دوافع التعديلات الدستورية الجزائرية والتركية وإجراءاتها للتوجه نحو النظام الرئاسي = The Motives of the Algerian and Turkish Constitutional Amendments and Their Procedures to Move towards the Presidential System

2018 ◽  
pp. 1-31
Author(s):  
محمد بو مدين
2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-35
Author(s):  
Laode Harjudin

Abstract. This study discusses the political process relating to the issue of presidential prerogative control with an emphasis on the views and interests of the actors involved in discussing the issue. This study explains two main questions, namely how the actualization of presidential prerogative powers in Indonesia's presidential system after the constitutional amendment and what is behind the ambivalence of the president's prerogative power formulation in Indonesia's presidential system after the constitutional amendment. This study finds that constitutional amendments related to the president's prerogatives show ambivalence that distorts the prerogative meaning itself and is not strict between limiting or actually expanding the president's power. This happens because of the tug-of-war between legislative and executive interests. Behind the issue of controlling the president's prerogative powers, there is the interest of legislative institutions to equalize power with the president. Instead, the executive seeks to maintain or extend the president’s prerogative power.Keywords: Prerogative Power; Presidential; Amendment of Constitutions.Abstrak. Studi ini membahas proses politik berkaitan dengan isu pengendalian prerogatif presiden dengan penekanan pada pandangan dan kepentingan para aktor yang terlibat dalam pembahasan isu tersebut. Studi in menjelaskan dua pertanyaan pokok: (1) Bagaimana aktualisasi kekuasaan prerogatif presiden dalam sistem presidensial Indonesia pasca amandemen konstitusi? (2) Apa yang melatarbelakangi ambivalensi rumusan kekuasaan prerogatif presiden dalam sistem presidensial Indonesia pasca amandemen konstitusi? Hasil studi inii menemukan bahwa amandemen konstitusi terkait dengan prerogatif presiden menampakkan ambivalensi yang mendistorsi makna prerogatif itu sendiri dan tidak tegas antara membatasi atau justru memperluas kekuasaan presiden. Hal ini terjadi karena adanya tarik menarik antara kepentingan legislatif dan eksekutif. Di balik isu pengendalian kekuasaan prerogatif presiden, ada kepentingan institusi legislatif untuk menyetarakan kekuasaan dengan presiden. Sebaliknya, pihak eksekutif berupaya untuk mempertahankan atau mempeluas kekuasaan prerogatif presiden.Kata Kunci: Kekuasaan Prerogatif; Presidensial; Amandemen Konstitusi.


2018 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hasret Dikici Bilgin ◽  
Emre Erdoğan

AbstractThe 2017 referendum marked a transition from an already incongruous parliamentary system to rampant presidentialism and created more conflicts rather than defusing them. Given the extraordinary conditions under which the referendum was held, and the limited time allowed for discussion of its possible ramifications, any effort to analyze the eve and aftermath of the referendum provoked more questions than answers. Why was the referendum held in 2017, although the governing party had advocated for a new constitution and transition to a presidential system since it came to power in 2002? What was the attitude of the voters towards the presidential system? How did popular support change or did it in fact change during the referendum campaign? The analysis of these questions presented here relies on extant research to inventory what we really know and do not know about the most recent Turkish referendum and why these unanswered questions might have critical consequences.


2019 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 791-809
Author(s):  
Mahir Tokatlı

On the 24th of June 2018, for the first time Turkish citizens voted in separate elections for both parliament and the head of government . The constitutional amendments passed a year earlier in a controversial referendum became effective at the same time and transformed the parliamentary system of government into a so-called presidential system . However, regarding the relationship between the executive and legislative branches, the constitution reveals strong similarities to an Israeli experiment (1996 to 2002), which conversely was described as a mixed type or quasi-parliamentary system . The “alla Turca” variant presents a clear asymmetry concerning the horizontal separation of powers in favor of the president and creates a concentration of powers . Parliament is rigorously constrained in its powers, while the president permanently remains capable of acting unless an arithmetic three-fifths majority is formed that could recall him prematurely for political reasons . Under the undemocratic conditions of a semi-competitive electoral system and in a state of emergency that applied at the time, the AKP won both elections . [ZParl, vol . 50 (2019), no . 4, pp . 791 - 809]


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