Prosecutor Quality, Witness Participation, Crime, and Reform

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 64-100
Author(s):  
Andrew F. Daughety ◽  
Jennifer F. Reinganum
Keyword(s):  
Crime Rate ◽  
Social Planner

We develop a model wherein concerns about prosecutor quality reduce the willingness of witnesses to cooperate with prosecutors. This causes an increase in the crime rate and in wrongly convicted innocent defendants. Because citizens are taxpayers and may be victims, perpetrators, witnesses, or falsely accused defendants, they care about the prosecutor’s quality. They update beliefs about this quality based on the disposition of cases. If the prosecutor’s believed quality falls below a threshold, then a majority of voters chooses to replace the prosecutor with a challenger, in expectation of reform. We compare the majority’s choice with that of a social planner. (JEL D83, K41, K42)

A Sustainable Approach for Organisational using Strategic Management

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Abdulla Almazrouei ◽  
◽  
Azlina Md Yassin ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Mortality Rate ◽  
Strategic Planning ◽  
Strategic Management ◽  
Crime Rate ◽  
External Environment ◽  
Police Department ◽  
Public Institutions ◽  
Abu Dhabi ◽  
The Public ◽  
The World

Strategic management have gained popularity in the public institutions to foster good delivery service to the public. The strategic planning enables organizations to establish a strategic match between the internal competency, resources and external environment. Majority of the successful organizations across the world use strategic management and planning as a tool that enables to optimize the operations and achieve maximum productivity with the resources. This paper reviewed on strategic management for organisations in Abu Dhabi especially for Abu Dhabi Police (ADP) force. It presents three strategic management theories which can be adopted by an organisation. This would help the organisation such as police department to reduce the increasing crime rate and mortality rate in UAE.

scholarly journals The dark footprint of state violence: A synthetic approach to the American crime decline

2021 ◽  
pp. 136248062098423
Author(s):  
Aaron Roussell ◽  
Lori Sexton ◽  
Paul Deppen ◽  
Marisa Omori ◽  
Esther Scheibler
Keyword(s):  
Crime Rate ◽  
State Violence ◽  
The State ◽  
Synthetic Approach ◽  
Holistic View ◽  
Lethal Violence ◽  
Crime Decline ◽  
Reported Crime ◽  
Criminal Legal System ◽  
Deaths In Custody

This project combines the conversation on the national crime rate with emerging discussions on the violence that the state perpetrates against civilians. To measure US lethal violence holistically, we reconceptualize the traditional definitional boundaries of violence to erase arbitrary distinctions between state- and civilian-caused crime and violence. Discussions of the “crime decline” focus specifically on civilian crime, positioning civilians as the sole danger to the health, wealth, and safety of individuals. Violence committed by the state—from police homicide to deaths in custody to in-prison sexual assault—is not found in the traditionally reported crime rate. These absences belie real dangers posed to individuals which are historical and contemporary, nonnegligible, and possibly rising. We present Uniform Crime Report data side-by-side with data on police killings, deaths in custody, and executions from sources such as Fatal Encounters, the Washington Post, the Guardian, and the Center for Disease Control to produce a robust discussion of deaths produced through the criminal legal system. We ground this empirical analysis in a broader conceptual framework that situates state violence squarely within the realm of US crime, and explore the implications of this more holistic view of crime for future analyses.

Pricing of Connected and Autonomous Vehicles in Mixed-Traffic Networks

2021 ◽  
pp. 036119812098585
Author(s):  
Paolo Delle Site
Keyword(s):  
Autonomous Vehicles ◽  
Marginal Cost ◽  
User Behavior ◽  
Social Planner ◽  
Traffic Networks ◽  
Mixed Traffic ◽  
The Third ◽  
First Case ◽  
Marginal Cost Pricing ◽  
The Social

For networks with human-driven vehicles (HDVs) only, pricing with arc-specific tolls has been proposed to achieve minimization of travel times in a decentralized way. However, the policy is hardly feasible from a technical viewpoint without connectivity. Therefore, for networks with mixed traffic of HDVs and connected and autonomous vehicles (CAVs), this paper considers pricing in a scenario where only CAVs are charged. In contrast to HDVs, CAVs can be managed as individual vehicles or as a fleet. In the latter case, CAVs can be routed to minimize the travel time of the fleet of CAVs or that of the entire fleet of HDVs and CAVs. We have a selfish user behavior in the first case, a private monopolist behavior in the second, a social planner behavior in the third. Pricing achieves in a decentralized way the social planner optimum. Tolls are not unique and can take both positive and negative values. Marginal cost pricing is one solution. The valid toll set is provided, and tolls are then computed according to two schemes: one with positive tolls only and minimum toll expenditure, and one with both tolls and subsidies and zero net expenditure. Convergent algorithms are used for the mixed-behavior equilibrium (simplicial decomposition algorithm) and toll determination (cutting plane algorithm). The computational experience with three networks: a two-arc network representative of the classic town bypass case, the Nguyen-Dupuis network, and the Anaheim network, provides useful policy insight.

scholarly journals Demand Subsidy versus Production Regulation: Development of New Energy Vehicles in a Competitive Environment

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (11) ◽  
pp. 1280
Author(s):  
Zixuan Wang ◽  
Xiuzhang Li
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Consumer Preference ◽  
Social Planner ◽  
Environmental Preferences ◽  
The Social ◽  
New Energy ◽  
Vehicle Market ◽  
New Energy Vehicles

In the competitive market environment, the growth of new energy vehicles (NEVs) faces many obstacles. Demand subsidy or production regulation-related policies are widely used to promote the development of NEVs. A comparative analysis of the effects of the two types of policies on the competitive vehicle market requires further study. To fill this gap, we investigate which type of policy is more preferable from the perspective of the social planner. In this paper, we construct a Stackelberg game with a welfare-maximizing social planner and two profit-maximizing manufacturers producing NEVs and fuel vehicles (FVs), respectively. Interestingly, although both types of policies can increase the quantity of NEVs, demand subsidy also promotes the growth of total vehicles at the same time; in contrast, production regulation reduces the total vehicles. Moreover, compared with the benchmark that no policy intervention, demand subsidy generally improves social welfare, while production regulation improves social welfare only with high consumer preference for NEVs. Nevertheless, production regulation always has a positive impact on the environment, whereas demand subsidy may have a positive impact only when the NEV is very environment friendly. The numerical results show that consumer environmental preferences and the regulation of environmental impact determine which type of policy dominates the other.

Why do firms oppose entry-deterring policies? Environmental regulation and entry deterrence

2014 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 141-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ana Espínola-Arredondo ◽  
Félix Muñoz-García
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Regulation ◽  
Entry Deterrence ◽  
Social Planner ◽  
Policy Regimes ◽  
Incumbent Firm ◽  
The Social ◽  
Emission Fees

AbstractThis paper investigates the design of environmental regulation under different regimes: flexible and inflexible policies. We analyze under which settings strict emission fees can be used as an entry-deterring tool, and become socially optimal. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the incentives of the social planner and the incumbent firm are aligned regarding policy regimes ifentry can be easily deterred by setting a stringent regulation. Their incentives, however, can bemisaligned when entry becomes more costly to deter, leading the incumbent to actually preferenvironmental policies that attract entry.

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