Design Basis Report

2021 ◽  
pp. 57-74
Author(s):  
Ashoke Kumar Dasgupta
Keyword(s):  
Design Basis

Safety cases for design-basis accidents in LWRs featuring passive systems

2021 ◽  
pp. 111095
Author(s):  
Thomas Mull ◽  
Thomas Wagner ◽  
Giuseppe Bonfigli ◽  
Sebastian Buchholz ◽  
Frank Schäfer ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Passive Systems ◽  
Design Basis ◽  
Safety Cases

scholarly journals The SPES3 Facility for Testing an Integral Layout SMR: BDBE Simulation Analysis

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roberta Ferri ◽  
Andrea Achilli ◽  
Cinzia Congiu ◽  
Gustavo Cattadori ◽  
Fosco Bianchi ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Nuclear Fission ◽  
Sensitivity Analyses ◽  
Medium Size ◽  
Design Calculation ◽  
Pressurized Water ◽  
Pressure Equalization ◽  
Plant Safety ◽  
Design Basis ◽  
Safety Features

The SPES3 facility is being built at the SIET laboratories, in the frame of an R&D program on Nuclear Fission, led by ENEA and funded by the Italian Ministry of Economic Development. The facility is based on the IRIS reactor design, an advanced medium size, integral layout, pressurized water reactor, based on the proven technology of PWR with an innovative configuration and safety features suitable to cope with Loss of Coolant Accidents through a dynamic coupling of the primary and containment systems. SPES3 is suitable to test the plant response to postulated Design and Beyond Design Basis Events, providing experimental data for code validation and plant safety analysis. It reproduces the primary, secondary and containment systems of the reactor with 1:100 volume scale, full elevation, prototypical fluid and thermal-hydraulic conditions. A design-calculation feedback process, based on the comparison between IRIS and SPES3 simulations, performed respectively by FER, with GOTHIC and RELAP5 coupled codes, and by SIET, with RELAP5 code, led to reduce the differences in the two plants behaviour, versus a 2-inch equivalent DVI line DEG break, considered the most challenging LOCA for the IRIS plant. Once available the final design of SPES3, further calculations were performed to investigate Beyond Design Basis Events, where the intervention of the Passive Containment Condenser is fundamental for the accident recovery. Sensitivity analyses showed the importance of the PCC actuation time, to limit the containment pressure, to reach an early pressure equalization between the primary and containment systems and to allow passive water transfer from the containment to the RPV, enhanced by the ADS Stage-II opening.

scholarly journals Computational Fluid Dynamics Modeling of Steam Condensation on Nuclear Containment Wall Surfaces Based on Semiempirical Generalized Correlations

2012 ◽  
Vol 2012 ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pavan K. Sharma ◽  
B. Gera ◽  
R. K. Singh ◽  
K. K. Vaze
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Nuclear Reactor ◽  
Pressure Rise ◽  
Dynamics Modeling ◽  
Steam Condensation ◽  
Noncondensable Gases ◽  
Nuclear Containment ◽  
Design Basis ◽  
Lumped Parameter ◽  
Transport Calculation

In water-cooled nuclear power reactors, significant quantities of steam and hydrogen could be produced within the primary containment following the postulated design basis accidents (DBA) or beyond design basis accidents (BDBA). For accurate calculation of the temperature/pressure rise and hydrogen transport calculation in nuclear reactor containment due to such scenarios, wall condensation heat transfer coefficient (HTC) is used. In the present work, the adaptation of a commercial CFD code with the implementation of models for steam condensation on wall surfaces in presence of noncondensable gases is explained. Steam condensation has been modeled using the empirical average HTC, which was originally developed to be used for “lumped-parameter” (volume-averaged) modeling of steam condensation in the presence of noncondensable gases. The present paper suggests a generalized HTC based on curve fitting of most of the reported semiempirical condensation models, which are valid for specific wall conditions. The present methodology has been validated against limited reported experimental data from the COPAIN experimental facility. This is the first step towards the CFD-based generalized analysis procedure for condensation modeling applicable for containment wall surfaces that is being evolved further for specific wall surfaces within the multicompartment containment atmosphere.

Current status of design basis earthquake level for nuclear power plant sites in several countries

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hoseon Choi ◽  
Seung Gyu Hyun
Keyword(s):  
Power Plant ◽  
Nuclear Power Plant ◽  
South Korea ◽  
Seismic Activity ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Current Status ◽  
Seismic Safety ◽  
Design Basis ◽  
Design Earthquake ◽  
Design Construction

<p>According to strict criteria step by step for site selection, design, construction and operation, the seismic safety of nuclear power plant (NPP) sites in South Korea are secured by considering design basis earthquake (DBE) level capable of withstanding the maximum ground motions that can occur on the site. Therefore, it is intended to summarize DBE level and its evaluation details for NPP sites in several countries.</p><p>Similar but different terms are used for DBE from country to country, i.e. safe shutdown earthquake (SSE), design earthquake (DE), SL2, Ss, and maximum calculated earthquake (MCE). They may differ when applied to actual seismic design process, and only refer to approximate comparisons. This script used DBE as a representative term, and DBE level was based on horizontal values.</p><p>The DBE level of NPP sites depends on seismic activity of the area. Japan and Western United States, where earthquakes occur more frequently than South Korea, have high DBE values. The DBE level of NPP sites in South Korea has been confirmed to be similar or higher compared to that of Central and Eastern Unites Sates and Europe, which have similar seismic activity.</p>

Radiation Dose Evaluation of Typical Design Basis Accident for Advanced PWR in China

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haiying Chen ◽  
Shaowei Wang ◽  
Xinlu Tian ◽  
Fudong Liu
Keyword(s):  
Radiation Dose ◽  
Effective Dose ◽  
Half Life ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Outer Boundary ◽  
Design Basis ◽  
Loss Of Coolant Accident ◽  
Design Basis Accident ◽  
Typical Design ◽  
Total Effective Dose

Abstract The loss of coolant accident (LOCA) is one of the typical design basis accidents for nuclear power plant. Radionuclides leak to the environment and cause harm to the public in LOCA. Accurate evaluation of radioactivity and radiation dose in accident is crucial. The radioactivity and radiation dose model in LOCA were established, and used to analyze the radiological consequence at exclusion area boundary (EAB) and the outer boundary of low population zone (LPZ) for Hualong 1. The results indicated that the long half-life nuclides, such as 131I, 133I, 135I, 85Kr, 131mXe, 133mXe and 133Xe, released to environment continuously, while the short half-life nuclides, such as 132I, 134I, 83mKr, 85mKr, 87Kr, 88Kr, 135mXe and 138Xe, no longer released to environment after a few hours in LOCA. 133Xe may release the largest radioactivity to environment, more than 1015Bq. Inhalation dose was the major contribution to the total effective dose. The total effective dose and thyroid dose of Hualong 1 at EAB and the outer boundary of LPZ fully met the requirements of Chinese GB6249.

Application of Advanced Model of Zr-Based Cladding Oxidation in Steam-Oxygen-Nitrogen Gas Mixtures to Separate Effects Tests and Integral Experiments

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Vasiliev
Keyword(s):  
Diffusion Coefficient ◽  
Nuclear Power ◽  
Temperature Oxidation ◽  
Parabolic Kinetics ◽  
Design Basis ◽  
Design Basis Accident ◽  
Air Ingress ◽  
Pure Steam ◽  
Modeling Code ◽  
Advanced Model

During postulated design-basis or beyond-design-basis accident at nuclear power plant with PWR or BWR, the high temperature oxidation of Zr-based fuel claddings in H2O-O2-N2 gas atmosphere could take place. Recent experimental observations showed that the oxidation of those claddings in the air (or, more generally, in oxygen-nitrogen and steam-nitrogen mixtures) behaves in much more aggressive way (linear or enhanced parabolic kinetics) compared to oxidation in pure steam (standard parabolic kinetics). This is why an advanced model of Zr-based cladding oxidation was developed. For calculations of cladding oxidation in oxygen-nitrogen and steam-nitrogen mixtures, the effective oxygen diffusion coefficient in ZrO2+ZrN layer formed in cladding is used. The diffusion coefficient enhancement factor depends on ZrN content in ZrO2+ZrN layer. A numerical scheme was realized to determine ZrO2+ZrN/α-Zr(O) and α-Zr(O)/β-Zr layers boundaries relocation and layers transformations in claddings. The model was implemented to the SOCRAT best estimate computer modeling code. The SOCRAT code with advanced model of oxidation was successfully used for calculations of separate effects tests and air ingress integral experiments QUENCH-10, QUENCH-16 and PARAMETER-SF4.

scholarly journals A Safety Re-Evaluation of the AVR Pebble Bed Reactor Operation and Its Consequences for Future HTR Concepts

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rainer Moormann
Keyword(s):  
Fission Product ◽  
End Of Life ◽  
Fission Products ◽  
Normal Operation ◽  
Primary Circuit ◽  
Pebble Bed ◽  
Pebble Bed Reactor ◽  
Hot Gas ◽  
Design Basis ◽  
Gas Tight

The AVR pebble bed reactor (46 MWth) was operated 1967–1988 at coolant outlet temperatures up to 990°C. Also because of a lack of other experience the AVR operation is a basis for future HTRs. This paper deals with insufficiently published unresolved safety problems of AVR and of pebble bed HTRs. The AVR primary circuit is heavily contaminated with dust bound and mobile metallic fission products (Sr-90, Cs-137) which create problems in current dismantling. The evaluation of fission product deposition experiments indicates that the end of life contamination reached several percent of a single core inventory. A re-evaluation of the AVR contamination is performed in order to quantify consequences for future HTRs: The AVR contamination was mainly caused by inadmissible high core temperatures, and not — as presumed in the past — by inadequate fuel quality only. The high AVR core temperatures were detected not earlier than one year before final AVR shut-down, because a pebble bed core cannot be equipped with instruments. The maximum core temperatures were more than 200 K higher than precalculated. Further, azimuthal temperature differences at the active core margin were observed, as unpredictable hot gas currents with temperatures > 1100°C. Despite of remarkable effort these problems are not yet understood. Having the black box character of the AVR core in mind it remains uncertain whether convincing explanations can be found without major experimental R&D. After detection of the inadmissible core temperatures, the AVR hot gas temperatures were strongly reduced for safety reasons. Metallic fission products diffuse in fuel kernel, coatings and graphite and their break through takes place in long term normal operation, if fission product specific temperature limits are exceeded. This is an unresolved weak point of HTRs in contrast to other reactors and is particularly problematic in pebble bed systems with their large dust content. Another disadvantage, responsible for the pronounced AVR contamination, lies in the fact that activity released from fuel elements is distributed in HTRs all over the coolant circuit surfaces and on graphitic dust and accumulates there. Consequences of AVR experience on future reactors are discussed. As long as pebble bed intrinsic reasons for the high AVR temperatures cannot be excluded they have to be conservatively considered in operation and design basis accidents. For an HTR of 400 MWth, 900°C hot gas temperature, modern fuel and 32 fpy the contaminations are expected to approach at least the same order as in AVR end of life. This creates major problems in design basis accidents, for maintenance and dismantling. Application of German dose criteria on advanced pebble bed reactors leads to the conclusion that a pebble bed HTR needs a gas tight containment even if inadmissible high temperatures as observed in AVR are not considered. However, a gas tight containment does not diminish the consequences of the primary circuit contamination on maintenance and dismantling. Thus complementary measures are discussed. A reduction of demands on future reactors (hot gas temperatures, fuel burn-up) is one option; another one is an elaborate R&D program for solution of unresolved problems related to operation and design basis accidents. These problems are listed in the paper.

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