The targeted assignment of incentive schemes – Part 2

Author(s):  
Saskia Opitz
Keyword(s):  
2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael J. Kurschilgen ◽  
Alexander Morell ◽  
Ori Weisel

2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (Supplement_5) ◽  
Author(s):  
J Ese ◽  
C Ihlebak

Abstract Background Public health problems often constitute so called “wicked problems”, and the importance of involving multiple stakeholders in order to address such problems is acknowledged, for instance through the SDG17 guidelines. Partnerships between academia and the public sector have been deemed especially promising. However, sustainable partnerships might be difficult due to divergent understandings and interests. Although there is a substantial research literature on academic-public partnerships in general, partnerships addressing public health specifically are less investigated. The aim of the project was therefore to identify enablers for sustainable public health partnerships between academia and the public sector. Methods A mixed methods design was used. A survey regarding partnerships was sent to 41 European, Asian and American regions, with a response rate of 72 %. Based on survey data, an interview guide was developed and four best cases (Canada, Bulgaria, the Netherlands and Norway) were identified. Site visits and group interviews with representatives from stakeholders of the partnerships were conducted. Interview data and answers to open ended questions from questionnaires were analysed. Results Three main findings became apparent through the analysis. Important enablers were: 1) person-to-person fit between individuals, 2) national incentive schemes for collaboration, and 3) formal partnership agreements that provided a framework that allowed for manoeuvring. The enablers identified are on a macro, miso and micro level. Furthermore, they can be categorised as political, organisational, and social. Conclusions The data support the notion that partnerships are complex social structures that need to be initiated and managed on different levels and with different measures. At the same time, data demonstrate that across different geographical, political, and social contexts the same enablers are reappearing as important for sustaining public health partnerships. Key messages Similar enablers for sustaining public health partnerships are found across geographical, political, and social contexts. Important enablers for partnerships are person-to-person fit, national incentive schemes, and formal agreements.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Min Dai ◽  
Steven Kou ◽  
Shuaijie Qian ◽  
Xiangwei Wan

The problems of nonconcave utility maximization appear in many areas of finance and economics, such as in behavioral economics, incentive schemes, aspiration utility, and goal-reaching problems. Existing literature solves these problems using the concavification principle. We provide a framework for solving nonconcave utility maximization problems, where the concavification principle may not hold, and the utility functions can be discontinuous. We find that adding portfolio bounds can offer distinct economic insights and implications consistent with existing empirical findings. Theoretically, by introducing a new definition of viscosity solution, we show that a monotone, stable, and consistent finite difference scheme converges to the value functions of the nonconcave utility maximization problems. This paper was accepted by Agostino Capponi, finance.


2015 ◽  
Vol 54 (S1) ◽  
pp. s45-s62 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohammad Faisal Ahammad ◽  
Sang Mook Lee ◽  
Miki Malul ◽  
Amir Shoham

2018 ◽  
Vol 71 (4) ◽  
pp. 979-995
Author(s):  
Rasyad A Parinduri ◽  
Yoong Hon Lee ◽  
Kung Ming Tiong

Abstract We examine the effects of bigger rewards in individual dynamic tournaments on efforts and risk taking using the three-point rule in chess. Most chess tournaments use the standard rule while some tournaments use the Bilbao rule, which is identical to the three-point rule in soccer: We observe the same pairs of chess players playing under both rules, a research design that fits fixed-effect models. We find the Bilbao rule makes games 33% more decisive, mostly to white players’ advantage, who win 50% more games. We identify two mechanisms why the Bilbao rule works: It encourages players to play longer and discourages them from using drawish openings. These results suggest incentive schemes that provide bigger rewards for better performances work in individual multi-stage tournaments in which efforts and financial rewards are directly linked, and in which strategic interactions among teammates and with competitors are less complex.


2021 ◽  
Vol 235 ◽  
pp. 01025
Author(s):  
Jia Xu

With the advent of the blockchain era, employee incentives need to open up new ideas. The application of blockchain technology can promote the advantages of traditional equity incentive schemes and avoid weaknesses. Although there is still no mature ESOP on-chain solution on the market, and ESOP onchain still needs to consider a series of legal issues. The combination of equity incentives and blockchain technology is feasible. Due to the consensus mechanism of blockchain technology, grant and exercise information is recorded at each node on the chain. The implementation of the plan will be open and transparent throughout the process, avoiding the possibility of dark box operations. This is conducive to enhancing the credibility of the enterprise and enhancing employees’ trust in the enterprise, which can really play an incentive role.


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