Pareto Improving Redistribution in the Case of Private Provision of Multiple Pure Public Goods

2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 220-230
Author(s):  
Tilak Sanyal
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
Pareto Improvement ◽  
Income Transfer ◽  
Private Provision ◽  
Voluntary Contribution ◽  
The Rich ◽  
Poor Individual ◽  
Pareto Improving

The article considers the scope of Pareto improvement through an inequality-inducing income transfer in a society where multiple pure public goods are provided by voluntary contribution only from the rich individual. In contrast to the case of single public good, here we show that in presence of only one poor individual in the society such an income transfer can never be Pareto improving. JEL Classification: H41, D63, D31, H23

A Model of Inequality Aversion and Private Provision of Public Goods

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hide-Fumi Yokoo
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Theoretical Foundation ◽  
Inequality Aversion ◽  
Public Good Provision ◽  
Marginal Rate ◽  
Private Provision ◽  
Marginal Rate Of Substitution ◽  
Good Provision ◽  
Corner Solutions

AbstractI develop a model of inequality aversion and public goods that allows the marginal rate of substitution to be variable. As a theoretical foundation, utility function of the standard public goods model is nested in the Fehr-Schmidt model. An individual’s contribution function for a public good is derived by solving the problem of kinky preference and examining both interior and corner solutions. Results show that the derived contribution function is not monotonic with respect to the other individual’s provision. Thus, the model can be used to explain empirical evidence for the effect of social comparison on public-good provision.

A Case for Private Provision but Collective Ownership of Public Goods

1998 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 90-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
William D. Gerdes
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Private Provision ◽  
The Public ◽  
Collective Ownership ◽  
Free Ride ◽  
Voluntary Exchange

One strategy for generating Pareto results in a public good model is to create an environment where traders internalize the public good externality. The model presented here accomplishes this by separating the provision and ownership of public goods. Such goods are privately provided but collectively owned. Under this arrangement, Lindahl prices are generated through the voluntary exchange activities of consumers. Persistent attempts to free ride are not consistent with maximizing behavior which leads to internalization.

Pareto Improving Lotteries and Voluntary Public Goods Provision

2006 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Karaivanov
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Public Goods Provision ◽  
Equal Distribution ◽  
Voluntary Provision ◽  
Resource Distributions ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Distribution Of Resources ◽  
Pareto Improving

This paper characterizes the utility possibility frontier resulting in a model of private voluntary provision of a public good. It is shown that ex-ante lotteries over resource distributions among the agents can be Pareto improving. A corollary is that an equal distribution of resources among the agents, or any distribution where all agents contribute in equilibrium, is always Pareto dominated by a lottery between two unequal distributions.

State Preferences and the Provision of Public Goods / Staatspräferenzen und die Bereitstellung öffentlicher Güter

2003 ◽  
Vol 223 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Xenia Matschke
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
State Parameter ◽  
Public Good Provision ◽  
Relative Importance ◽  
Private Provision ◽  
The Public ◽  
Good Provision ◽  
Parameter Measuring ◽  
State Preferences

SummaryCountries differ substantially in the emphasis on the public sector and the ratio between state consumption and provision of public goods. It seems that these differences are often not well explained by only assuming a heterogeneous population. In this paper, I take differing state preferences as given and investigate how changes in state preferences affect the provision of a public good. The provision of the public good is modelled as a two-stage game with the state and the citizens as players. I find that the Nash equilibrium provision of the public good is independent of a so-called "welfare state" parameter. In contrast, an increase in a parameter measuring the relative importance of public good provision vs. state consumption leads to an increase in the overall public good provision, while private provision declines.

THE EFFECTS OF UNCERTAINTY ON THE VOLUNTARY PRIVATE PROVISION OF IMPURE PUBLIC GOODS

2009 ◽  
Vol 54 (01) ◽  
pp. 61-73
Author(s):  
ILTAE KIM
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Collective Good ◽  
Private Provision ◽  
The Public ◽  
Voluntary Provision ◽  
Impure Public Goods ◽  
Impure Public Good ◽  
Increase In Risk

This paper examines the effects of uncertainty on an individual's own contribution to the provision of the collective good using an impure public good model. Two types of uncertainty analyzing free-riding behavior are evaluated: (i) uncertainty surrounding the contributions of others to the public characteristic and (ii) uncertainty surrounding the response of others to an individual's own contribution. We extend previous studies by examining both the compensated and uncompensated effects of increases in such risks on the provision of the collective good. We also establish the conditions that are sufficient to determine both compensated and the total, uncompensated effects of an increase in risk on the voluntary provision of the collective good.

scholarly journals Private provision of public goods by environmental groups

2018 ◽  
Vol 116 (12) ◽  
pp. 5334-5340 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Grant ◽  
Christian Langpap
Keyword(s):  
Water Quality ◽  
Dissolved Oxygen ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Nonprofit Organizations ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Oxygen Deficiency ◽  
Extensive Literature ◽  
Environmental Groups ◽  
Private Provision ◽  
Environmental Organization

Many environmental nonprofit groups are assumed to provide public goods. While an extensive literature examines why donors join and give to nonprofits, none directly tests whether donations actually provide public goods. We seek such a test by using a common form of environmental organization: watershed groups. We find their increased presence resulted in lower dissolved oxygen deficiency and higher proportions of swimmable and fishable water bodies. Increased donations to and expenditures by the groups also improved water quality. Thus, private groups likely played a role in mitigating environmental problems. Overall, our results indicate private provision of a public good by nonprofit organizations.

On the Essence and Tipology of International Public Goods

2005 ◽  
pp. 131-141
Author(s):  
V. Mortikov
Keyword(s):  
Economic Policy ◽  
Social Construction ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Global Public Goods ◽  
Club Goods ◽  
Basic Properties ◽  
International Public Goods ◽  
Regional Public Goods ◽  
Joint Products

The basic properties of international public goods are analyzed in the paper. Special attention is paid to the typology of international public goods: pure and impure, excludable and nonexcludable, club goods, regional public goods, joint products. The author argues that social construction of international public good depends on many factors, for example, government economic policy. Aggregation technologies in the supply of global public goods are examined.

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