted in the face of industry as a regulator to promote the implementation of single market rules in the defence market. The Libyan crisis of 2011 highlighted the need for strategic autonomy. This abstract concept implies the capability to act. It highlights the need for greater autonomy in industrial matters to support military capabilities without external dependencies. The crisis also occurs at a time of widespread decline in defence budgets that makes it difficult for nations to tackle large programs individually. The need for a competitive industrial base to support autonomous operations is of value. It is in this context that the EU Global Strategy in 2016 is enacted, resulting in the implementation in defence of the CFSP initiative aimed at streamlining demand, and the European Defence Plan, which includes the creation of a specific fund, the EDF, aimed at incentivising industrial cooperation to act on the supply side. The initiatives launched over the past four years to promote security and defence cooperation, with particular attention to the industrial component, are underway and will be difficult to go back even if European countries are in the dilemma between protectionism and cooperation. The COVID 19 crisis has diverted that attention. The future presents a scenario of greater strategic instability, which is faced with different national perspectives, greater competition between great powers in which Europe does not present a single voice, and a European society that seems far from its defence. Under these conditions, Europe faces the need to decide between having military and industrial capabilities appropriate to its political objectives or maintaining formulas for cooperation with third parties following current models. If the strategic objective is to have sufficient autonomy to address actions independently, the development of an industrial defence policy will be a basic element and will be conditioned by member states' visions, budgetary effort, and level of coordination of operational demand and industrial supply.


European View ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niklas Nováky

In December 2017 the EU established Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). Previously an unused instrument in the Treaty on European Union, PESCO enables able and willing EU member states to develop their defence capabilities and improve the deployability of their forces through common projects. This article argues that PESCO has the potential to become a game changer for EU defence cooperation and could help the Union to achieve strategic autonomy, but only if (1) the participating member states do more than the minimum required to fulfil their binding PESCO commitments, (2) the implementation of PESCO is monitored rigorously at the national and EU levels and (3) there are consequences for those member states that fail to meet their commitments. Otherwise, PESCO will become—like the Battlegroups before it—another oversold EU security and defence initiative that failed to meet the expectations placed on it.


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