Confronting Forensic Pathologists

2021 ◽  
pp. 192536212110325
Author(s):  
Victor W. Weedn

Background: The Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause gives defendants a right to confront their accusers. Method: U.S. Supreme Court cases that interpreted this right as applied to forensic scientists were reviewed. Results: Melendez-Diaz, Bullcoming, and Williams examined constitutional rights to confront forensic scientists. Lower courts have specifically examined their application to forensic pathology. Whether autopsy reports are considered “testimonial” varies among jurisdictions and has not been definitively settled. Defendants are generally able to compel testimony of forensic pathologists. Where the forensic pathologist is truly unavailable, the surrogate expert should be in a position to render an independent opinion.

1995 ◽  
Vol 75 (3) ◽  
pp. 390-405 ◽  
Author(s):  
JACK E. CALL

In 1991, the Supreme Court held in Wilson v. Seiter that in a prison conditions case, the plaintiff must prove that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Although this decision might appear to make it more difficult for inmates to win overcrowding lawsuits, it is predicted that this will not be the case. Published lower-court overcrowding cases are examined to determine what the effect of Wilson ( and two other Supreme Court cases decided since Wilson) has been. It is concluded that, although the number of published lower-court overcrowding cases since Wilson is not large, early indications are that these recent Supreme Court cases are not likely to have a dramatic impact upon the legal environment for prison overcrowding cases.


2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 505-535
Author(s):  
Kaytlin L. Roholt

Since a majority of Supreme Court justices created the abortion right in 1973, a troubling pattern has emerged: The Supreme Court has come to ignore—and even nullify—longstanding precedent and legal doctrines in the name of preserving and expanding the abortion right. And with a Supreme Court majority that is blithe to manipulate any doctrine or principle—no matter how deeply rooted in U.S. legal tradition—in the name of expansive abortion rights, it should come as no surprise that lower courts are following suit. Most recently, the D.C. Circuit fired up the “ad hoc nullification machine,” but this time, its victim of choice was the constitutional distinction between citizenship and alien status. In Garza v. Hargan, the D.C. Circuit—sitting en banc—pronounced, for the first time, that the Constitution guarantees the right to an abortion on demand to unlawfully present aliens. The Supreme Court has long held, however, that the scope of constitutional rights accorded to unlawful aliens is limited. Rather than confront this inconvenient precedent, the D.C. Circuit entirely ignored the antecedent question of whether unlawfully present aliens are entitled to the Fifth Amendment abortion right. Instead, the court simply assumed that they are. This holding is wrong for two reasons. First, by effectively deciding that an unlawful immigrant minor, in federal custody, whose only contact with the United States was her detention at the U.S. border, was entitled to the full scope of Fifth Amendment rights, the D.C. Circuit ignored Supreme Court precedent mandating that a person must have “developed substantial connections with the country” before being accorded constitutional protections. Second, by carving out this special exception for the abortion right, the court prioritized that right over all other constitutional protections.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas Kahn-Fogel

For decades, scholars have routinely attacked the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as an incoherent mess, impossible for lower courts to follow. These scholars have based their claims almost entirely on qualitative analysis of the Court’s opinions. This Article presents the first systematic evaluation of the consensus view of Fourth Amendment law as incoherent. The primary method I use to evaluate the coherence of the body of law is an assessment of lower court performance on Fourth Amendment issues the Supreme Court would later resolve. Because the Supreme Court’s agreement with lower courts likely reflects, at least in part, the clarity of the Supreme Court’s previous pronouncements, a high rate of agreement between lower courts and the Supreme Court would tend to suggest the coherence of the field. On the other hand, if the Court concludes most lower courts got the wrong answer to a Fourth Amendment question, that conclusion suggests either a lack of clarity in the Court’s precedent or that the Court simply shifted course after having issued seemingly straightforward pronouncements in the past. Either of these possibilities would suggest a kind of incoherence or instability in Fourth Amendment law. I examine lower court decisions dealing with issues the Supreme Court subsequently addressed over the course of twenty Supreme Court terms. Because Supreme Court cases tend to deal with the most difficult, divisive issues, I also compare the frequency with which the Court has felt compelled to review Fourth Amendment questions to the rate at which the Court has dealt with other important constitutional issues.


1997 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael J. Bulzomi ◽  
Robert M. Dunn
Keyword(s):  

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nirej Sekhon

The Supreme Court has cast judicial warrants as the Fourth Amendment gold standard for regulating police discretion. It has embraced a "warrant preference" on the premise that requiring police to obtain advance judicial approval for searches and seizures encourages accurate identification of evidence and suspects while minimizing interference with constitutional rights. The Court and commentators have overlooked the fact that most outstanding warrants do none of these things. Most outstanding warrants are what this article terms "non-compliance warrants": summarily issued arrest warrants for failures to comply with a court or police order. State and local courts are profligate in issuing such warrants for minor offenses. For example, the Department of Justice found that the municipal court in Ferguson, Missouri issued one warrant for every two of its residents. When issued as wantonly as this, warrants are dangerous because they generate police discretion rather than restrain it. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has, most recently in Utah v. Strieff, treated non-compliance warrants as if no different from the traditional warrants that gave rise to the Fourth Amendment warrant preference. This article argues that non-compliance warrants pose unique dangers, constitutional and otherwise. Non-compliance warrants create powerful incentives for the police to conduct unconstitutional stops, particularly in poor and minority neighborhoods. Their enforcement also generates race and class feedback loops. Outstanding warrants beget arrests and arrests beget more warrants. Over time, this dynamic amplifies race and class disparities in criminal justice. The article concludes by prescribing a Fourth Amendment remedy to deter unconstitutional warrant checks. More importantly, the article identifies steps state and local courts might take to stem the continued proliferation of non-compliance warrants.


Author(s):  
Scott Burris ◽  
Micah L. Berman ◽  
Matthew Penn, and ◽  
Tara Ramanathan Holiday

This chapter describes “due process,” a Constitutional restriction on governmental actions that impact individuals, in the context of public health. It outlines the doctrines of procedural and substantive due process, including the legal tests that courts apply to decide whether individuals’ due process rights have been violated. It uses examples from Supreme Court cases that have defined due process in the context of public health, including those that struggle to define the scope of reproductive rights. It also examines two cases where public health principles were raised as a justification for governmental action: one about involuntary sterilization and one about Ebola. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the “state action doctrine” that defines which public health actors may be challenged on due process grounds.


2010 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 377-406
Author(s):  
Stephen Wood ◽  
Mary Anne Wood ◽  
Stephen Wood ◽  
Rachel Asbury

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