CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF MILITARY INTERVENTIONS IN POSTWAR TURKEY AND GREECE

1995 ◽  
Author(s):  
ΓΕΡΑΣΙΜΟΣ ΚΑΡΑΜΠΕΛΙΑΣ
Author(s):  
David P. Auerswald ◽  
Stephen M. Saideman

This concluding chapter identifies the implications of this book's study for both future research and policy makers. One implication of this study is the shedding of light on the forum-shopping process associated with military interventions. Forum shopping occurs when countries have more than one option from which to choose when deciding whether and how to intervene. The experiences of Afghanistan and Libya show that while there may be other outlets for multilateral military operations, NATO, despite its limitations, is almost always the preferred intervention forum for its member states. The second set of implications deals with the use of principal-agency theory in civil–military relations. Ultimately, the cases of Afghanistan and Libya are ideal for comparative analysis on how countries react to various domestic and international pressures.


2021 ◽  
pp. 001041402198975
Author(s):  
Polina Beliakova

Civilian control of the military is a fundamental attribute of democracy. While democracies are less coup-prone, studies treating civilian control as a dependent variable mostly focus on coups. In this paper, I argue that the factors predicting coups in autocracies, weaken civilian control of the military in democracies in different ways. To capture this difference, I advance a new comprehensive framework that includes the erosion of civilian control by competition, insubordination, and deference. I test the argument under conditions of an intrastate conflict—a conducive environment for the erosion of civilian control. A large-N analysis confirms that while intrastate conflict does not lead to coups in democracies, it increases the military’s involvement in government, pointing to alternative forms of erosion taking place. Further case study—Russia’s First Chechen War—demonstrates the causal logic behind the new framework, contributing to the nuanced comparative analysis of civil-military relations across regimes.


Author(s):  
Ozan O. Varol

Balanced civil-military relations emerge from synergy. In this case synergy refers to civilians setting aside their ideological differences, working together to build credible democratic institutions, and constructing a viable alternative to military rule. If the civilians themselves are divided on the future democratic trajectory of the nation or the military’s exit from politics, the military may more easily exploit these divisions. Instead of trying for a quick power grab, civilians in an emerging democracy must shun any antidemocratic alternatives, including military interventions, to political rule. The more effective the civilian politicians are in constructing a stable, robust democracy, the less likely power vacuums and military interventions will occur. If political parties have a real chance to compete and win in the electoral marketplace, they are more likely to play the democratic game rather than violate its rules and resort to tanks and guns to oust their opponents.


1992 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-105
Author(s):  
Ziaul Haque

A quite large number of developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, which are today characterised by chronic underdevelopment, general social retardation, slow social mobility, and political instability became highly prone to military interventions in politics in their initial phases of decolonization soon after World War II. These military interventions in the fragile civil polities and stagnant economies, termed by some scholars as the coup zone, are justified and legitimised on various pretexts of modernisation, democratisation, and reform; which means that the military seeks to fill the institutional vacuum when the overall civil administration of the country breaks down as a consequence of the rivalry for pelf and power between various ruling classes. Thus, the military has emerged as the most powerful institution in these countries. Some social revolutions of modern times, in China in 1949, for example, and in Cuba in 1959, were caused by endemic military interventions in the civil society.


2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 425-447 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Kuehn ◽  
Aurel Croissant ◽  
Jil Kamerling ◽  
Hans Lueders ◽  
André Strecker

Institutionalizing civilian control over the military is a crucial challenge for newly democratized nations. This paper aims to answer the question under which conditions civilian control can be established after the transition to democracy, and under which conditions civilian control fails. To answer this question, we draw on original data on civil–military relations in 28 new democracies in Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America and run a fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis. We find that no single explanatory factor can be considered necessary for the success or failure of civilian control in new democracies, but identify a number of sufficient variable combinations to explain the development of civil–military relations after the transition to democracy.


2019 ◽  
Vol IV (I) ◽  
pp. 62-70
Author(s):  
Shaukat ◽  
Zahir Shah ◽  
Afzaal Amin

Civil-military relations in developing countries are at the heart of a central concern of democracy. In Pakistan, the same has not only been turbulent throughout our history; it has also been an uneasy relationship with frequent military interventions. However, in Pakistan military has come to identify itself with the state rather than just one of the key components of a constitutional state. The Agency Theory, based on Principal-Agent relation, has been applied by many to explain the 1999 Musharraf takeover in Pakistan. The intervention is justified on many grounds. But what is more interesting is the fact it is welcomed in a country where people at large long for democracy and cherish democratic ideals.


2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-59
Author(s):  
Nelson Goldpin Obah-Akpowoghaha ◽  
◽  
Adegbite Simon Aboluwoye ◽  
Kelechi Johnmary Ani ◽  
◽  
...  

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