scholarly journals Alexander of Aphrodisias on the soul as a cause of generation

Author(s):  
Maria Varlamova

The discussion about the soul in ancient philosophy is connected not only with consideration of the soul’s relation to the body, its capacities and functions of the living organism, but also with the question of generation, formation and animation of organic body, that has life potentially, in the womb. Considering the generation among the capacities of the nourishing soul, Alexander in De Anima Liber discusses the causes of embryogenesis. Among the causes of embryo’s development, he indicates the nourishing capacity, which is transmitted from the parent through the seed, and the soul as a form of the parent, which acts in the embryo, since it is part of the mother, that is, before birth. The paper explicates Alexander's notion of ​​the causes of animal’s generation in the context of his idea of ​​the soul as capacity (δύναμις) and disposition (ἕξις) from the perspective of the Alexander's treatise "On the Soul" and Simplicius's commentary on the Aristotle's "Physics".

2021 ◽  
pp. 151-172
Author(s):  
Sonia Kamińska

This paper is devoted to Alexander of Aphrodisias, the Exegete, whose theory is gaining popularity among Aristotelian scholars as a possible solution to manifold interpretation problems created by Aristotle’s De Anima 3.5 due to its brevity and obscurity. I recommend Alexander’s solution as a remedy for two main predicaments concerning the notorious second intellect called enigmatically nous poietikos: the mysterious (if any) function of active intellect, and Thomistic monopoly in the field of Aristotle’s psychology (and theology). In other words, I believe that the externalist interpretations which identify nous poietikos with the Deity or a noetic sphere are more appropriate than the internalist ones that include the productive mind in our mental apparatus (Aquinas being the most famous partisan of this view). This is why I believe Alexander (an externalist), who remains rather unknown to scholars focused outside ancient philosophy, should be introduced to the broader public, especially because he inspired the Arabic philosophy, which is also an alternative to internalism (often overlapping with theistic readings). This introduction, alongside shedding light on some psychological issues, is the main aim of my paper.


2021 ◽  
Vol 34 (72) ◽  
pp. 1445-1522
Author(s):  
Jakob Hans Josef Schneider

Resumo: No capítulo 5 do Livro III De anima (430a10-19) Aristóteles distingue entre o νοῦς ποιητικός (nous poietikós), chamado pelos Latinos intellectus agens (intelecto agente), e νοῦς παθητικός (nous pathetikós), chamado pelos Latinos intellectus passivus, ou seja, intellectus possibilis (intelecto possível), termos técnicos e filosóficos mais comuns. O capítulo 5 é de grande importância não só para a filosofia antiga e para os comentadores das obras de Aristóteles, como os comentários de Teofrasto, de Alexander de Afrodisias, de Simplício e Themístius entre outros, mas também para a filosofia do mundo árabe e da Europa latina. Sabe-se que Aristóteles não escreveu um tratado próprio sobre o intelecto, embora possam ser encontradas várias observações acerca do intelecto em suas obras. Os tratados do Intelecto começam com Al-Kindi, Al-Farabi, Avicena e sobretudo Averróis, e se refletem, num sentido crítico e afirmativo, (nos debates) dos tratados latinos, por exemplo, nos tratados de Alberto Magno, de Tomás de Aquino, de Sigério de Brabant entre outros. Este artigo apresenta observações preliminares e preparatórias ao projeto de traduções bilíngue (Latim-Português) dos tratados medievais sobre o intelecto ‘Teorias do Intelecto na Idade Média’ que está em desenvovlimento no Centro Internacional de Estudos Medievais da UFU. Palavras-chaves: unidade do intelecto, imaginação, intencionalidade, luz intelectual e cognição Theories of the Intellect in the Latin Middle Ages. De anima III, cap. 5 of Aristotle and his Medieval Tradition  Abstract: In the chapter 5 of the III. Book of De anima (430a10-19) Aristotle distinguishes between the νοῦς ποιητικός (nous poietikós) called by the Latins intellectus agens (agent intellect) and the νοῦς παθητικός (nous pathetikós) called by the Latins intellectus passivus, or intellectus possibilis (possible intellect), most common technical and philosophical terms. The chapter 5 is of great importance not only to ancient philosophy and to the commentators of Aristotle’s works such as the commentaries of Theophrastus, Alexander of Aphrodisias, of Simplicius, and Themistius among others, but also to the philosophy of the Arabic World and the Latin Europe. One knows well that Aristotle does not have written a proper treatise on intellect; although there are several observations about the intellect in his works. Separate treatises begin with Al-Kindi, Al-Farabi, Avicenna, and especially Averroes, which Latin treatises as of Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Siger of Brabant among others reflect in a critical as well as an affirmative sense. This article can be read as preliminary and preparatory observations to a bilingual (Latin-Portuguese) translation project of treatises corresponding to ‘Theories of Intellect in the Middle Ages’ which is ongoing at the International Center for Medieval Studies at UFU. Key-words: Unity of the Intellect, Imagination, Intentionality, Intellectual Light, and Cognition Theorien des Intellekts im Lateinischen Mittelalter. De anima III, 5 des Aristoteles und seine mittelalterliche Tradition Zusammenfassung: Im 5. Kapitel des III. Buchs von De anima (430a10-19) unterscheidet Aristoteles zwischen dem νοῦς ποιητικός (nous poietikós), von den Lateinern intellectus agens (tätiger Intellekt) genannt und dem νοῦς παθητικός (nous pathetikós), von den Lateinern intellectus passivus oder auch intellectus possibilis (möglicher Intellekt) genannt, gemeinhin bekannte technische und philosophische Begriffe. Dieses 5. Kapitel ist von grösster Bedeutung nicht nur für die antike Philosophie und die Kommentatoren der Werke des Aristoteles wie die Kommentare des Theophrastus, des Alexander von Aphrodisias, Simplicius und Themistius unter anderen, sondern auch für die Philosophie der arabischen Welt und des lateinischen Europas. Bekanntlich hat Aristoteles keinen eigenen Traktat über den Intellekt geschrieben, obgleich sich viele Beobachtungen zum Intellekt in seinem Werk antreffen. Selbständige Traktate über den Intellekt beginnen mit Al-Kindi, Al-Farabi, Avicenna und besonders Averroes, die sich in den lateinischen Traktaten, z.B. des Albertus Magnus, Thomas von Aquin, Siger von Brabant und anderen zustimmend wie kritisch widerspiegeln. Dieser Artikel kann als vorläufige und vorbereitende Bemerkungen zu einem zweisprachigen (lateinisch-portugiesischen) Übersetzungsprojekt von Texten gelesen werden, welche „Theorien des Intellekts im Lateinischen Mittelalter“ betreffen. Dieses Projekt ist am Internationalen Zentrum für Mittelalterstudien der UFU in Arbeit genommen worden. Schlüsselwörter: Verstand, Vernunft, Intentionalität, Anschauung und Erkenntnis


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-7
Author(s):  
Robert Roreitner

Abstract This article sheds new light on Themistius’ argument in what is philosophically the most original (and historically the most influential) section of his extant work, namely On Aristotle's On the Soul 100.16–109.3: here, Themistius offers a systematic interpretation of Aristotle's ‘agent’ intellect and its ‘potential’ and ‘passive’ counterparts. A solution to two textual difficulties at 101.36–102.2 is proposed, supported by the Arabic translation. This allows us to see that Themistius engages at length with a Platonizing reading of the enigmatic final lines of De anima III.5, where Aristotle explains ‘why we do not remember’ (without specifying when and what). This Platonizing reading (probably inspired by Aristotle's early dialogue Eudemus) can be safely identified with the one developed in a fragmentary text extant only in Arabic under the title Porphyry's treatise On the soul. While Themistius rejects this reading, he turns out to be heavily influenced by the author's interpretation of the ‘agent’, ‘potential’ and ‘passive’ intellect. These findings offer us a new glimpse into Themistius’ philosophical programme: he is searching for an alternative to both the austere (and, by Themistius’ lights, distorted) Aristotelianism of Alexander of Aphrodisias and the all too Platonizing reading of Aristotle adopted by thinkers such as Porphyry.


Antioxidants ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 229
Author(s):  
JunHyuk Woo ◽  
Hyesun Cho ◽  
YunHee Seol ◽  
Soon Ho Kim ◽  
Chanhyeok Park ◽  
...  

The brain needs more energy than other organs in the body. Mitochondria are the generator of vital power in the living organism. Not only do mitochondria sense signals from the outside of a cell, but they also orchestrate the cascade of subcellular events by supplying adenosine-5′-triphosphate (ATP), the biochemical energy. It is known that impaired mitochondrial function and oxidative stress contribute or lead to neuronal damage and degeneration of the brain. This mini-review focuses on addressing how mitochondrial dysfunction and oxidative stress are associated with the pathogenesis of neurodegenerative disorders including Alzheimer’s disease, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, Huntington’s disease, and Parkinson’s disease. In addition, we discuss state-of-the-art computational models of mitochondrial functions in relation to oxidative stress and neurodegeneration. Together, a better understanding of brain disease-specific mitochondrial dysfunction and oxidative stress can pave the way to developing antioxidant therapeutic strategies to ameliorate neuronal activity and prevent neurodegeneration.


Rhizomata ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 168-187
Author(s):  
André Laks

AbstractIt is well known that when it comes to perception in the De anima, Aristotle uses affection-related vocabulary with extreme caution. This has given rise to a debate between interpreters who hold that in Aristotle’s account, the act of sense-perception nevertheless involves the physiological alteration of the sense organ (Richard Sorabji), and those think, with Myles Burnyeat, that for Aristotle, perception does not involve any material process, so that an Aristotelian physics of sense-perception is a “physics of forms alone”. The present article suggests that the dematerialisation of Aristotle’s theory of perception, which has a long story from Alexander of Aphrodisias to Brentano, may be in fact traced back to Theophrastus’ exegesis of Aristotle’s relevant passages in the De anima in his Physics, as we can reconstruct it on the basis of Priscian’s Metaphrasis in Theophrastum and Simplicius’ commentary of Aristotle’s De Anima. The reconstruction also provides a scholastic-theoretical frame to Theophrastus’ critical exposition of ancient theories about sense perception in his De sensibus, whether or not the discussion originally belonged to Theophrastus’ Physics.


Author(s):  
Stephen Menn ◽  
Justin E. H. Smith
Keyword(s):  
The Body ◽  
The Mind ◽  

This section presents, in Latin and English, the entirety of Anton Wilhelm Amo’s 1734 Philosophical Disputation Containing a Distinct Idea of those Things that Pertain either to the Mind or to Our Living and Organic Body. In this work Amo attempts to work out the implications of the impossibility of being-acted-upon for the mind’s actions, and tries to show how the mind understands, wills, and effects things through the body by ‘intentions’ which direct motions in our body intentionally toward external things. Amo tries to show how far each type of human act belongs to the mind, how far to the body; he argues especially against Jean Le Clerc, who had attributed a broad range of acts to the mind.


Health ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 75-94
Author(s):  
James Allen

This chapter undertakes a comparison between ancient philosophy and ancient medicine, showing that in Greek works and texts of the Roman period a parallel was drawn between the therapeutic art of medicine for the body and philosophy as a form of therapy in its own right. Attention is also paid to the epistemological dimension of medicine, with a variety of thinkers taking different stances on the kind of knowledge available to medicine and its sources. Do doctors have a mere “knack” for curing like rhetoricians with their art of persuasion, or is medicine a science in the full and proper sense? Authors and traditions covered include Plato, the Stoics, the Epicureans, and the Pyrrhonist Skeptics, as well as medical thinkers like Diocles and Herophilus.


Author(s):  
Alan Kelly

Proteins are, in my view, the most impressive molecules in food. They influence the texture, crunch, chew, flow, color, flavor, and nutritional quality of food. Not only that, but they can radically change their properties and how they behave depending on the environment and, critically for food, in response to processes like heating. Even when broken down into smaller components they are important, for example giving cheese many of its critical flavor notes. Indeed, I would argue that perhaps the most fundamental phenomenon we encounter in cooking or processing food is the denaturation of proteins, as will be explained shortly. Beyond food, the value of proteins and their properties is widespread across biology. Many of the most significant molecules in our body and that of any living organism (including plants and animals) are proteins. These include those that make hair and skin what they are, as well as the hemoglobin that transports oxygen around the body in our blood. Proteins are built from amino acids, a family of 20 closely related small molecules, which all have in chemical terms the same two ends (chemically speaking, an amino end and an acidic end, hence the name) but differ in the middle. This bit in the middle varies from amino acid to amino acid, from simple (a hydrogen atom in the case of glycine, the simplest amino acid) to much more complex structures. Amino acids can link up very neatly, as the amino end of one can form a bond (called a peptide bond) with the acid end of another, and so forth, so that chains of amino acids are formed that, when big enough (more than a few dozen amino acids), we call proteins. Our bodies produce thousands of proteins for different functions, and the instructions for which amino acids combine to make which proteins are essentially what the genetic code encrypted in our DNA specifies. We hear a lot about our genes encoding the secrets of life, but what that code spells is basically P-R-O-T-E-I-N. Yes, these are very important molecules!


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