Study on Green Supply Chain Coordination in ELV Recycling System w ith Government Subsidy for the Third-Party Recycler

2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 66-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daqiang Chen ◽  
Peiqi Mao ◽  
Danzhi Sun ◽  
Sasa Yang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Recycling System ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Third Party

Game Models of Green Supply Chain Involved the Third Party Logistics

2014 ◽  
Vol 700 ◽  
pp. 727-733
Author(s):  
Shi Ying Jiang ◽  
Chun Yan Ma
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Third Party Logistics ◽  
Product Price ◽  
The Third Party Logistics ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Third Party

The green supply chain consisting of the third party logistics and retailer is as the background.Some factors are considered such as product green degree, carbon tax and consumer preferences. Two kinds of green supply chain game models are set up: Stackelberg game model dominated by the third party logistics,Stackelberg game model dominated by retailer. The game models are compared, and finally the numerical simulation has been carried on.Study shows that in the game models, with the improvement of product green degree, product price, logistics price, profit of the third party logistics, the profits of retailer and the supply chain will increase;With the increase of carbon tax, product price and logistics price also unceasingly increase.

scholarly journals Investigating a green supply chain with product recycling under retailer's fairness behavior

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Chirantan Mondal ◽  
Bibhas C. Giri
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Green Product ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Product Recycling ◽  
Forward Channel

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>Due to the rapid increment of environmental pollution and advancement of society, recently many manufacturing firms have started greening their products and focusing on product remanufacturing. The retailing firms are also taking several efforts for marketing those products and thinking more about the fairness of the business. Keeping this in mind, this study investigates the effect of recycling activity and the retailer's fairness behavior on pricing, green improvement, and marketing effort in a closed-loop green supply chain. In the forward channel, the manufacturer sells the green product through the retailer while in the reverse channel, either the manufacturer or the retailer or an independent third-party collects used products. The centralized model and six decentralized models are developed depending on the retailer's fairness behavior and/or product recycling. The optimal results are derived and compared analytically. The analytical results are verified by exemplifying a numerical example. A restitution-based wholesale price contract is developed to resolve the channel conflicts and coordinate the supply chain. Our results reveal that (ⅰ) the manufacturer never selects the third-party as a collector of used products under fair-neutral retailer, (ⅱ) the fairness behavior of the retailer improves her profitability but it diminishes the manufacturer's profit, and (ⅲ) if the manufacturer does not pay much transfer price, then the collection through the third-party is preferable to the fair-minded retailer.</p>

scholarly journals The Optimal Pricing of Dual-Channel Supply Chain with the Third Party Product Recovery and Sales Effort

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Limin Wang ◽  
Qiankun Song ◽  
Zhenjiang Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Product Recovery ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
The Third ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Retail Channel ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
Decentralized Model

The optimal pricing of dual-channel supply chain with the third party product recovery and sales effort is considered in this paper. The optimal selling pricing of direct channel and retail channel in the forward supply chain and the optimal collection pricing of retail channel and the third party in the backward supply chain are given for the general case under the centralized and decentralized model. Then, the effect of sales effort of the retailer and the optimal pricing strategy with sales effort under the centralized and decentralized model are provided and analyzed. Finally, the comparative analysis of four situations is carried out by numerical results.

Research on the Optimization of Inventory Routing Problem Based on VMI-TPL Mode

2013 ◽  
Vol 409-410 ◽  
pp. 1089-1092
Author(s):  
Wei Yang Zhao ◽  
Bin Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Ant Colony Algorithm ◽  
Optimal Path ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Inventory Routing ◽  
Third Party Logistics ◽  
Routing Problem ◽  
The Third Party Logistics ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Third Party

The paper establishes an inventory routing integrated model to economize the supply chain cost based on a supply chain composed of a single supplier, a third party logistics enterprise and multiple retailers. First of all, the paper acquires the optimal path arrangement for the third party logistics vehicles and the initial fixed partition through ant colony algorithm. Secondly, the paper calculates the total cost of the supply chain through the integral multiple sampling period and the fixed partition policies. Finally, the paper adjusts the third party logistics replenishment period for different partitions until the cost of supply chain comes to the minimum.

scholarly journals The Reward-Penalty Mechanism in a Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Asymmetric Information of the Third-Party Collector

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Wenbin Wang ◽  
Jia Lv ◽  
Ni An ◽  
Jie Guan ◽  
Shiyuan Quan
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Effort Level ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Buy Back

This paper investigates the reward-penalty mechanism (RPM) implemented by the government in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with asymmetric information. The manufacturer produces and sells products to consumers, while the collection of waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) is delegated to the third-party collector, the one who has private information about the collection effort level. An information screening contract for the manufacturer is put forward to obtain the private information from the third-party collector, which is composed of buy-back price and franchise fee. By utilizing principal-agent theory, two cases are mainly examined including the CLSC without the RPM and the CLSC with the RPM. The results demonstrate that (i) the information screening contract is effective in capturing the collector’s collection effort level, (ii) raising the buy-back price to motivate the third-party collector is confirmed to perform well on enhancing the collection quantity from consumers, (iii) H-type collector collects more WEEEs and earns more profits than L-type collector, and (iv) the RPM improves the collection quantity of the enterprise and reaps more environmental benefits. The numerical results verify the validity of the contract and the feasibility of the RPM.

scholarly journals Consignment stock policy in a closed-loop supply chain

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Chakraborty ◽  
Tarun Maiti ◽  
B. C. Giri
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Decision Strategy ◽  
Decision Strategies ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Stock Policy ◽  
Strategy I

The main feature of sustainable supply Chain Management is reuse of End of Life (EOL) products to reduce the environmental pollution. This paper considers the Consignment Stock (CS) policy for a Closed-Loop Supply Chain (CLSC). To achieve the economic goal, this study presents a multi-echelon supply chain with a single manufacturer, a single retailer and a third-party service provider. The objective is to optimize this three-level CLSC under a Stackelberg game scenario. The other objective is to identify the environmental impact of remanufacturing EOL products. In this CLSC, the manufacturer acts as the Stackelberg leader and the retailer, the third party are the followers. Under manufacturer's leadership, the retailer and the third party acquire three different decision strategies - I, II, and III. In decision strategy I, the retailer acts as the leader and the third party acts as a follower, whereas in decision strategy II, they obtain a Nash game strategy. In the decision strategy III, they act as one unit and decide their decisions centrally. Numerical example and sensitivity analysis are used to illustrate optimal results of different decision strategies and also check the behaviour of key model-parameters. The best outcomes are found in decision strategy I. The main findings of our study show that when upper level player has more power then the supply chain gives best outcomes.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document