scholarly journals Aristotle’s De Anima according to Franz Brentano. The structure of human soul in The Psychology of Aristotle. In Particular His Doctrine of the Active Intellect and in the context of the other works from the Aristotelica Collection

2016 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 31-50
Author(s):  
Sonia Kamińska
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Human Soul ◽  
De Anima ◽  
Franz Brentano ◽  
Active Intellect

scholarly journals Divine and angelic cognition in St. Thomas Aquinas

2021 ◽  
Vol 64 (2) ◽  
pp. 25-38
Author(s):  
Predrag Milidrag
Keyword(s):  
Thomas Aquinas ◽  
The Other ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Future Contingents ◽  
Human Soul ◽  
Summa Theologiae ◽  
Structural Symmetry ◽  
The One ◽  
Active Intellect

In the first part of the Summa theologiae St. Thomas Aquinas analyzes the cognition in God, angels and human beings; he does that by comparing and juxtaposing them. On the one side, the questions concerning divine cognition, such as the identity of the divine cognition and the divine substance, its nondiscursivity, its scope or future contingents are considered in the articles dedicated to the angels. On the other side, the proper characteristics of the human cognition in the part of the Summa on human soul, such as the active intellect, lack of inborn intelligible species, the inductive procedure in the abstracting from sense cognition, the cognition of the particulars, those problems are analyzed in the part on angelic cognition too. So, there is a structural symmetry of corresponding questions in the Summa on divine, angelic and human cognition.

The Emotions

2021 ◽  
pp. 18-41
Author(s):  
David Charles
Keyword(s):  
Pure Form ◽  
The Other ◽  
Sense Perception ◽  
De Anima ◽  
Body And Soul ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Physical Features ◽  
Distinct Features ◽  
Physical Type

In De Anima A.1, Aristotle developed an account of certain ‘affections of the soul’ such as anger which is his model for other ‘affections and actions common to body and soul’ such as desire and sense perception. His remarks about anger can be understood in two different ways. According to one account, which I call ‘the Pure Form Interpretation’, anger is essentially a compound made up of two definitionally distinct features, one purely psychological (a desire for revenge: its form) and the other physical (the boiling of the blood: its matter), where the latter in some way ‘underlies’ the former. In the other, described as ‘the Impure Form Interpretation’, the type of desire for revenge referred to in the definition of anger (its form) is inseparable in definition from (and not abstractable from) physical features such as, for example, the boiling blood. The type of desire which defines anger is itself defined as a boiling-of-the-blood-(or hot-) desire for revenge. Aristotle’s comments in De Anima A.1 are, it is argued, best understood in line with the Impure Form Interpretation, as defining anger as an inextricably psycho-physical type of desire for revenge, not decomposable into two definitionally separate features, one purely psychological, one purely physical.

Reading Books in Natural Philosophy: How Conrad Gessner‘s Commentary on De Anima (1563) was Annotated and Interpreted

2017 ◽  
Vol 93 (2) ◽  
pp. 69-89
Author(s):  
Anja-Silvia Goeing
Keyword(s):  
Early Modern ◽  
Natural Philosophy ◽  
Human Soul ◽  
De Anima ◽  
Preventive Healthcare ◽  
Modern Natural ◽  
The World ◽  
The One ◽  
Object Of Study

Conrad Gessner (1516–65) was town physician and lecturer at the Zwinglian reformed lectorium in Zurich. His approach towards the world and mankind was centred on his preoccupation with the human soul, an object of study that had challenged classical writers such as Aristotle and Galen, and which remained as important in post-Reformation debate. Writing commentaries on Aristotles De Anima (On the Soul) was part of early-modern natural philosophy education at university and formed the preparatory step for studying medicine. This article uses the case study of Gessners commentary on De Anima (1563) to explore how Gessners readers prioritised De Animas information. Gessners intention was to provide the students of philosophy and medicine with the most current and comprehensive thinking. His readers responses raise questions about evolving discussions in natural philosophy and medicine that concerned the foundations of preventive healthcare on the one hand, and of anatomically specified pathological medicine on the other, and Gessners part in helping these develop.

Response

1997 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 153-155
Author(s):  
Alfred L. Ivry
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
De Anima ◽  
Informed Reader

Herbert Davidson's critique of my thesis regarding the relation between Averroes' Middle and Long commentaries on De anima contrasts my reading and translation of Middle Commentary passages with his own. I leave it to the informed reader to judge whether one translation is more “neutral” than the other, excluding the specific denotation which I give to sharh, which is the point at issue.

scholarly journals Alexander of Aphrodisias, De Intellectu 110.4: ‘I Heard this from Aristotle’. A modest proposal

2000 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 252-256 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Opsomer ◽  
Bob Sharples
Keyword(s):  
Human Being ◽  
De Anima ◽  
The Third ◽  
Modest Proposal ◽  
Alexander Of Aphrodisias ◽  
Active Intellect

The treatise De intellectu attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias can be divided into four sections. The first (A, 106.19–110.3) is an interpretation of the Aristotelian theory of intellect, and especially of the active intellect referred to in Aristotle, De anima 3.5, which differs from the interpretation in Alexander's own De anima, and whose relation to Alexander's De anima, attribution to Alexander, and date are all disputed. The second (B, 110.4–112.5) is an account of the intellect which is broadly similar to A though differing on certain points. The third (Cl, 112.5–113.12) is an account of someone's response to the problem of how intellect can enter the human being ‘from outside’ if it is incorporeal and hence cannot move at all; in the fourth (C2, 113.12–24) the writer who reported Cl criticizes that solution and gives his own alternative one.

scholarly journals “The universal being is either nothing or posterior”: an inquiry into the constitution and priority of being as being in Peripatetic metaphysics

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 499-516
Author(s):  
Maria Varlamova
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
De Anima ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Alexander Of Aphrodisias ◽  
I 11 ◽  
The Subject ◽  
First Philosophy ◽  
Aristotle's Metaphysics

As a subject of the first philosophy, the being as being is defined as the most universal and primary one. However, Aristotle proves in the Metaphysics that neither One nor being are substances, therefore they do not exist separately. Furthermore, in the De Anima he claims that those that are said to be universal are "either nothing or posterior", because they cannot be on its own in separation from the particular things. How, then, the universal being which can be named nothing or posterior postulated as the subject of first philosophy that is most worthy of knowing? And, on the other hand, if the being as universal is not a substance, on what ground it has it's unity? In order to answer these questions, I will consider Alexander of Aphrodisias' Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics and also the Quaestio I.3 and I.11 of his Quaestiones.

scholarly journals Cloud and Clothe : Hildegard of Bingen's metaphors of the fall of the human soul

2016 ◽  
Vol 49 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 5-18
Author(s):  
Sonja Weiss
Keyword(s):  
The Body ◽  
Original Sin ◽  
The Other ◽  
Philosophical Question ◽  
Human Soul ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Way

The paper examines Hildegard's use of metaphors in her visions of the human fall, and the way she combined the biblical motif of Original Sin with the philosophical question of a soul's embodiment, particularly in her moral play, Ordo virtutum, but also in her medical and visionary writings. The metaphor of the cloud sometimes blends with the metaphor of clothing (as in, "to clothe"), since the corporeal vestment of the soul before the Fall is said to resemble a cloud of light. Both metaphors are present in Hildegard's other works, particularly the image of the cloud, which is frequently used to illustrate cosmological implications of Original Sin. The metaphor of clothing, on the other hand, reveals parallels with certain Christian Gnostic revelations, blended with the Neo-Platonic doctrine of the soul as enslaved to the body.

scholarly journals Konsep Pendidikan Akhlak (Studi Pemikiran Ibnu Miskawaih dalam Kitab Tahzîb al-Akhlāq)

2017 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Moslem Moslem
Keyword(s):  
Moral Education ◽  
The Other ◽  
Human Soul ◽  
Ethical Philosophy ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Life Journey ◽  
The One ◽  
Practical Level

ABSTRACT Talking about the concept of morals, is something that can not be ignored just so much more to provide enlightenment for the students or educators in the field of moral education in particular. The figure of Ibn Miskawayh (his famous name) is one of the most important classical Muslim thinkers in the field of morals. He contributes greatly in drawing concrete formulations about the human soul or more precisely about the faculties of the human soul that help humans develop their moral potential. He examines morality very detailed, both on the theoretical and practical level, so that the concept is more of a rational ethic or ethical philosophy. This paper on the one hand wants to clarify the concept of moral education according to Ibn Miskawayh in his essay Tahzîb al-Akhlāq, on the other hand wants to clarify his life journey and the background of the writing of Tahzîb al-Akhlāq.Keywords: Moral education, Ibnu Miskawaih, Tahzîb al-Akhlāq

scholarly journals Anagnorisis (processing forgiveness): The mystical praxis-space of diaconal reaching out to the Other/others (the hopeful case of Joseph and his brothers)

2021 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniël J. Louw
Keyword(s):  
Life Story ◽  
Truth And Reconciliation Commission ◽  
The Other ◽  
Missio Dei ◽  
Human Soul ◽  
Reconciliation Commission ◽  
Truth And Reconciliation ◽  
The Core ◽  
Mode Of Life

The following question is at stake: What entails forgiveness and reconciliation within processes of healing regarding schisms in a very diverse and polarised society? Despite the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission the burning question that still prevails: What is meant by a praxis of forgiveness and a spirituality of reconciliation within a post-apartheid dispensation? It is argued that forgiving and reconciling are not instant or merely ‘handsome pardoning’. Both are embedded in processes of reaching out to the pain and hurt of the other. As a process, forgiveness starts with self-acknowledgement and should manifest in modes of compassionate being-with and diaconal acts of reaching out, creating spaces of ‘mystical encounters’. In this regard, the notion of anagnorisis, as captured by narrating the encounter between Joseph and his brothers, should be read as an exemplification of reconciliation, directed by the missio Dei, promissio Dei and passio Dei. Within a Christian paradigm, Ernst Bloch’s notion of docta spes, very aptly captures the core of pastoral, reconciliatory care: Hope care to the human soul (nēphēsh) – the search for life and meaning. ‘Dum spiro – spero’ [While I Breathe, I Hope].Contribution: It is often the case that reconciliation is viewed as an instant event. The case of Joseph and his brothers illustrates the fact that reconciliation is in fact a mode of life, embedded over many years. In this way, reconciliation could be rendered as part of one’s life story; as a mode of journeying through life, exemplifying the how of authentic human encounters. Reconciliation then becomes an ontic feature of relational integrity and indication of the quality of the human soul: Habitus as feeling from the hurt being of the other.

Survey of the Active Intellect in Transcendent Theosophy

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 139-163
Author(s):  
Maryam Salem ◽  
Maryam Kheradmand
Keyword(s):  
General View ◽  
Human Soul ◽  
Islamic World ◽  
Philosophical Foundations ◽  
The World ◽  
Active Intellect ◽  
The Universe

Mull? ?adr? (1572–1640) can, as we will argue in this article, be considered the greatest philosopher in Islamic world, because he has tried to eliminate the shortcomings of all previous schools. He claimed that man unites with the Active Intellect in the process of his intellectual perception, which is the highest perceptive status of the soul. This union, in its intense form, dissolves the human soul in the Active Intellect. In this theory, Mull? ?adr? assimilates some specific principles which belong only to what Seyyed Hossein Nasr has defined as Transcendent Theosophy: the primacy of existence, graded unity of being, substantial motion, the evolutional motion of the soul in all perceptive steps, the unity of the intellect, the intelligent, and the intellegible and identity of knowledge and being. Since the Active Intellect is the archetype of humanity from Mull? ?adr?’s view, i.e. among the horizontal intellects or the same Platonic Ideas, and there is no plurality in the world of intellect, the main problem raised is how an Active Intellect is distinguished from other intellects, and the human soul is united with and eventually destroyed. Hence, Mull? ?adr?, in his theory of expanded emanation, envisages that the plurality of the universe is due to the quiddity, which is an ideational (?i?tib?ri) thing. Thus, according to him, we can say that the plurality of the world of the intellect is subjective and comes to the fore to justify the relation of God to the world of pluralities; so the theory of intellects is based on the substantive and natural view into the universe, which is the general view of the philosophers; however, the theory of expanded emanation is a particular view of Mull? ?adr?, which is in full harmony with important philosophical foundations of him. The present study tries to explain these issues through Mull? ?adr?’s texts.

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