THEMISTIUS AGAINST PORPHYRY (?) ON ‘WHY WE DO NOT REMEMBER’

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Robert Roreitner
Keyword(s):  
De Anima ◽  
Arabic Translation ◽  
Alexander Of Aphrodisias ◽  
Agent Intellect ◽  
The One

Abstract This article sheds new light on Themistius’ argument in what is philosophically the most original (and historically the most influential) section of his extant work, namely On Aristotle's On the Soul 100.16–109.3: here, Themistius offers a systematic interpretation of Aristotle's ‘agent’ intellect and its ‘potential’ and ‘passive’ counterparts. A solution to two textual difficulties at 101.36–102.2 is proposed, supported by the Arabic translation. This allows us to see that Themistius engages at length with a Platonizing reading of the enigmatic final lines of De anima III.5, where Aristotle explains ‘why we do not remember’ (without specifying when and what). This Platonizing reading (probably inspired by Aristotle's early dialogue Eudemus) can be safely identified with the one developed in a fragmentary text extant only in Arabic under the title Porphyry's treatise On the soul. While Themistius rejects this reading, he turns out to be heavily influenced by the author's interpretation of the ‘agent’, ‘potential’ and ‘passive’ intellect. These findings offer us a new glimpse into Themistius’ philosophical programme: he is searching for an alternative to both the austere (and, by Themistius’ lights, distorted) Aristotelianism of Alexander of Aphrodisias and the all too Platonizing reading of Aristotle adopted by thinkers such as Porphyry.

L’intellect agent, la lumière, l’hexis. Averroès lecteur d’Aristote et d’Alexandre d’Aphrodise

Chôra ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 18 ◽  
pp. 431-451
Author(s):  
Jean‑Baptiste Brenet ◽  
Keyword(s):  
De Anima ◽  
Alexander Of Aphrodisias ◽  
Agent Intellect ◽  
Positive State

This article examines Averroes’ interpretation, found in his Long Commentary on the De Anima, of a famous passage in Aristotle’s De An. III 5 (430a14‑15) which presents the intellect “producing all things, as a kind of positive state (hexis), like light”. Averroes, clearly heir to Alexander of Aphrodisias for whom hexis refers not to the intellect “agent” itself but to its product, defends nevertheless, via the comparison with light, the conception of the agent intellect (a substance purely in act by itself ) as an hexis, which leads us to the inevitable consequence that the agent intellect is the prime object of the material intellect, acting as a condition for all subsequent thoughts.

The Lever, or How to Act at a Distance: A Backdrop to Theophrastus’ De sensibus

Rhizomata ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 168-187
Author(s):  
André Laks
Keyword(s):  
Present Article ◽  
Sense Organ ◽  
Sense Perception ◽  
De Anima ◽  
Extreme Caution ◽  
Alexander Of Aphrodisias ◽  
Physiological Alteration ◽  
Material Process ◽  
Theoretical Frame

AbstractIt is well known that when it comes to perception in the De anima, Aristotle uses affection-related vocabulary with extreme caution. This has given rise to a debate between interpreters who hold that in Aristotle’s account, the act of sense-perception nevertheless involves the physiological alteration of the sense organ (Richard Sorabji), and those think, with Myles Burnyeat, that for Aristotle, perception does not involve any material process, so that an Aristotelian physics of sense-perception is a “physics of forms alone”. The present article suggests that the dematerialisation of Aristotle’s theory of perception, which has a long story from Alexander of Aphrodisias to Brentano, may be in fact traced back to Theophrastus’ exegesis of Aristotle’s relevant passages in the De anima in his Physics, as we can reconstruct it on the basis of Priscian’s Metaphrasis in Theophrastum and Simplicius’ commentary of Aristotle’s De Anima. The reconstruction also provides a scholastic-theoretical frame to Theophrastus’ critical exposition of ancient theories about sense perception in his De sensibus, whether or not the discussion originally belonged to Theophrastus’ Physics.

PLATO'S REPUBLIC IN ARABIC A NEWLY DISCOVERED PASSAGE

2004 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 263-300 ◽  
Author(s):  
DAVID C. REISMAN
Keyword(s):  
Arabic Translation ◽  
Literal Translation ◽  
New Information ◽  
The One ◽  
Editio Princeps ◽  
Proper Context

My aim here is to present an editio princeps of a newly discovered Arabic translation of a very important passage from Plato's Republic (Book VI, 506d3–509b10) found in the work entitled Kitāb fī Masā'il al-umūr al-ilāhiyya (hereafter Masā'il), penned by the somewhat obscure Neoplatonist Abū Hāmid al-Isfizārī (fl. mid-fourth / tenth c.). While an edition of al-Isfizārī's work has been published by Daniel Gimaret, the manuscript he used (Ragıp Paşa 1463) lacked the literal translation of the Republic passage. The one other known exemplar of the work, MS Zāhiriyya 4871, dated slightly later than the first, appears to be closer to the author's original unedited version; it contains the Republic passage. I am currently preparing a new edition of the work on the basis of the Zāhiriyya manuscript, but it seemed worthwhile to bring the Republic passage to immediate attention. I do not attempt here a thorough evaluation of al-Isfizārī's philosophy as presented in the Masā'il; this can be done successfully only upon completion of the edition. However, to place the work in its proper context, I do provide a brief overview of the transmission of Plato's Republic in Arabic; a discussion of new information on al-Isfizārī's Nachlass, and a description of the two exemplars of his Masā'il. The edited text of the passage from the Republic is accompanied by a provisional translation.

Reading Books in Natural Philosophy: How Conrad Gessner‘s Commentary on De Anima (1563) was Annotated and Interpreted

2017 ◽  
Vol 93 (2) ◽  
pp. 69-89
Author(s):  
Anja-Silvia Goeing
Keyword(s):  
Early Modern ◽  
Natural Philosophy ◽  
Human Soul ◽  
De Anima ◽  
Preventive Healthcare ◽  
Modern Natural ◽  
The World ◽  
The One ◽  
Object Of Study

Conrad Gessner (1516–65) was town physician and lecturer at the Zwinglian reformed lectorium in Zurich. His approach towards the world and mankind was centred on his preoccupation with the human soul, an object of study that had challenged classical writers such as Aristotle and Galen, and which remained as important in post-Reformation debate. Writing commentaries on Aristotles De Anima (On the Soul) was part of early-modern natural philosophy education at university and formed the preparatory step for studying medicine. This article uses the case study of Gessners commentary on De Anima (1563) to explore how Gessners readers prioritised De Animas information. Gessners intention was to provide the students of philosophy and medicine with the most current and comprehensive thinking. His readers responses raise questions about evolving discussions in natural philosophy and medicine that concerned the foundations of preventive healthcare on the one hand, and of anatomically specified pathological medicine on the other, and Gessners part in helping these develop.

scholarly journals Alexander of Aphrodisias, De Intellectu 110.4: ‘I Heard this from Aristotle’. A modest proposal

2000 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 252-256 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Opsomer ◽  
Bob Sharples
Keyword(s):  
Human Being ◽  
De Anima ◽  
The Third ◽  
Modest Proposal ◽  
Alexander Of Aphrodisias ◽  
Active Intellect

The treatise De intellectu attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias can be divided into four sections. The first (A, 106.19–110.3) is an interpretation of the Aristotelian theory of intellect, and especially of the active intellect referred to in Aristotle, De anima 3.5, which differs from the interpretation in Alexander's own De anima, and whose relation to Alexander's De anima, attribution to Alexander, and date are all disputed. The second (B, 110.4–112.5) is an account of the intellect which is broadly similar to A though differing on certain points. The third (Cl, 112.5–113.12) is an account of someone's response to the problem of how intellect can enter the human being ‘from outside’ if it is incorporeal and hence cannot move at all; in the fourth (C2, 113.12–24) the writer who reported Cl criticizes that solution and gives his own alternative one.

scholarly journals Rivalutare l’Etica Eudemia. A proposito di A. Kenny, The Aristotelian Ethics, II edizione

Elenchos ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-164
Author(s):  
Carlo Natali
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Ethical Discourse ◽  
Alexander Of Aphrodisias ◽  
Aristotelian Ethics ◽  
The Common ◽  
The One

AbstractIn the paper I discuss three theses defended by A. Kenny: (1) in antiquity up to Aspasius or to Alexander of Aphrodisias the EE was considered the most important version of Aristotle’s ethical discourse; (2) the idea that the common books belonged to the one or to the other treatise; (3) the opposition between the theory of happiness of EN I and X and that of EE II and VIII.

The De Anima of Alexander of Aphrodisias

1989 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 354-357
Author(s):  
Allan Silverman ◽  
Keyword(s):  
De Anima ◽  
Alexander Of Aphrodisias

scholarly journals Psyche as the Principle and Cause of Life in Aristotle

2013 ◽  
pp. 115-142
Author(s):  
Martin F. Meyer
Keyword(s):  
Life Science ◽  
De Anima ◽  
Biological Investigation ◽  
Natural Function ◽  
Living Things ◽  
Extensive Field ◽  
Important Field ◽  
The One ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Explanatory Status

Biology is the most extensive field in the Corpus Aristotelicum. In his fundamental work De anima, Aristotle tries to fix the borders of this life science. The term ψυχή has a twofold explanatory status. On the one hand, ψυχή is understood as a principle of all living beings. On the other hand, it is understood as a cause of the fact that all living beings are alive. The paper is divided into three sections. (1) The first part shows why Aristotle discusses these issues in a work entitled Περὶ ψυχῆς. Since Pythagoras and Heraclitus, ψυχή was understood as a life principle: Pythagoras believed that men, animals and plants share the same nature: they are all ἔμψυχα and they are homogenous qua ψυχή. (2) The second part of this article deals with Aristotle’s definition of the soul in DA II: ψυχή is the principle of all living things. This establishes (i) the external criteria to divide living and non-living beings and (ii) the internal criteria to divide living beings. (3) The third part of this paper is concerned with the methodological consequences of this definition: the life functions (δυνάμεις τῆς ψυχῆς) are the central explanandum in Aristotle’s biology. De anima II defines such various life-functions as nourishment, sense-perception and locomotion. These capacities contour the main fields of the philosopher’s biological investigation. For Aristotle, the faculty of reproduction is a subtype of nourishment. Reproduction is the most important and most natural function of all living beings. Genetics is, therefore, the most important field in Aristotle’s biology.

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