Theorizing Political Responsiveness in Prosecutorial Decision-Making

This chapter details our theory for why we should expect the priorities and preferences of the president, Congress, and a U.S. Attorney’s local public to affect prosecutorial behavior. We argue that principal-agency theory provides a useful tool to understand how political principals like the president and Congress can influence U.S. Attorney decision-making. We expect that presidential rhetoric and congressional hearings on crime-fighting priorities will provide important, meaningful signals regarding these principals’ priorities and that federal prosecutors will adjust their behavior depending on the strength of the signals they have received from their principals. Additionally, we anticipate that U.S. Attorneys will be mindful of their local public’s preferences because they are often drawn from the district in which they serve and will continue to work in the district when their tenure ends. We also introduce the empirical measures used to capture political superiors’ communication to federal prosecutors that we rely on in the remainder of the book.

Could Contracts between Pharmaceutical Firms and French Veterinarians Bias Prescription Behaviour: A Principal-Agency Theory Approach in the Context of Oligopolies

In France, veterinarians can both prescribe and deliver veterinary medicines, which is a questionable situation from the perspective of antimicrobial use (AMU) reduction to avoid antimicrobial resistance (AMR). This situation places veterinarians in direct commercial relationships with the pharmaceutical industry as purchase contracts are signed between veterinarians and pharmaceutical companies. The aim of the present work is to analyse the relationships between veterinarians and pharmaceutical firms in the oligopoly market context of French veterinary medicine to determine whether the prescription behaviour of practitioners can be biased by joint prescription and delivery. Therefore, we develop an analysis based on principal-agent theory. Contracts between pharmaceutical companies and veterinarians during the 2008–2014 period were analysed based on 382 contracts related to 47 drugs belonging to eight main pharmaceutical firms (2320 observations). The price per unit after rebate of each drug and contract was calculated. The descriptive analysis demonstrated high disparity among the contracts across pharmaceutical firms with regard to the provisions of the contracts and how they are presented. Then, linear regression was used to explain the price per unit after rebate based on the explanatory variables, which included the yearly purchase objective, year, type of drug and type of rebate. The decrease in price per unit after rebate for each extra €1000 purchase objective per drug category was established to be €0.061 per 100 kg body weight for anticoccidiosis treatments, €0.029 per 100 kg body weight for anti-inflammatories, €0.0125 per 100 kg body weight and €0.0845 per animal for antiparasitics, and €0.031 per animal for intramammary antimicrobials. Applying agency theory reveals that veterinarians can be considered agents in the case of monopolistic situations involving pharmaceutical firms; otherwise, veterinarians are considered principals (oligopolistic situations in which at least several medicines have similar indications). The present study does not provide evidence suggesting that joint prescription and delivery may introduce any potential prescription bias linked to conflicts of interest under the market conditions during the 2008–2014 period.

A Qualitative Analysis of Public Private Partnership (PPP) Project Contracts in the Roads Sector. A Contextual Elucidation of Uganda National Roads Authority (UNRA)

Public Private Partnership Projects continue to gain momentum across the world. Governments in developing countries now find PPP projects as an alternative to conventional financing and providing public infrastructure. Guided by the principal agency theory, this study examines different types of PPP Project contracts in the roads sector with specific focus on the Uganda National Roads Authority (UNRA). Contracting out of projects in the roads sector has led to increased costs of road construction in Uganda. The main objectives of this study are to examine the relevance of the principal-agency theory to the adoption of PPP project contracts by UNRA and establish the types of PPP Project contracts suitable for adoption by UNRA. Data was collected through literature survey and interviews. Study findings revealed that Principal-Agency theory is relevant to adoption of PPP project contracts and that UNRA intends to use mainly management PPP contract. It is concluded that principal-agent relationship is very crucial if the execution of PPP Project contracts is to be a success and that there is a very high chance that UNRA is planning to also adopt the use of Build, Own and Transfer (BOT) PPP Project contract in the roads sector. The study recommends that UNRA should ensure a cordial relationship with private parties and not rely solely on management PPP contracts. The organisation should explore other PPP project contracts such as Private Finance Initiative, Leasing, Design Build, Build Operate and Transfer, and then Design Build and Finance. The choice of contracts should always be based on affordability and value for money.

Role of Democratic Volunteers as the "Election Marketer"

Voter turnout in 1999-2009 has decreased significantly. At 1999 92.6% chosen and 7.3% abstains, at 2004 84.1% chosen and 15.9% abstains, at 2009 70.9% chosen and 29.1% abstains. (www.merdeka.com). These conditions encourage Indonesian Election Commision to form Democratic Volunteer as an agent that helps the socialization of Election 2014. This study aims to comprehensively assess the role of Democratic Volunteer as "Election Marketer" in Principal Agency Theory perspective. This study uses qualitative research with case study approach. The results are (1) Relations between Pasuruan Regency Election Commision as principal with Democratic Volunteerasagent (2) Contract model of Democratic Volunteer in two aspects, the type of contract that contract model is short Term Contracts, and the type of both relationship are relation between government and civil society; (3) In carrying out its role as election marketer, Democratic Volunteer fulfill four criteria in Principal Agency Theory perspective. The weakness of model contract of Democratic Volunteer are Short Term Contracts must be solved by entering into a Long Term Contracts to be interwoven communication simultaneously between the government, in this case between Pasuruan Regency Election Commision with Democratic Volunteer as the embodiment of Civil Societies participation is represented by five segments groups of voters.

In search of effective corporate governance. An explorative research within the context of semi-public housing management in the Netherlands

In this paper we elaborate, supported by literature on trust, a framework for corporate governance that might overcome lacunas in the classical frameworks of the principal agency theory and the stewardship theory. A historical analysis of the development of corporate governance in the context of the Dutch semi-public housing management shows that a mixture of principal agency and stewardship approach of semi-public managers proves to be contradictory and toxic. A discourse analysis and factor analysis report on the search of actors for a more effective corporate governance. The findings are only indicative, due to the explorative stage of the research. The indication is that third framework gets more positive and consistent support in the corporate governance practice. A longitudinal set up and extension of samples and contexts is recommended.

Implications for Policy and Theory

This concluding chapter identifies the implications of this book's study for both future research and policy makers. One implication of this study is the shedding of light on the forum-shopping process associated with military interventions. Forum shopping occurs when countries have more than one option from which to choose when deciding whether and how to intervene. The experiences of Afghanistan and Libya show that while there may be other outlets for multilateral military operations, NATO, despite its limitations, is almost always the preferred intervention forum for its member states. The second set of implications deals with the use of principal-agency theory in civil–military relations. Ultimately, the cases of Afghanistan and Libya are ideal for comparative analysis on how countries react to various domestic and international pressures.