scholarly journals Investigating a green supply chain with product recycling under retailer's fairness behavior

2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Chirantan Mondal ◽  
Bibhas C. Giri
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Green Product ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Product Recycling ◽  
Forward Channel

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>Due to the rapid increment of environmental pollution and advancement of society, recently many manufacturing firms have started greening their products and focusing on product remanufacturing. The retailing firms are also taking several efforts for marketing those products and thinking more about the fairness of the business. Keeping this in mind, this study investigates the effect of recycling activity and the retailer's fairness behavior on pricing, green improvement, and marketing effort in a closed-loop green supply chain. In the forward channel, the manufacturer sells the green product through the retailer while in the reverse channel, either the manufacturer or the retailer or an independent third-party collects used products. The centralized model and six decentralized models are developed depending on the retailer's fairness behavior and/or product recycling. The optimal results are derived and compared analytically. The analytical results are verified by exemplifying a numerical example. A restitution-based wholesale price contract is developed to resolve the channel conflicts and coordinate the supply chain. Our results reveal that (ⅰ) the manufacturer never selects the third-party as a collector of used products under fair-neutral retailer, (ⅱ) the fairness behavior of the retailer improves her profitability but it diminishes the manufacturer's profit, and (ⅲ) if the manufacturer does not pay much transfer price, then the collection through the third-party is preferable to the fair-minded retailer.</p>

scholarly journals The Reward-Penalty Mechanism in a Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Asymmetric Information of the Third-Party Collector

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Wenbin Wang ◽  
Jia Lv ◽  
Ni An ◽  
Jie Guan ◽  
Shiyuan Quan
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Effort Level ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Buy Back

This paper investigates the reward-penalty mechanism (RPM) implemented by the government in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with asymmetric information. The manufacturer produces and sells products to consumers, while the collection of waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) is delegated to the third-party collector, the one who has private information about the collection effort level. An information screening contract for the manufacturer is put forward to obtain the private information from the third-party collector, which is composed of buy-back price and franchise fee. By utilizing principal-agent theory, two cases are mainly examined including the CLSC without the RPM and the CLSC with the RPM. The results demonstrate that (i) the information screening contract is effective in capturing the collector’s collection effort level, (ii) raising the buy-back price to motivate the third-party collector is confirmed to perform well on enhancing the collection quantity from consumers, (iii) H-type collector collects more WEEEs and earns more profits than L-type collector, and (iv) the RPM improves the collection quantity of the enterprise and reaps more environmental benefits. The numerical results verify the validity of the contract and the feasibility of the RPM.

scholarly journals Consignment stock policy in a closed-loop supply chain

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Chakraborty ◽  
Tarun Maiti ◽  
B. C. Giri
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Decision Strategy ◽  
Decision Strategies ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Stock Policy ◽  
Strategy I

The main feature of sustainable supply Chain Management is reuse of End of Life (EOL) products to reduce the environmental pollution. This paper considers the Consignment Stock (CS) policy for a Closed-Loop Supply Chain (CLSC). To achieve the economic goal, this study presents a multi-echelon supply chain with a single manufacturer, a single retailer and a third-party service provider. The objective is to optimize this three-level CLSC under a Stackelberg game scenario. The other objective is to identify the environmental impact of remanufacturing EOL products. In this CLSC, the manufacturer acts as the Stackelberg leader and the retailer, the third party are the followers. Under manufacturer's leadership, the retailer and the third party acquire three different decision strategies - I, II, and III. In decision strategy I, the retailer acts as the leader and the third party acts as a follower, whereas in decision strategy II, they obtain a Nash game strategy. In the decision strategy III, they act as one unit and decide their decisions centrally. Numerical example and sensitivity analysis are used to illustrate optimal results of different decision strategies and also check the behaviour of key model-parameters. The best outcomes are found in decision strategy I. The main findings of our study show that when upper level player has more power then the supply chain gives best outcomes.

System dynamics research of remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain dominated by the third party

2017 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 379-386 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shidi Miao ◽  
Tengfei Wang ◽  
Deyun Chen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
System Dynamics ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Rapid Development ◽  
Waste Recycling ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
The Impact

With the rapid development of the electronic information industry in recent years, electronic products are being updated faster and faster, and e-waste recycling has become a common problem around the world. Firstly, this article contrasts recycling at home and abroad using the predicament of Midea Corp. Based on a closed-loop supply chain with the system dynamics method, a model is constructed and simulated. In this model, the collection point coverage rate is introduced to adjust the e-waste recycling rate dynamically. Aiming at a recycling mode dominated by the third party of the closed-loop supply chain, the article mainly discusses the impact on the sales rate and market share of the recycling model by third-party enterprises and compares the total revenue of all supply chains. Simulation results show that the model is more effective and optimal than the traditional recycling model.

Game Models of Green Supply Chain Involved the Third Party Logistics

2014 ◽  
Vol 700 ◽  
pp. 727-733
Author(s):  
Shi Ying Jiang ◽  
Chun Yan Ma
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Carbon Tax ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Third Party Logistics ◽  
Product Price ◽  
The Third Party Logistics ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Third Party

The green supply chain consisting of the third party logistics and retailer is as the background.Some factors are considered such as product green degree, carbon tax and consumer preferences. Two kinds of green supply chain game models are set up: Stackelberg game model dominated by the third party logistics,Stackelberg game model dominated by retailer. The game models are compared, and finally the numerical simulation has been carried on.Study shows that in the game models, with the improvement of product green degree, product price, logistics price, profit of the third party logistics, the profits of retailer and the supply chain will increase;With the increase of carbon tax, product price and logistics price also unceasingly increase.

Decision-Making of Closed-Loop Supply Chain Strategic Alliance Considering the Quality Level of Remanufactured Products and Patent Protection

2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (05) ◽  
pp. 2050021
Author(s):  
Xiaogang Cao ◽  
Hui Wu ◽  
Hui Wen ◽  
Kebing Chen
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
New Products ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Quality Level ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Alliance Structure

In this paper, a closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer and a third-party remanufacturer responsible for collecting used products and remanufacturing is constructed. Considering the quality level of remanufactured products, four kinds of closed-loop supply chain alliance structure models are constructed. The optimal equilibrium decisions of these four models are compared and analyzed. The optimal decisions of the models are verified by numerical analysis. Furthermore, the impacts of the quality of remanufactured products and the decision influence of the third-party remanufacturer in the alliance on the remanufacturer’s decision are further analyzed. The results show that remanufactured products are competitive with new products, and the improvement of the remanufactured product quality will reduce the market demand of new products. The equilibrium decision of the closed-loop supply chain is affected by the alliance behavior of members in the closed-loop supply chain and the quality level of remanufactured products. The higher the decision concentration of the closed-loop supply chain is, the more favorable the supply chain is; the higher the remanufacturing quality level is, the more favorable the supply chain is, and the alliance decision of the third-party remanufacturer is affected by the quality level of remanufactured products and the decision-making influence of the third-party remanufacturer in the alliance structure. We find that the improvement of the concentration degree of closed-loop supply chain decision can benefit the supply chain by improving the remanufacturing quality level, which has direct effect on the alliance decision of the third-party remanufacturer. In most cases, the choice of the alliance is the dominant decision of the third-party remanufacturer.

scholarly journals A Stochastic Differential Game in the Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Third-Party Collecting and Fairness Concerns

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (8) ◽  
pp. 2241 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jianmin Xiao ◽  
Zongsheng Huang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Return Rate ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
The Third ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Fairness Concern

This paper investigates the optimal return control problem in a closed-loop supply chain consisted of one manufacturer, one retailer, and one third-party collector, in the presence of stochastic return disturbance and fairness concern of followers. We formulate the stochastic differential game-theoretic models and resolve the feedback Stackelberg equilibriums without and with fairness concern. We also derive the evolutionary paths of the stochastic return rate and the value functions of the supply chain members under the optimal control strategies. We find that the feedback equilibrium exists only under a specific condition, and the expectation and variance of the return rate both approach the stable state for a specific closed-loop supply chain system. We further discussed the impact of fairness concerns on the supply chain system. The manufacturer would shift profit to the retailer by lowering the wholesale price, and the stable expected return rate will be lower in the supply chain with fairness concerns, as the third party will have less incentive to collect used products, considering unfairness. The manufacturer should set a higher transfer subsidy to incentivize the third party to collect when the third party is concerned with fairness.

scholarly journals Managing Pricing of Closed-Loop Supply Chain Under Patent Protection

2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-47
Author(s):  
Xiaogang Cao ◽  
Leqi Hua ◽  
Hui Wen ◽  
Yan Wu
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Decision Problem ◽  
Patent Protection ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
The Third ◽  
Pricing Decision ◽  
The Third Party

AbstractThis paper studies the closed-loop supply chain decision problem in which the original manufacturer allows the third-party remanufacturer to remanufacture under patent protection. In the two cycle mode, the authors discuss the pricing decision problem of the original manufacturer, the retailer, and the third-party remanufacturer in centralized and decentralized decision-making cases. The authors obtain the optimal sale price and wholesale price of new products and remanufactured products in two cases, and the optimal recycling rate of used products in centralized decision-making case. Finally, the authors carry out the corresponding numerical simulation of the pricing decision.

scholarly journals Manufacturer’s cooperation strategy of closed-loop supply chain considering corporate social responsibility

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yingluo Yan ◽  
Fengmin Yao ◽  
Jiayi Sun
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Recycling Rate ◽  
The Third ◽  
Cooperation Strategy ◽  
Product Recycling ◽  
Corporate Social

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become a popular and important strategy for corporate operation and sustainable development. Meanwhile, many social or environmental incidents that occur in one enterprise could bring huge risk or disruption for the entire supply chain. This study discusses the manufacturer’s cooperation strategy of closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) composed of a dominant manufacturer with CSR behavior consciousness, a retailer with CSR investment, and a third-party recycler. In the CSR-CLSC, the manufacturer exhibits CSR behavior consciousness through considering stakeholders welfare, the retailer makes CSR investment through profit donation and the third-party recycler exhibits CSR activity through product recycling. And under the Stackelberg Game setting, we formulate four different decision-making models to investigate the interaction between manufacturer’s CSR behavior consciousness and retailer’s CSR investment, as well as their impact on the manufacturer’s cooperative strategy selection and CLSC operation. The results show that both the CSR behavior consciousness of manufacturer and CSR investment of retailer are conducive to reducing the wholesale price of new products, enhancing the recycling rate of waste products and improving the performance of CSR-CLSC members, and both of them have the function of mutual incentives. The vertical cooperation strategy of manufacturer is conducive to increasing the overall performance of CSR-CLSC, and compared with the cooperation with the third-party recycler, the manufacturer has stronger motivation to cooperate with the retailer, and it is also more beneficial to improving the CSR investment level, the waste product recycling rate, and the performance of CSR-CLSC members.

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