The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Time-Dependent Discounting

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daehyun Kim ◽  
Xiaoxi Li
Keyword(s):  
Repeated Games ◽  
Folk Theorem ◽  
The Self ◽  
Time Dependent ◽  
Constructive Proof ◽  
The Public ◽  
Discount Factors ◽  
Time Inconsistent ◽  
Public Monitoring ◽  
Perfect Monitoring

This paper defines a general framework to study infinitely repeated games with time-dependent discounting in which we distinguish and discuss both time-consistent and -inconsistent preferences. To study the long-term properties of repeated games, we introduce an asymptotic condition to characterize the fact that players become more and more patient; that is, the discount factors at all stages uniformly converge to one. Two types of folk theorems are proven without the public randomization assumption: the asymptotic one, that is, the equilibrium payoff set converges to the feasible and individual rational set as players become patient, and the uniform one, that is, any payoff in the feasible and individual rational set is sustained by a single strategy profile that is an approximate subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in all games with sufficiently patient discount factors. We use two methods for the study of asymptotic folk theorem: the self-generating approach and the constructive proof. We present the constructive proof in the perfect-monitoring case and show that it can be extended to time-inconsistent preferences. The self-generating approach applies to the public-monitoring case but may not extend to time-inconsistent preferences because of a nonmonotonicity result.

Cooperative Homo economicus

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Bowles ◽  
Herbert Gintis
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Repeated Games ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Public Information ◽  
Folk Theorem ◽  
The Self ◽  
Correlated Equilibrium ◽  
Homo Economicus ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Game Theoretic

This chapter examines whether recent advances in the theory of repeated games, as exemplified by the so-called folk theorem and related models, address the shortcomings of the self-interest based models in explaining human cooperation. It first provides an overview of folk theorems and their account of evolutionary dynamics before discussing the folk theorem with either imperfect public information or private information. It then considers evolutionarily irrelevant equilibrium as well as the link between social norms and the notion of correlated equilibrium. While the insight that repeated interactions provide opportunities for cooperative individuals to discipline defectors is correct, the chapter argues that none of the game-theoretic models mentioned above is successful. Except under implausible conditions, the cooperative outcomes identified by these models are neither accessible nor persistent, and are thus labeled evolutionarily irrelevant Nash equilibria.

scholarly journals The Impact of Monitoring in Infinitely Repeated Games: Perfect, Public, and Private

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Masaki Aoyagi ◽  
V. Bhaskar ◽  
Guillaume R. Fréchette
Keyword(s):  
Laboratory Experiment ◽  
Repeated Games ◽  
Imperfect Monitoring ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Private Monitoring ◽  
Stage Game ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Public Monitoring ◽  
Perfect Monitoring ◽  
Infinitely Repeated Games

This paper uses a laboratory experiment to study the effect of the monitoring structure on the play of the infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma. Keeping the strategic form of the stage game fixed, we examine the behavior of subjects when information about past actions is perfect (perfect monitoring), noisy but public (public monitoring), and noisy and private (private monitoring). We find that the subjects sustain cooperation in every treatment, but that their strategies differ across the three treatments. Specifically, the strategies under imperfect monitoring are both more complex and more lenient than those under perfect monitoring. The results show how the changes in strategies across monitoring structures mitigate the effect of noise in monitoring on efficiency. (JEL C72, C73, C92, D82, D83)

scholarly journals A complete folk theorem for finitely repeated games

2020 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 1129-1142
Author(s):  
Ghislain-Herman Demeze-Jouatsa
Keyword(s):  
Repeated Games ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Repeated Game ◽  
Complete Characterization ◽  
Folk Theorem ◽  
Equilibrium Payoff ◽  
Perfect Monitoring ◽  
Special Case

AbstractThis paper analyzes the set of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria of any finitely repeated game with complete information and perfect monitoring. The main result is a complete characterization of the limit set, as the time horizon increases, of the set of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of the finitely repeated game. This model includes the special case of observable mixed strategies.

Compressed Identity

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 13-35
Author(s):  
H. Şule Albayrak
Keyword(s):  
Public Sphere ◽  
Civil Service ◽  
Muslim Women ◽  
The Self ◽  
Political Rights ◽  
The Public ◽  
Economic Issues ◽  
Turkish State ◽  
The Public Sphere ◽  
Depth Interviews

For decades the authoritarian secularist policies of the Turkish state, by imposing a headscarf ban at universities and in the civil service, excluded practising Muslim women from the public sphere until the reforms following 2010. However, Muslim women had continued to seek ways to increase their knowledge and improve their intellectual levels, not only as individuals, but also by establishing civil associations. As a result, a group of intellectual women has emerged who are not only educated in political, social, and economic issues, but who are also determined to attain their socio-economic and political rights. Those new actors in the Turkish public sphere are, however, concerned with being labeled as either “feminist,” “fundamentalist” or “Islamist.” This article therefore analyzes the distance between the self-identifications of intellectual Muslim women and certain classifications imposed on them. Semi-structured in-depth interviews with thirteen Turkish intellectual Muslim women were carried out which reveal that they reject and critique overly facile labels due to their negative connotations while offering more complex insights into their perspectives on Muslim women, authority, and identity.

Makna Alif dalam Puisi Zikir D. Zawawi Imron dan Sajak Alif Ahmadun Yosi Herfanda

2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 52
Author(s):  
Sholeha Rosalia ◽  
Yosi Wulandari
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Study ◽  
Comparative Method ◽  
The Self ◽  
Sociology Of Literature ◽  
Self Reflection ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Creation

Alif means the first, saying the Supreme Life and is Sturdy and has the element of fire and Alif is formed from Ulfah (closeness) ta'lif (formation). With this letter Allah mementa'lif (unite) His creation with the foundation of monotheism and ma'rifah belief in appreciation of faith and monotheism. Therefore, Alif opens certain meanings and definitions of shapes and colors that are in other letters. Then be Alif as "Kiswah" (clothes) for different messages. That is a will. "IQRO" is a revelation that was first passed down to the Prophet Muhammad. Saw. Read it, which starts with the letter Alif and ends with the letter Alif. The creation of a poem is influenced by the environment and the self-reflection of a poet where according to the poet's origin, in comparing in particular Alif's poetry from the two poets. The object of this research is the poetry of Zikir by D. Zawawi Imron and Sajak Alif by Ahmadun Yosi Herfanda. This study uses a comparative method and sociology of literature. Through a comparative study of literature between the poetry of Zikir D. Zawawi Imron and Sajak Alif Ahmadun Yosi Herfanda, it is hoped that the public can know the meaning of Alif according to the poet's view. With this research, the Indonesian people can accept different views on the meaning of Alif in accordance with their respective understanding without having to look for what is right and wrong. The purpose in Alif is like a life, in the form of letters like a body, a tree that is cut to the root, from the heart is split to the seeds, then from the seeds are split so that nothing is the essence of life. So, it is clear that Alif is the most important and Supreme letter. Talking about the meaning of Alif as the first letter revealed on earth. After the letter Alif was revealed, 28 other Hijaiyah letters were born. The letter Alif is made the beginning of His book and the opening letter. Other letters are from Alif and appear on him.

scholarly journals Numerical Boundary Conditions for Solar Magnetic Hydrodynamic Flows Using the Method of Characteristics

1996 ◽  
Vol 154 ◽  
pp. 149-153
Author(s):  
S. T. Wu ◽  
A. H. Wang ◽  
W. P. Guo
Keyword(s):  
Boundary Conditions ◽  
Method Of Characteristics ◽  
Numerical Solutions ◽  
The Self ◽  
Time Dependent ◽  
Solar Plasma ◽  
The Method Of Characteristics ◽  
Mhd Simulations ◽  
Self Consistent ◽  
Dynamic Structures

AbstractWe discuss the self-consistent time-dependent numerical boundary conditions on the basis of theory of characteristics for magnetohydrodynamics (MHD) simulations of solar plasma flows. The importance of using self-consistent boundary conditions is demonstrated by using an example of modeling coronal dynamic structures. This example demonstrates that the self-consistent boundary conditions assure the correctness of the numerical solutions. Otherwise, erroneous numerical solutions will appear.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document