Reputations, Relationships, and Contract Enforcement

2007 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 595-628 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. Bentley MacLeod

When the quality of a good is at the discretion of the seller, how can buyers assure that the seller provides the mutually efficient level of quality? Contracts that provide a bonus to the seller if the quality is acceptable or impose a penalty on the seller if quality is unacceptable can, in theory, provide efficient incentives. But how are such contracts enforced? While the courts can be used, doing so involves high real costs. Informal enforcement, involving a loss of reputation and future access to the market for any party that defaults on a contract, may often be a better alternative. This paper explores the use of both formal and informal enforcement mechanisms, provides a rationale for a variety of observed market mechanisms, and then generates a number of testable hypotheses.

2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 651-676 ◽  
Author(s):  
KARTHIKEYA NARAPARAJU

AbstractIn developing countries, lack of formal contract enforcement mechanisms is compensated by informal governance enforced through trust, kinship, reputation, etc. This paper focuses on one such setting in India's urban informal economy: the ‘day labour’ market for casual labour. We survey seven such markets in Navi Mumbai (a city on the outskirts of Mumbai), and find considerable incidence of contract enforcement problems in the form of employers reneging on wage payments to labourers. We find that payments to labourers with access to social networks and a record of work done are less likely to be reneged. Further, consistent with the literature on the limits of informal enforcement, we find that labourers in large markets, with greater linguistic and caste-based diversity, are more likely to be reneged. We argue that interventions aimed at facilitating access to formal mechanisms might help overcome some of the limitations with informal enforcement.


2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 644-666 ◽  
Author(s):  
Victor Yawo Atiase ◽  
Samia Mahmood ◽  
Yong Wang ◽  
David Botchie

Purpose By drawing upon institutional theory, the purpose of this paper is to investigate the role of four critical resources (credit, electricity, contract enforcement and political governance) in explaining the quality of entrepreneurship and the depth of the supporting entrepreneurship ecosystem in Africa. Design/methodology/approach A quantitative approach based on ordinary least squares regression analysis was used. Three data sources were employed. First, the Global Entrepreneurship Index (GEI) of 35 African countries was used to measure the quality of entrepreneurship and the depth of the entrepreneurial ecosystem in Africa which represents the dependent variable. Second, the World Bank’s data on access to credit, electricity and contract enforcement in Africa were also employed as explanatory variables. Third, the Ibrahim Index of African Governance was used as an explanatory variable. Finally, country-specific data on four control variables (GDP, foreign direct investment, population and education) were gathered and analysed. Findings To support entrepreneurship development, Africa needs broad financial inclusion and state institutions that are more effective at enforcing contracts. Access to credit was non-significant and therefore did not contribute to the dependent variable (entrepreneurship quality and depth of entrepreneurial support in Africa). Access to electricity and political governance were statistically significant and correlated positively with the dependent variables. Finally, contract enforcement was partially significant and contributed to the dependent variable. Research limitations/implications A lack of GEI data for all 54 African countries limited this study to only 35 African countries: 31 in sub-Saharan Africa and 4 in North Africa. Therefore, the generalisability of this study’s findings to the whole of Africa might be limited. Second, this study depended on indexes for this study. Therefore, any inconsistencies in the index aggregation if any could not be authenticated. This study has practical implications for the development of entrepreneurship in Africa. Public and private institutions for credit delivery, contract enforcement and the provision of utility services such as electricity are crucial for entrepreneurship development. Originality/value The institutional void is a challenge for Africa. This study highlights the weak, corrupt nature of African institutions that supposedly support MSME growth. Effective entrepreneurship development in Africa depends on the presence of a supportive institutional infrastructure. This study engages institutional theory to explain the role of institutional factors such as state institutions, financial institutions, utility providers and markets in entrepreneurship development in Africa.


1988 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 265-297 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Klein ◽  
Kevin M. Murphy

2009 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 138-162 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aron Balas ◽  
Rafael La Porta ◽  
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes ◽  
Andrei Shleifer

Simeon Djankov et al. (2003) introduce a measure of the quality of contract enforcement—the formalism of civil procedure—for 109 countries as of 2000. For 40 of these countries, we compute procedural formalism every year since 1950. We find that large differences in procedural formalism between common and civil law countries existed in 1950 and widened by 2000. For this area of law, the findings are inconsistent with the hypothesis that national legal systems are converging, and support the view that legal origins exert long lasting influence on legal rules. (JEL K41, O17)


2000 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 253-265 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hamish R. Gow ◽  
Deborah H. Streeter ◽  
Johan F.M. Swinnen

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 170-175
Author(s):  
E.S. Manakina ◽  
◽  
O.V. Medvedeva ◽  
I.I. Manakin ◽  
O.V. Kazaeva ◽  
...  

The article is devoted to the organizational aspects of the activity of the Ryazan regional medical and physical culture dispensary for the medical support of the population engaged in physical culture and sports. Specially emphasized is the need to modernize medical support of people engaged in physical culture and sports in the Ryazan region, which is determined by a significant imbalance between the increasing burden on the specialists of the medical and physical culture dispensary and the high rate of commissioning of new sports facilities, and, as a result, a significant increase in the number of people engaged in physical culture and sports. The real costs of working time of specialists were determined, which made it possible to develop and realize a plan of measures aimed at reduction of the time of direct examination by a doctor, the time spent by athletes at the examination stage and, accordingly, increasing their number per unit time. Conclusion. The reasonability of optimization of the structure of the medical and physical culture dispensary of the Ryazan region, development of methods for planning its activities, formation of a unified concept of sports and wellness medicine within the framework of the preventive direction with the creation of a branch development program is identified, which will improve both the quality of medical care provided at the outpatient stage, and will result in reduction of morbidity, probability of sudden death, and of cases of premature retirement from sports.


2020 ◽  
Vol 102 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthieu Chemin

I assemble and classify a database of judicial reforms funded by foreign aid agencies as either comprehensive (targeting all characteristics of quality, speed, access) or limited reform. A triple difference is used to compare firms in countries with or without judicial reforms, before and after reforms, and in sectors more or less reliant on contract enforcement mechanisms, due to their need for relationship-specific investments. I find that externally financed comprehensive judicial reforms improve perceptions of judiciary efficiency (for all firms) and firm productivity (for sectors relying on relationship-specific investments) by 0.15 and 0.09 (22%) standard deviation, respectively.


2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 521-537
Author(s):  
Károly Mike ◽  
Gábor Kiss

AbstractHow do firms combine a broad range of contract enforcement mechanisms into coherent governance structures? How often are distinct structures used in an economy? We develop a new empirical approach, based on latent class analysis, to answer these questions. Economy-level data from Hungary are used to derive a data-driven typology of contractual governance between firms. The joint use of law, morality, self-enforcing contracts, reputation and community norms is examined. They are shown to be combined into bilateral, third-party or comprehensive governance structures. The crucial governance choice is whether to move beyond bilateralism and, if yes, whether to use a mixture of (formal and informal) third-party mechanisms as a substitute or a complement. Complementarity is much more common. We find no instances of ‘impersonal exchange’; the law never stands alone. By implication, economic development may be best understood as a process from a narrower towards a broader set of enforcement mechanisms.


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