scholarly journals Evaluating the causal effect of university grants on student dropout: Evidence from a regression discontinuity design using principal stratification

2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 1906-1931 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fan Li ◽  
Alessandra Mattei ◽  
Fabrizia Mealli
2014 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 179-211 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Kai-sing Kung

Using China's Great Leap Famine as example, this article shows how political career incentives can produce disastrous outcomes under the well-intended policies of a dictator. By exploiting a regression discontinuity design, the study identifies the causal effect of membership status in the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee—full (FM) Versus alternate members (AM)—on grain procurement. It finds that the difference in grain procurement between AMs and FMs who ranked near the discontinuity threshold is three times that between all AMs and all FMs on average. This may explain why Mao exceptionally promoted some lower-ranked but radical FMs shortly before the Leap: to create a demonstration effect in order to spur other weakly motivated FMs into action.


2015 ◽  
Vol 105 (5) ◽  
pp. 502-507 ◽  
Author(s):  
Josh Angrist ◽  
David Autor ◽  
Sally Hudson ◽  
Amanda Pallais

In an ongoing evaluation of post-secondary financial aid, we use random assignment to assess the causal effects of large privately-funded aid awards. Here, we compare the unbiased causal effect estimates from our RCT with two types of non-experimental econometric estimates. The first applies a selection-on-observables assumption in data from an earlier, nonrandomized cohort; the second uses a regression discontinuity design. Selection-on-observables methods generate estimates well below the experimental benchmark. Regression discontinuity estimates are similar to experimental estimates for students near the cutoff, but sensitive to controlling for the running variable, which is unusually coarse.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 336-377
Author(s):  
Jean-William Laliberté

This paper estimates the long-term impact of growing up in better neighborhoods and attending better schools on educational attainment. First, I use a spatial regression-discontinuity design to estimate school effects. Second, I study students who move across neighborhoods in Montreal during childhood to estimate the causal effect of growing up in a better area (total exposure effects). I find large effects for both dimensions. Combining both research designs in a decomposition framework, and under key assumptions, I estimate that 50–70 percent of the benefits of moving to a better area on educational attainment are due to access to better schools. (JEL H75, I21, R23)


2021 ◽  
pp. 152700252198939
Author(s):  
Barry Reilly ◽  
Robert Witt

This paper exploits a sharp regression discontinuity design to identify the causal impact of the Scottish Premiership League (SPL) “split” on spectator match attendance. We use data drawn from all 19 completed seasons for which this institutional arrangement has been in place. The causal effect of the “split” is to induce, for the last five rounds of games played in the season, a differential in average attendance of about 24% between the clubs that just qualify for the “Championship Play-off” section and those that do not. However, the annualized effect for the season is found to be modest.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Berlinski ◽  
Alejandra Ramos

This paper analyzes the effect on teacher mobility of a program that rewards excellence in teaching practices in Chile. Successful applicants receive a 6 percent annual wage increase for up to 10 years and an award that publicly recognizes their excellence. The paper uses a regression discontinuity design to identify the causal effect of the public merit award. The program does not alter transitions out of teaching. The program does, however, increase the mobility of awardees within the school system. This is consistent with the program providing a credible public signal of teacher quality.


2018 ◽  
Vol 112 (3) ◽  
pp. 706-712 ◽  
Author(s):  
JON H. FIVA ◽  
DANIEL M. SMITH

A handful of recent studies have investigated the causal effect of incumbency on dynasty formation in candidate-centered electoral contexts. We use candidate-level data and a regression discontinuity design to estimate the incumbency advantage and its relation to dynasty formation in the party-centered, closed-list, proportional-representation setting of Norway. The results indicate that the incumbency advantage exists even in this party-centered environment; however, in contrast to recent findings for the United States and the Philippines, we find no evidence that incumbency is important to the formation of dynasties. This finding underscores the need for more research into the role of internal party organizational networks in the perpetuation of political dynasties.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 8-18
Author(s):  
Otakar Kořínek

This paper draws on weekly consumer spending data collected by American private companies to analyze the impact of the Economic Impact Payments on consumer spending in American counties. We use regression discontinuity design to quantify the causal effect of the Stimulus Checks on spending and use heterogeneity in economic and demographic factors to determine which groups of counties increased their spending the most, to see what factors affected the Stimulus Checks’ effectiveness. We then use the observed difference in impact across groups of counties to discuss whether the Stimulus Checks were the optimal governmental policy in the crisis and discuss the effectiveness of one-time transfer payments in future recessions.


2018 ◽  
Vol 112 (3) ◽  
pp. 698-705 ◽  
Author(s):  
JENS OLAV DAHLGAARD

Scholars have argued that children affect their parents’ political behavior, including turnout, through so-called trickle-up socialization. However, there is only limited causal evidence for this claim. Using a regression discontinuity design on a rich dataset, with validated turnout from subsets of Danish municipalities in four elections, I causally identify the effect of parenting a recently enfranchised voter. I consistently find that parents are more likely to vote when their child enters the electorate. On average across all four elections, I estimate that parents become 2.8 percentage points more likely to vote. In a context where the average turnout rate for parents is around 75%, this is a considerable effect. The effect is driven by parents whose children still live with them while there is no discernible effect for parents whose child has left home. The results are robust to a range of alternative specifications and placebo tests.


2018 ◽  
Vol 86 (5) ◽  
pp. 1901-1934 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raphael Corbi ◽  
Elias Papaioannou ◽  
Paolo Surico

Abstract A series of discontinuities in the allocation mechanism of federal transfers to municipal governments in Brazil allow us to identify the causal effect of public spending on local labour markets, using a “fuzzy” Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD). Our estimates imply a cost per job of about 8,000 US dollars per year and a local income multiplier around two. The effect comes mostly from employment in services and is more pronounced among less financially developed municipalities.


2017 ◽  
Vol 112 (2) ◽  
pp. 322-338 ◽  
Author(s):  
DAVID SZAKONYI

Do businesspeople who win elected office use their positions to help their firms? Business leaders become politicians around the world, yet we know little about whether their commitment to public service trumps their own private interests. Using an original dataset of 2,703 firms in Russia, I employ a regression discontinuity design to identify the causal effect of firm directors winning seats in subnational legislatures from 2004 to 2013. First, having a connection to a winning politician increases a firm’s revenue by 60% and profitability by 15% over a term in office. I then test between different mechanisms, finding that connected firms improve their performance by gaining access to bureaucrats and not by signaling legitimacy to financiers. The value of winning a seat increases in more politically competitive regions but falls markedly when more businesspeople win office in a convocation. Politically connected firms extract fewer benefits when faced with greater competition from other rent-seekers.


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