Diagnoses are not Diseases

1992 ◽  
Vol 161 (5) ◽  
pp. 686-691 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. H. S. Mindham ◽  
J. G. Scadding ◽  
R. H. Cawley
Keyword(s):  
Physical Symptoms ◽  
Mental Illnesses ◽  
Multiple Personality Disorder ◽  
Factitious Disorder ◽  
Compulsive Gambling ◽  
American Mind ◽  
The Media ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Open Question ◽  
The Brain

The psychiatric community seems determined to ground its medical legitimacy on principles that confuse diagnoses with disease. If mental illnesses are diseases of the CNS, they are diseases of the brain, not the mind. If mental illnesses are the names of (mis)behaviour, they are forms of behaviour, not diseases. Psychiatric metaphors have the same role in medicine as religious metaphors have in theology. Religion is, among other things, the institutionalised denial of a finite life. Psychiatry is, among other things, the institutionalised denial of the tragic nature of life: individuals who want to reject the reality of free will and responsibility can medicalise life, and entrust its management to health professionals. Psychiatrists have succeeded in persuading the scientific community, the courts, the media, and the general public that the conditions they call mental disorders are diseases, that is, phenomena independent of motivation or will. The more firmly psychiatrically based ideas take hold of the collective American mind, the more foolishness and injustice they generate. Long ago, the law makers agreed to let psychiatrists literalise the metaphor of mental illnesses. Thus, the Americans With Disabilities Act (AWDA), scheduled to be fully implemented by July 1992, covers claustrophobia, personality problems, and mental retardation, though unlike DSM–III–R it excludes kleptomania, pyromania, compulsive gambling, and transvestism. The literal language of psychiatry allows motivated actions to be called ‘diseases'. Other examples of behaviour for which psychiatrists have disease names, and which AWDA implicitly accepts as genuine diseases, include dysmorphophobia, multiple personality disorder, frotteurism, hypoactive sexual desire disorder, and factitious disorder with physical symptoms. However, it remains an open question whether premenstrual syndrome will achieve similar recognition in DSM–IV. Diseases occur naturally, whereas diagnoses are artefacts; why do psychiatrists make diagnoses?

5. Psychiatry under attack—inside and out

2018 ◽  
pp. 77-89
Author(s):  
Tom Burns
Keyword(s):  
Mental Illnesses ◽  
Brain Diseases ◽  
Social Oppression ◽  
1960S And 1970S ◽  
The 1960S ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

‘Psychiatry under attack’ focuses on the contradictions inherent in psychiatry. The mind–brain relationship is the big issue in psychiatry. It would be simple if psychiatry were just about ‘brain diseases’, but psychiatry concerns ‘mental’ illnesses. While many mental illnesses involve disorders of the brain, not all brain diseases are mental illnesses. Psychiatry originally viewed mental illnesses as inherited weaknesses. However, Freud and his followers shifted the balance to ‘nurture’. The ‘anti-psychiatry movement’ of the 1960s and 1970s, led by Szasz, Foucault, and Laing, condemned psychiatry as confusing at best and an instrument of social oppression at worst. There is now less opposition to psychiatry though disquiet remains about aspects of its practice.

Being Brains

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fernando Vidal ◽  
Francisco Ortega
Keyword(s):  
Basic Research ◽  
Mental Illnesses ◽  
Human Sciences ◽  
Brain Disorders ◽  
Internal Logic ◽  
Political Debates ◽  
Brain Sciences ◽  
Health Agencies ◽  
The Media ◽  
The Brain

This book offers a critical exploration of the influential and pervasive belief that “we are our brains” (and that therefore he neurosciences will provide the key to all human phenomena). Since the 1990s, “neurocentrism” has become widespread in most Western and many non-Western societies. Advances, especially in neuroimaging, decisively bolstered it and helped justify increased funding for the brain sciences. Such a belief permeates many other contexts beyond basic research. Major national health agencies consider that “mental” illnesses are “brain disorders.” People diagnosed with some of those disorders advocate “neurodiversity” rights. In the human sciences, subspecialties such as neuroanthropology, neuroaesthetics, neuroeducation, neurohistory, neurolaw, neurosociology or neurotheology quickly professionalized. Dubious businesses, aimed for example at building neuroimaging lie detectors, selling (“neuromarketing”), or promoting wellbeing thanks to regimens said to target the brain (“neurobics”), became successful. The media has showered attention on all things “neuro,” and novels and films rehearsed the challenges of seeing persons as “cerebral subjects.” Skeptics have reacted to the “neurohype,” and spoken of neuromythology, neurotrash, neuromania or neuromadness. The neurocentric view of the human is not hegemonic or monolithic, but embodies a powerful ideology that is at the heart of some of today’s most important philosophical, ethical, scientific and political debates. Why We Are Our Brains critically explores the internal logic of such ideology, its genealogy, and its main contemporary incarnations.

Lighting Up the Brain to Illuminate the Mind

2004 ◽  
Vol 49 (6) ◽  
pp. 713-716
Author(s):  
Ellen S. Berscheid
Keyword(s):  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

How Does the Brain Make the Mind? We Do Not Know.

PsycCRITIQUES ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 61 (32) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher A. Was
Keyword(s):  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

Moving past the vaccine/autism controversy - to examine potential vaccine neurological harms

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Peter R. Breggin
Keyword(s):  
Neurological Disorders ◽  
Developmental Disorder ◽  
Physical Symptoms ◽  
Psychosocial Disorders ◽  
The Us ◽  
Potential Vaccine ◽  
Research And Education ◽  
The Brain ◽  
New Vaccines

BACKGROUND: The vaccine/autism controversy has caused vast scientific and public confusion, and it has set back research and education into genuine vaccine-induced neurological disorders. The great strawman of autism has been so emphasized by the vaccine industry that it, and it alone, often appears in authoritative discussions of adverse effects of the MMR and other vaccines. By dismissing the chimerical vaccine/autism controversy, vaccine defenders often dismiss all genuinely neurological aftereffects of the MMR (measles, mumps, and rubella) and other vaccines, including well-documented events, such as relatively rare cases of encephalopathy and encephalitis. OBJECTIVE: This report explains that autism is not a physical or neurological disorder. It is not caused by injury or disease of the brain. It is a developmental disorder that has no physical origins and no physical symptoms. It is extremely unlikely that vaccines are causing autism; but it is extremely likely that they are causing more neurological damage than currently appreciated, some of it resulting in psychosocial disabilities that can be confused with autism and other psychosocial disorders. This confusion between a developmental, psychosocial disorder and a physical neurological disease has played into the hands of interest groups who want to deny that vaccines have any neurological and associated neuropsychiatric effects. METHODS: A review of the scientific literature, textbooks, and related media commentary is integrated with basic clinical knowledge. RESULTS: This report shows how scientific sources have used the vaccine/autism controversy to avoid dealing with genuine neurological risks associated with vaccines and summarizes evidence that vaccines, including the MMR, can cause serious neurological disorders. Manufacturers have been allowed by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to gain vaccine approval without placebo-controlled clinical trials. CONCLUSIONS: The misleading vaccine autism controversy must be set aside in favor of examining actual neurological harms associated with vaccines, including building on existing research that has been ignored. Manufacturers of vaccines must be required to conduct placebo-controlled clinical studies for existing vaccines and for government approval of new vaccines. Many probable or confirmed neurological adverse events occur within a few days or weeks after immunization and could be detected if the trials were sufficiently large. Contrary to current opinion, large, long-term placebo-controlled trials of existing and new vaccines would be relatively easy and safe to conduct.

Cartesian Fingerprints in Beckett's Imagination Dead Imagine

2012 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 223-243
Author(s):  
Irit Degani-Raz
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
Levels Of Abstraction ◽  
The Media ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Limiting Case

The idea that Beckett investigates in his works the limits of the media he uses has been widely discussed. In this article I examine the fiction Imagination Dead Imagine as a limiting case in Beckett's exploration of limits at large and the limits of the media he uses in particular. Imagination Dead Imagine is shown to be the self-reflexive act of an artist who imaginatively explores the limits of that ultimate medium – the artist's imagination itself. My central aim is to show that various types of structural homologies (at several levels of abstraction) can be discerned between this poetic exploration of the limits of imagination and Cartesian thought. The homologies indicated here transcend what might be termed as ‘Cartesian typical topics’ (such as the mind-body dualism, the cogito, rationalism versus empiricism, etc.). The most important homologies that are indicated here are those existing between the role of imagination in Descartes' thought - an issue that until only a few decades ago was quite neglected, even by Cartesian scholars - and Beckett's perception of imagination. I suggest the use of these homologies as a tool for tracing possible sources of inspiration for Beckett's Imagination Dead Imagine.

Big Heads title page

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
vernon thornton
Keyword(s):  
Title Page ◽  
Language Of Thought ◽  
Correct Version ◽  
Evolutionary Context ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

A description of of the mind and its relationship to the brain, set in an evolutionary context. Introduction of a correct version of 'language-of-thought' called 'thinkish'.

Zombies and Dolls

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcello Massimini ◽  
Giulio Tononi
Keyword(s):  
Body Problem ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Turing Test ◽  
Hard Problem ◽  
Mind Body Problem ◽  
The Hard Problem ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

This chapter uses thought experiments and practical examples to introduce, in a very accessible way, the hard problem of consciousness. Soon, machines may behave like us to pass the Turing test and scientists may succeed in copying and simulating the inner workings of the brain. Will all this take us any closer to solving the mysteries of consciousness? The reader is taken to meet different kind of zombies, the philosophical, the digital, and the inner ones, to understand why many, scientists and philosophers alike, doubt that the mind–body problem will ever be solved.

scholarly journals Agency, Responsibility, Selves, and the Mechanical Mind

Philosophies ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 7
Author(s):  
Fiorella Battaglia
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Technology ◽  
Extended Mind ◽  
Human Machine Interaction ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Legal Perspective ◽  
Area Of Concern ◽  
Third Person Perspective ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Brain

Moral issues arise not only when neural technology directly influences and affects people’s lives, but also when the impact of its interventions indirectly conceptualizes the mind in new, and unexpected ways. It is the case that theories of consciousness, theories of subjectivity, and third person perspective on the brain provide rival perspectives addressing the mind. Through a review of these three main approaches to the mind, and particularly as applied to an “extended mind”, the paper identifies a major area of transformation in philosophy of action, which is understood in terms of additional epistemic devices—including a legal perspective of regulating the human–machine interaction and a personality theory of the symbiotic connection between human and machine. I argue this is a new area of concern within philosophy, which will be characterized in terms of self-objectification, which becomes “alienation” following Ernst Kapp’s philosophy of technology. The paper argues that intervening in the brain can affect how we conceptualize the mind and modify its predicaments.

The brain as a mediator of the mind and the world

Cortex ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 45 (7) ◽  
pp. 904-905
Author(s):  
Zhicheng Lin
Keyword(s):  
The World ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain
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