scholarly journals The Limits and Potential of Liberal Democratisation in Southeast Asia

2014 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 19-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sorpong Peou

This article argues that Southeast Asia is a region where uneven political development presents a theoretical challenge to the study of regime change and continuity in the academic field of comparative politics. Of the 11 political regimes, only Timor-Leste, the Philippines, and Indonesia can now be considered liberally democratic. However, these democracies are far from consolidated. The other eight regimes range from soft dictatorships to electoral authoritarian regimes and illiberal democracies. This article seeks to explain why no single theory adequately explains regime change and continuity in this region. Impediments to democratisation are many – one of which is the fact that traditional and undemocratic institutions remain strong and that transitions to civilian rule remain vulnerable to other powerful state institutions, most notably the armed forces.

Author(s):  
Barbara Watson Andaya

Southeast Asia includes eleven countries, although this contemporary configuration disguises significant differences, especially in regard to religion and economic status. Theravada Buddhism is dominant in the “mainland” countries of Myanmar (Burma), Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos, while Vietnam is influenced by the religious and intellectual traditions of China, including Mahayana Buddhism, Daoism, and Confucianism. In the “island” areas (Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Indonesia, and Timor Leste/Timor Lorosae), the dominant faiths are Islam and Christianity (the latter a majority in the Philippines, Timor Leste, and parts of the eastern Indonesian archipelago), with Bali retaining a localized form of Hinduism. There are also marked economic differences. Singapore and Brunei are among the world’s richest countries, with Laos and Timor Leste among the poorest. Despite this diversity, a regional theme concerns the interaction between religious change and commerce. A chronological and comparative approach that moves from early times to the present day shows that ideas about relationships to the cosmos have developed in tandem with expanding commerce. Although this relationship has never been static, the aim of establishing a beneficial interaction with the supranatural world remains a basic human goal. During the 1st millennium ce the rise of new polities, combined with increasing overland and maritime trade, encouraged the adoption and adaption of incoming religions, notably Hinduism and Buddhism. The 13th century marks the beginning of a new phase with the spread of Theravada Buddhism on the mainland and Islam and subsequently Christianity in the island world. The commerce-religion nexus, though still present, is less evident from the mid-19th century to World War II, when all of Southeast Asia except for Thailand was under colonial control. From the late 20th century transnational trade has allied with religious resurgence, generating new and dynamic forms of engaging with nonhuman forces.


1973 ◽  
Vol 67 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carl H. Landé

The paper describes a “dyadic” type of political structure which, it is argued, is a necessary supplement to class and interest group models for the analysis of informal political structure in contemporary Southeast Asia, and probably in other developing areas.Various types of simple and complex dyadic structures are described. The paper then examines four Southeast Asian polities, of different degrees of political development, with attention to the manner in which they combine group and dyadic structures. The examples are the Kalinga, a pagan ethnolinguistic group of Northern Luzon; the Tausug, a Muslim group of the Sulu archipelago; the traditional Thai monarchy; and the present Republic of the Philippines. In each case the effects of structure upon the operation of the system are explored. The paper concludes with a set of paired propositions concerning the characteristics of “trait associations” and “personal followings.”


2020 ◽  
pp. 19-61
Author(s):  
David Shambaugh

This chapter traces the history of American presence in Southeast Asia. The American legacy in the region began with traders and missionaries during the first half of the nineteenth century, then progressed to diplomats and official relations during the second half, and then to the arrival of American armed forces at the turn of the twentieth century. Meanwhile, America’s commercial interests and footprint continually broadened and deepened; educational and religious ties also blossomed. Except in the Philippines, America was largely seen as a benevolent partner—but not yet a power. That would change in the wake of World War II and the Cold War. With the advent of communist regimes in China, North Vietnam, and North Korea, and the ensuing Korean War, Southeast Asia took on a completely different cast in Washington. It became one of two major global theaters of conflict against communism. Thus began America’s long and draining involvement in Vietnam and Indochina (1958–1975). But with the end of the long and exhausting Indochina conflict, which tore the United States itself apart, American attention naturally began to wane and dissipate. Yet, the United States continued to engage and build its relations with the region from the Carter through the Bush 43 administrations.


2015 ◽  
Vol 67 (3) ◽  
pp. 387-422 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas B. Pepinsky

This article proposes a political economy approach to decolonization. Focusing on the industrial organization of agriculture, it argues that competition between colonial and metropolitan producers creates demands for decolonization from within the metropole when colonies have broad export profiles and when export industries are controlled by colonial, as opposed to metropolitan, interests. The author applies this framework to the United States in the early 1900s, showing that different structures of the colonial sugar industries in the Philippines, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico–diverse exports with dispersed local ownership versus monocrop economies dominated by large US firms–explain why protectionist continental-agriculture interests agitated so effectively for independence for the Philippines, but not for Hawaii or Puerto Rico. A comparative historical analysis of the three colonial economies and the Philippine independence debates complemented by a statistical analysis of roll call votes in the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act supports the argument. In providing a new perspective on economic relations in the late-colonial era, the argument highlights issues of trade and empire in US history that span the subfields of American political development, comparative politics, and international political economy.


2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-16
Author(s):  
Paul Chambers ◽  
Andreas Ufen

This paper is the introduction for a special issue which examines intra-party factions and factionalism in competitive party systems of Southeast Asia, looking at the cases of Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Timor-Leste, in that order and rounding up with a comparative conclusion. The study centres primarily upon one query: in competitive party systems of Southeast Asia, what accounts for the rise of factionalism in some party systems relative to others? The paper at hand frames this special issue, reviewing the literature and examining the causes, effects and forms of factionalism in general and more specifically in Southeast Asia.


Author(s):  
Redactie KITLV

Esther Captain en Guno Jones, Oorlogserfgoed overzee: De erfenis van de Tweede Wereldoorlog in Aruba, Curaçao, Indonesië en Suriname (Fridus Stijlen) Cynthia Chou, The Orang Suku Laut of Riau, Indonesia: The inalienable gift of territory (Timothy P. Barnard) Marshall Clark, Maskulinitas: Culture, gender and politics in Indonesia (Will Derks) Matthew Isaac Cohen, Performing otherness: Java and Bali on international stages, 1905-1952 (Suryadi) Marleen Dieleman, Juliette Koning and Peter Post (eds), Chinese Indonesians and regime change (Dewi Anggraeni) Wim van den Doel, Zo ver de wereld strekt: De geschiedenis van Nederland overzee vanaf 1800 (Hans Hägerdal) Michael Feener and Terenjit Sevea (eds), Islamic connections: Muslim societies in South and Southeast Asia (Michael Laffan) R. Michael Feener, Muslim legal thought in Modern Indonesia (Stijn Cornelis van Huis) Zane Goebel, Language, migration, and identity: Neighbourhood talk in Indonesia (Sheri Lynn Gibbings) Lizzy van Leeuwen, Lost in mall: An ethnography of middle-class Jakarta in the 1990s (Andy Fuller) Alfred W. McCoy, Policing America’s empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the rise of the surveillance state (Florentino Rodao) Frans H. Peters, Vervlogen verwachtingen: De teloorgang van Nieuw-Guinea in 1961-1962 (Jaap Timmer) Christina Schwenkel, The American war in contemporary Vietnam: Transnational remembrance and representation (Hans Hägerdal) Yeoh Seng Guan, Loh Wei Leng, Khoo Salma Nasution and Neil Khor, Penang and its region: The story of an Asian entrepôt (David Kloos)


2018 ◽  
Vol 72 (2) ◽  
pp. 283-315 ◽  
Author(s):  
Melissa M. Lee

AbstractWhy do some countries fail to govern their territory? Incomplete domestic sovereignty, defined as the absence of effective state authority over territory, has severe consequences in terms of security, order, economic growth, and human well-being. These negative consequences raise the question of why such spaces remain without effective authority. While the international relations literature suggests that state weakness persists because of an absence of war and the comparative politics literature treats political underdevelopment as the consequence of domestic factors that raise the costs of exercising authority, these views are incomplete. I argue that hostile neighbors weaken state authority over territory through a strategy of foreign interference. Foreign interference in domestic sovereignty is a powerful instrument of statecraft that can yield domestic and foreign policy benefits. I investigate the effects of hostile neighboring states through a cross-national, within-country statistical analysis utilizing a novel indicator of state authority, and pair this analysis with a qualitative case study of Malaysian subversion of the Philippines in the 1970s. Together, this evidence shows how this international factor is an underappreciated yet important contributor to weak state authority even after accounting for domestic factors. The study's conclusions challenge our understanding of the effects of international politics on internal political development.


2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 263-288
Author(s):  
Vincenzo Bove ◽  
Mauricio Rivera ◽  
Chiara Ruffa

A wealth of research in comparative politics and international relations examines how the military intervenes in politics via coups. We shift attention to broader forms of military involvement in politics beyond coups and claim that terrorist violence and the threat of terror attacks provide a window of opportunity for military intervention, without taking full control of state institutions. We highlight two mechanisms through which terrorism influences military involvement in politics: (1) government authorities demand military expertise to fight terrorism and strengthen national security and “pull” the armed forces into politics, and (2) state armed actors exploit their informational advantage over civilian authorities to “push” their way into politics and policy-making. A panel data analysis shows that domestic terror attacks and perceived threats from domestic and transnational terrorist organizations increase military involvement in politics. We illustrate the theoretical mechanisms with the cases of France (1995–1998 and 2015–2016) and Algeria (1989–1992).


2012 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 814-815
Author(s):  
Erik Martinez Kuhonta

Emmanuel Teitelbaum raises some very valuable points regarding my book. First, on the issue of regime type, I argued that the central variables that affect equitable development are the character of institutions, especially institutionalized political parties and cohesive state structures, and pragmatic ideology—not regime type. While one conclusion that emerges from the study is that illiberal regimes (Malaysia and Vietnam) have done better than liberal regimes (Thailand and the Philippines), I do not argue that illiberalism is a necessary variable for equitable development. The record across the developing world shows that many authoritarian regimes have very dismal economic outcomes. My argument hinges on the power, responsiveness, and capacity of institutions.


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